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Abstract
With the ongoing trend towards a competitive and service oriented economy, the need
for innovative pricing schemes becomes increasingly important as pricing remains the
only differentiation possibility for almost homogeneous services. This thesis studies
the impact of innovative nonlinear tariffs that are formed by a cost cap component over
and beyond the traditional tariff components of fixed fee, usage price, and allowance.
Thereby, cost cap components fix an upper cost ceiling, after which consumption is
exempt from further costs. Cost caps have recently been introduced for telecommuni-
cation services, but were also used earlier as deductibles in insurance contracts or as
maximum day rates for rental services.
The thesis at hand demonstrates the use of different methodologies in order to study the
effects of these innovative pricing schemes. Implications for consumers and providers
caused by the extension of tariffs by a cost cap component are discussed in detail. Based
on a theoretical model, the influence of cost cap components on consumers’ consump-
tion and tariff decision behavior under uncertainty is analyzed. The results show that
cost cap tariffs are only an optimal tariff choice for those consumers that face consid-
erable uncertainty about their future demand, such that both relatively low and rela-
tively high consumption levels are considered feasible. The application of the devel-
oped model in a stated preference experiment confirms the model’s external validity,
and shows the importance of the two-way dependency of consumption and choice.
Further analyses provide evidence for the influence of psychological effects on cost
cap tariff choice. Interestingly, framing of the cost cap tariff influences its perception
and increases its attractiveness. However, the subsequent studies on further effects
do not compose to a distinct finding. While the results of an empirical study show that
i
respondents do not prefer a flat rate to a cost cap tariff due to the taximeter effect, a new
psychophysiological measurement approach reveals that respondents still experience
the pain of paying under a cost cap tariff. Furthermore, the conducted studies differ in
explaining the importance of a tariff’s insurance property on tariff choice.
Finally, circumstances under which the implementation of a cost cap component in-
creases the providers’ profits are analyzed on the basis of simulated annealing using
estimated consumers’ preferences. Thus, simulation results provide a profit forecast
even in cases where novel tariff schemes cannot be implemented in real markets with-
out barriers. The results show that the implementation of a cost cap component into tar-
iffs with usage prices always increases the providers’ profits. However, the superiority
of the cost cap component suffers from increasing marginal costs and fierce competitive
pressure.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Price is what matters in the marketplace.”
Financial Times
THE centrality of services to developed economies is ever increasing. Today, theservice sector comprises a majority of the Gross Domestic Product in many coun-
tries, such as the United States (64%) and Germany (68%). Services cover a variety of
different industries such as health care, transportation, media, information, entertain-
ment or telecommunications. However, all services feature two common characteristics
(Shoemaker and Mattila, 2009). Services are the intangible equivalent of goods, which
induces consumer uncertainty in service preference. Furthermore, production and con-
sumption of services are taking place at the same time. The perishability of services
challenges service providers to correctly anticipate consumer demand. In this context,
pricing of services is crucial for both consumer differentiation and shifting demand. In
fact, for many homogeneous services such as telecommunications, pricing is the major
service feature (Lambrecht et al., 2012).
1
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1.1 Motivation
Especially the telecommunications industry has been a major driver of economic
growth, with an impact on both companies and consumers (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2013a). Telecommunication services are omnipresent and the availability of data and
voice has changed our way of living. Thereby, telecommunications is a typical access
industry, where consumers gain the right to use the service but do not acquire any right
to the service itself (Essegaier et al., 2002). In most cases, access industries offer virtu-
ally identical services, which are often only differentiated by their pricing. Therefore,
price discrimination is common (Lambrecht et al., 2012) and consumer heterogeneity is
countered by complex nonlinear pricing schedules which are modeled by tariffs (Wil-
son, 1993). At the time when telecommunications companies were state owned, pric-
ing was realized in simple nonlinear tariffs. Since the deregulation of former national
monopolies, competition has become fierce and resulted in an increased price compe-
tition that lasts until now. Figure 1.1 exemplifies the decrease of producer prices in the
German telecommunications market, dropping to almost 30% of its former price levels
since 2006.
Service providers combat this price decline with innovative pricing practices to ease
competitive pressure and differentiate consumers. A lot of research has attended to
these new pricing approaches in various disciplines by studying the consumers’ choice
behavior and companies’ price strategies (Lambrecht et al., 2012). This includes offer-
ing an allowance, which guarantees consumers a quantity of usage free of charge (Lam-
brecht et al., 2007; Ascarza et al., 2012), or offering services in predefined consumption
buckets (Schlereth and Skiera, 2012). However, earlier results cannot be generalized to
more complex tariffs and, thus, there remains a need for further tariff research as stated
by Iyengar and Gupta (2009).
More recently, O2 Telefonica introduced such a complex pricing schedule by offering
a new variant of the pay-per-use tariff into the German telecommunications market.
This new tariff was advertised as the first tariff including a cost airbag. In addition to
2
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FIGURE 1.1: Trend of producer prices in the German telecommunications sector (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2013b)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
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Note: Producer prices are based on a basket of 2,000 telecommunication services offered by major Ger-
man providers and edited by the German Federal Statistical Office. The trend is shown as the percental
deviation of producer’s prices of 2006.
the marginal price for every minute on the phone, the tariff also included a cost ceil-
ing. Consequently, the total bill at the end of the billing period could not exceed this
predefined cost ceiling. With this pricing schedule O2 quickly attracted numerous com-
petitors’ customers (Briegleb, 2009). In the meantime other mobile operators have also
adopted the same tariff scheme in pricing their mobile services (Petzke, 2010). While
this type of tariff had not been implemented into telecommunications markets before,
equivalent variants have been used in related industries. Many insurance plans such as
car, household, or health insurances, include a deterrent fee, which acts as a cost ceiling
a consumer has to pay for himself before reaching it. Cost ceilings have also been used
in the rental industry, where day rates limit consumption-dependent costs by a prede-
fined maximum. Such a nonlinear tariff has been implemented by Deutsche Bahn AG,
which offers a bicycle sharing service. The basic tariff includes renting a bike for 8¢ per
minute although costs can never exceed a day rate of 15e per day.
3
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Considering its use in different pricing contexts, cost caps should rather be seen as
tariff components than as a tariff itself. In fact, combining the cost cap component
with known tariff components enables service providers to offer several new tariff
schemes. This might even climax in the combination of four tariff components. Ac-
tually, Deutsche Bahn was the first provider to offer such a four-part tariff.
Although cost caps are used in different industries, research on cost caps and in partic-
ular on four-part tariffs is limited. However, the possibility to extend tariffs with a cost
cap component opens up several promising research questions, which will be discussed
in the next section.
1.2 Research Questions
The implementation of a cost cap component into a tariff poses several research ques-
tions on both the consumers’ as well as the providers’ side. Earlier research on nonlin-
ear tariffs has accounted for the interplay of tariff choice and consumption (Dubin and
McFadden, 1984; Hanemann, 1984) by the use of discrete/continuous models. These
models take into account that the discrete choice depends partly on the outcome of con-
tinuous consumption decision and vice versa. However, previous literature considered
only tariffs of up to three components: fixed fees, usage prices and allowances. To this
point it is not clear how the cost cap component influences the consumers’ consump-
tion and decision behavior. Particularly due to the fact that cost caps further increase
the extent of nonlinearity in tariffs, the role of consumers’ uncertainty in consumption
(Lambrecht et al., 2007) is crucial. Thus, the first research question is as follows:
RESEARCH QUESTION 1. How does uncertainty about future consumption influence the
choice of tariffs with a cost cap component in comparison to pay-per-use and flat rate tariffs?
Furthermore, earlier research found tariff specific (Train et al., 1987) and even compo-
nent specific (Ascarza et al., 2012) preferences. These tariff biases significantly impact
4
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tariff choice, even if consumers were financially better off by choosing another tariff
alternative. Several psychological factors have been identified (Lambrecht and Skiera,
2006a) to explain tariff biases. Several of them potentially interfere with a cost cap
component so that the implementation of cost caps may significantly change tariff per-
ception. Furthermore, tariff framing was found to significantly influence tariff choice
(Ho and Zhang, 2008) and may also alter the perception of tariffs with a cost cap com-
ponent. The second research question addresses these considerations:
RESEARCH QUESTION 2. Which psychological factors influence the perception of tariffs with
cost cap components?
From a provider’s perspective two things are of special interest. First, whether and how
consumers’ tariff choice behavior can be estimated and second, how this knowledge
can be used to optimize the offered tariff portfolio. Stated as well as revealed prefer-
ence data has been used to study tariff choice within the last decade (see Schlereth and
Skiera, 2012, for an overview). It is however unclear whether earlier approaches can be
adopted to account for the cost cap component. Besides the degree of nonlinearity and
the importance of uncertainty, it is questionable whether respondents in stated prefer-
ence experiments can handle the complexity of four-part tariffs, i.e., tariffs including a
cost cap component. Developing a behavioral model, which accounts for consumers’
behavior under four part tariffs and verifying a methodology to estimate the very, is
the focus of the third research question:
RESEARCH QUESTION 3. How can the existing models of consumer preferences be improved
to accurately estimate consumers’ behavior and choice under four-part tariffs?
A thorough knowledge about prospective consumer behavior under four-part tariff en-
ables providers to adjust their tariff portfolio in order to optimize profits. However, it is
not clear whether cost cap components do in fact increase providers’ profits. Earlier re-
search studied nonlinear tariff optimization both under monopolistic and competitive
circumstances and identified several factors to drive providers’ profits. When consider-
5
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ing the cost cap component, two aspects are of greater interest. As consumption is free
of charge after reaching the cost cap, marginal costs seem to be critical as any consump-
tion after reaching the cap relates to a decreased profit to the provider. Furthermore,
adding a cost cap provides an additional possibility to price discriminate consumers.
From a researcher’s perspective, it is interesting to see whether a provider can take
advantage of this ability even under competitive pressure. Consequently, the fourth
research question asks:
RESEARCH QUESTION 4. Under which constellations is the implementation of a cost cap
component likely to increase providers’ profits?
1.3 Structure of this Thesis
The above research questions are addressed in the thesis at hand, which is organized
as follows. Chapter 2 provides the necessary fundamentals of tariff research. It starts
by structuring tariff schemes and the components they consist of. The chapter includes
an overview on models for tariff choice together with a discussion on the existence
and causes of tariff biases. Chapter 3, which is adopted from Koehler et al. (2012a),
addresses Research Question 1 by developing a theoretical model to study the effect of
cost cap tariffs on consumers’ consumption and choice behavior. The chapter concludes
in an empirical validation of the proposed model. In order to account for four-part tar-
iffs, the model is further extended in Chapter 4. The complexity of four-part tariffs
prevents the theoretical analysis of consumer behavior and is therefore approached as
an empirical investigation. The proposed methodology allows to estimate consumers’
tariff preferences and thus addresses Research Question 3. Based on the estimated pref-
erences of Chapter 4, optimal tariff portfolios including cost cap components are stud-
ied under different market assumptions in Chapter 5. Using a simulation approach,
circumstances are identified under which tariffs with cost caps outperform any other
alternative. While these studies rely on the proposed behavioral model, Chapter 6 fo-
cuses on tariff perception aspects from a psychological as well as physiological perspec-
6
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tive and addresses Research Question 2. Within this chapter, effects known to explain
tariff biases are examined in order to explain tariff choice involving cost cap compo-
nents. The framing effect is thereby studied in more detail. At last, as an adoption of
Koehler et al. (2012b), a new methodology based on psychophysiological measurement
is proposed to study the perception of tariffs with cost caps. The thesis concludes in
Chapter 7 and presents promising future research.
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Chapter 2
Foundations of Tariff Research
“An architect’s exceptional creativity [...] could hardly compensate for an ignorance of
structural engineering. No less important are the principles of economics to the successful
study and practice of the art of pricing.”
(Nagle, 1984)
THE second chapter provides an overview on tariff research and starts by classi-fying tariffs as the application of nonlinear pricing in Section 2.1. Then Section
2.2 explains in more detail how tariff components can be used to create different tariff
structures. Tariff choice is further discussed in Section 2.3, before 2.4 concludes with an
overview on tariff biases.
2.1 Nonlinear Pricing
Pricing has been an important field in marketing research ever since (Gijsbrechts, 1993;
Rao, 1984) and it is still today (Rao, 2009). With the shift towards a service oriented
9
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economy especially research on nonlinear pricing has gained momentum (Danaher,
2002; Iyengar et al., 2008; Lambrecht et al., 2007; Sundararajan, 2004). Nonlinear pric-
ing includes all schedules where the total costs that a consumer has to pay is not pro-
portional to its consumption (Iyengar and Gupta, 2009; Wilson, 1993). Most known
are quantity discounts for larger volumes or consumption. For instance, monthly pay-
ments for fitness memberships are lower when contracts are signed for a longer time
period. Consumer packaged goods are another example where larger volume packages
have a lower average price.
Wilson (1993) stated four preconditions to be satisfied in order to implement nonlinear
pricing:
1. Imperfectly competitive markets. Prices are driven down to marginal costs in com-
plete competitive markets and nonlinear pricing becomes obsolete. Wilson am-
plifies that the degree of competition limits the extend of nonlinear pricing.
2. Absence of resale markets. Another crucial precondition for nonlinear pricing is the
absence of a resale market or at least its limitation and control by the supplier.
With the possibility to resell products, buyers of large quantities can benefit from
reselling the product in smaller proportions and act as secondary suppliers on
the market. Often resale is limited by contractual prohibitions or high transaction
costs (Murphy, 1977).
3. Purchase monitoring. As pricing schedules are tailored to match specific consumer
types, it is crucial for a company to identify its consumers. Furthermore, nonlin-
ear pricing may be realized in several different ways, such as the quantity of a
single purchase, but also by the rate of purchases or the sum of purchases. This is
why the ability to measure consumers’ purchases is another important precondi-
tion for nonlinear pricing.
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4. Consumer heterogeneity. Heterogeneity is the fundamental assumption for nonlin-
ear pricing. Only if consumers value successive increments differently, companies
are able to profitably adjust their pricing policy on consumption size.
As stated in the introduction, services, such as telecommunication services, are charac-
terized by their intangibility and perishability (Shoemaker and Mattila, 2009). Thus, the
immediate consumption after purchase guarantees the absence of resale markets. Fur-
thermore, advances in information technology simplified the possibilities of purchase
monitoring. Therefore, competition and consumer heterogeneity remain the most im-
portant factors influencing the applicability of nonlinear pricing. Iyengar and Gupta
(2009) also highlighted the importance of consumer heterogeneity, calling it the pri-
mary factor of implementing nonlinear pricing schemes as consumers self select differ-
ent pricing plans based on their expected consumption under such. However, Iyengar
and Gupta point out that demand analysis under nonlinear pricing is nontrivial. This
is due to the fact that there is a two-way dependency between the choice of nonlinear
pricing schemes and consumption under the chosen schemes (Hanemann, 1984; Kridel
et al., 1993) which will be explained in more detail in Section 2.3.
2.2 Tariff Design
Consumer heterogeneity is countered by complex nonlinear pricing schedules which
are modeled through tariffs (Iyengar and Gupta, 2009; Wilson, 1993). Tariffs are used
for nonlinear pricing of services in, e.g., telecommunications, information technology,
energy, healthcare, and insurances (Bagh and Bhargava, 2013; Danaher, 2002; Iyengar
and Gupta, 2009). The design of tariffs is built on multiple pricing components and
thus, can be adapted for different consumer types. The following section provides
an overview on components complementing different tariff schedules. The section is
closely related to Skiera (1999).
11
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2.2.1 Tariff Components
Tariff components are the basis for tariff design. Their composition strongly influences
the nonlinearity of pricing under different tariff schemes and hence consumer behavior.
Recent pricing literature differentiates between four components.
Fixed Fee The fixed fee is a consumption independent payment which is charged on
a regular seasonal basis. It is also known as access, license or lump sum fee (Murphy,
1977; Oi, 1971). As the fee is consumption independent, it is often used to cover initial
investment costs (Valletti, 2003). In the context of new subscription services, Danaher
(2002) studied the effect of fixed fees in more detail. Danaher found two effects: First,
fixed fees have some negative effect on consumption. Second and even more important,
attrition elasticities increase as the fixed fee increases. The churn rate is an important
feature for services, demonstrating the importance of the optimal design of fixed fees.
Ho and Zhang (2008) further explained that the churn rate also depends on the framing
of the fixed fee. Using the loss aversion theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), Ho and
Zhang were able to show that an increase in loss aversion leads to an increased chance
of rejecting a tariff offer with fixed fee.
Minute Price While the fixed fee maps independently of consumption into the total
bill, which a consumer is requested to pay at the end of the billing period, the minute
price causes the total bill to increase proportionally with consumption. Thereby, the
consumer is charged a price for each consumed unit. The minute price is therefore also
called usage price, per unit charge, or marginal price. It is known to have a strong im-
pact on consumption (Danaher, 2002; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998), as consumption
decreases with the marginal price. However, Danaher showed that the attrition elas-
ticity is considerably smaller with respect to the minute price than with respect to the
fixed fee.
12
2.2 Tariff Design
Allowance Often an allowance is included in a tariff along a fixed fee. The allowance
grants a predefined consumption with a minute price of zero. Thus, exceeding the al-
lowance results in a positive marginal price. Lambrecht et al. (2007) found a strong
impact of an allowance on consumers’ tariff choice. The authors explain the tendency
to choose a tariff with allowance by consumers’ uncertainty in consumption. The ex-
pected bill increases with the variation in consumption which consumers try to avoid.
Besides this effect, Ascarza et al. (2012) found an increase in consumption under tariffs
with allowance that cannot be explained by the impact of the allowance on consumers’
budget constraint.
Cost Cap Recently, the cost cap component was introduced as a new component in
the design of telecommunications tariffs. It has only been studied by Kraemer and
Wiewiorra (2010) until now. The cost cap equals an upper limit of the total bill. Before
the total bill reaches the cost cap, consumption is charged with a positive marginal
price. Afterwards consumption has no additional costs, so that consumers are only
limited by their own satiation level. Kraemer and Wiewiorra showed the first evidence
that tariff choice is affected by psychological effects on cost caps which are also studied
in more detail in Chapter 6.
2.2.2 Tariff Structures
By combining different tariff components, a diverse amount of nonlinear tariff struc-
tures can be constructed. Earlier research differed between one-part, two-part, and
three-part tariffs, depending on the number of components. While a lot of research fo-
cused on the most common two-part tariffs (Goh and Bockstedt, 2012), recent studies
have shifted their focus on advantages of three-part tariffs (Goh and Bockstedt, 2012;
Iyengar et al., 2008; Jensen, 2006; Lambrecht et al., 2007). However, with the introduc-
tion of the cost cap component, new tariff structures with up to four tariff components
are possible. The following sections provide an overview.
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One-Part Tariffs
Pay-per-use tariff (PU) Pay-per-use tariffs, also known as linear tariffs, consist only
of a minute price ppu for every consumed unit. The total costs increase linearly in
consumption nPU :
K(nPU) = nPU pPU
Therefore, the average costs as well as the marginal costs are equal to the minute price,
which prevents price discrimination. Pay-per-use tariffs are a common pricing struc-
ture in practice (Skiera, 1999).
FIGURE 2.1: Total, marginal and average costs under a pay-per-use tariff
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nPU
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4
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nPU
dK HnPUL
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KHnPUL
In their recent paper, Schlereth et al. (2010) investigated several different tariff struc-
tures and their impact on consumer choice and consumption. The authors found that it
is often not revenue maximizing for a provider to offer only a pay-per-use tariff. While
a fixed fee of zero attracts more consumers, the higher marginal price limits the con-
sumers’ consumption and therefore also the provider’s revenues. Essegaier et al. (2002)
found that pay-per-use tariffs can only be optimal under specific conditions. When con-
sumers with high consumption satiation are more valuable and capacity constraints are
sufficiently small, a pay-per-use tariff might be more profitable than, e.g., a flat rate tar-
iff.
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Flat rate tariff (FR) The flat rate tariff consists only of a fixed fee fFR and is indepen-
dent of the consumer’s consumption.
K(nFR) = fFR
Consequently, the average costs per consumed unit decrease with consumption and
converge towards the marginal costs of zero.
FIGURE 2.2: Total, marginal and average costs under a flat rate tariff
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There are different beliefs about the flat rate’s ability to maximize profits. Schlereth et al.
(2010) explained that similar to a pay-per-use tariff, offering only a flat rate tariff results
in suboptimal revenues. This is because tariff adoption is significantly mitigated due to
a high fixed fee, while the remaining consumers have a much higher average consump-
tion with zero marginal costs. Other researchers, such as Essegaier et al. (2002) and Sun-
dararajan (2004), stated that a flat rate tariff can be optimal under specific conditions.
Sundararajan showed that under the presence of transaction costs for administering
tariffs, offering a flat rate in addition to a pay-per-use tariff is always profit improv-
ing. The reason is that pay-per-use tariffs involve a steady monitoring of consumers’
consumption resulting in high transaction costs. In contrast, the flat rate tariff requires
only a single payment transaction in every period. Essegaier et al. investigated pric-
ing of services when the provider’s service capacity is constrained and consumers are
heterogeneous. The authors conclude that the costs of providing another service unit
15
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is typically negligible as long as the overall consumer demand is within the provider’s
capacity. Therefore, service providers should focus on revenue. In contrast, revenue
strongly depends on the consumer mix that a provider is serving when the capacity
constraint is exhausted. The fixed fee is an effective way to extract consumer surplus
from light users as opposed to heavy users who are more sensitive to the minute price.
Flat rate tariffs can therefore be the optimal pricing structure if the market consists of
a high rate of more valuable light users. However, Essegaier et al. explain that under
competition flat rate pricing opens up to rival’s attacks on light users, as they subsi-
dize heavy users. Goettler and Clay (2011) also found that flat rate tariffs can yield
higher profits without a complementary two-part tariff. This is explained as consumers
with initially high consumption expectations staying within the flat rate as long as their
switching costs are high enough, even if they learn that their consumption is smaller
than expected.
The flat rate tariff was also found to have a strong psychological attraction to consumers
(Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Train et al., 1987). The phenomenon of preferring a cost-
inferior choice of a flat rate tariff has been named the flat rate bias (Train et al., 1989).
Section 2.4 provides a more detailed overview on research on the flat rate bias.
Two-Part Tariffs
Traditional two-part tariff (2PTF) One of the most studied tariffs is the traditional
two-part tariff which consists of a fixed fee f2PTF and a minute price of p2PTF. Conse-
quently, the total costs a consumer has to pay are:
K(n2PTF) = f2PTF + p2PTFn2PTF
Figure 2.3 shows the decrease in average costs. With an increase in consumption they
converge against the marginal minute price of p2PTF.
The seminal paper of Oi (1971) showed the advantages of two-part tariffs in compar-
ison to one-part tariffs. His work reviews whether it is optimal for an entertainment
service provider to charge for the amusement park entrance or for every ride. Under
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the presumption of serving a homogeneous consumer by one monopolist, the two-part
tariff is perfectly price discriminating. When setting p2PTF equal to marginal costs, all
consumer surplus can be extracted by adjusting f2PTF accordingly. Murphy (1977) con-
firmed this finding and stated that no other tariff can extract profits better than the
two-part tariff in this case. However, the monopolist’s profit maximization problem
becomes more complex when consumers are heterogeneous. To perfectly discriminate,
every single consumer has to be separated and to be offered a unique tariff. Murphy
emphasized the fact that such consumer identification is impossible and may also be
illegal (Oi, 1971) for a provider, and therefore precludes perfect discrimination. How-
ever, he concluded that more complex tariff structures will generate an increase in prof-
its if optimally designed. This may also imply excluding or subsidizing consumers (Oi,
1971). This finding has been recently confirmed by Schlereth et al. (2010), who find four
two-part tariffs to be revenue maximizing for a provider. However, they also stated
that revenue only increases slightly by providing four instead of one two-part tariff.
Due to implementation costs, such as advertising and billing of a new tariff, it may be
reasonable to limit the number of two-part tariffs.
FIGURE 2.3: Total, marginal and average costs under a traditional two-part tariff
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Cost cap tariff (2PTCC) The introduction of the cost cap component allows the cre-
ation of a new type of two-part tariff. The most simple possibility to implement a cost
cap c2PTCC is by combining it with a minute price p2PTCC. This combination is the most
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dominant implementation of a cost cap component. Therefore, this tariff will also be
cited as the cost cap tariff (CC) in the following. Under a cost cap tariff a consumer pays
a marginal price for every consumed unit until his total costs reach the cost cap. At this
point, the tariff becomes a flat rate with marginal costs of zero. Hence, total costs are
K(nCC) =

pCCnCC if pCCnCC ≤ cCC
cCC otherwise.
According to this equation, the marginal costs of pCC equal the average costs before
reaching the cost cap. Afterwards, the average costs decrease and converge towards
zero. Figure 2.4 illustrate these circumstances.
FIGURE 2.4: Total, marginal and average costs under a cost cap tariff
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Currently, the cost cap component is only offered in cost cap and four-part tariffs on the
market. The cost cap tariff, however, has been barely studied, with the notable excep-
tion of Kraemer and Wiewiorra (2010, 2012). The authors found a consumer tendency
to choose a cost cap tariff when they have a strong desire to be insured against high to-
tal monthly bills, and to be flexible considering the interplay of consumption and total
bill. Kraemer and Wiewiorra assumed that providers can benefit from the additional
risk premium consumers are willing to pay. On the other hand, they highlighted that
providing a cost cap tariff might be risky as in contrast to flat rate tariffs, light users
cannot compensate heavy users.
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Three-Part Tariff
Three-part tariff with allowance (3PTA) Recent studies (Ascarza et al., 2012; Bagh
and Bhargava, 2013; Iyengar et al., 2008; Jensen, 2006; Lambrecht et al., 2007) have fo-
cused on the impact of including an allowance A3PTA to the traditional two-part tariff.
When choosing such a tariff, the consumer pays a fixed fee f3PTA upfront and gets a
predefined number of free minutes with zero marginal costs. Only if consumption ex-
ceeds the allowance, a minute price of p3PTA has to be paid. Therefore, the total cost
function under a two-part tariff with allowance is:
K(n3PTA) =

f3PTA if n3PTA ≤ A3PTA
f3PTA + p3PTA(n3PTA − A3PTA) otherwise.
The marginal costs are zero under the allowance and equal to the minute price after-
wards. Therefore, the average costs under such a three-part tariff initially converge
towards zero. Nevertheless, subsequent consumption after exceeding the allowance
results in average costs converging towards the marginal price. Therefore, a further
decrease, as illustrated in Figure 2.5, as well as an increase of average costs is possible,
depending on the average price under the allowance.
FIGURE 2.5: Total, marginal and average costs under a three-part tariff with allowance
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From a provider’s perspective a three-part tariff can derive higher revenues compared
to a two-part tariff. Lambrecht et al. (2007) explained that three-part tariffs can skim
consumer surplus due to consumer uncertainty. This is especially true, when choice
and consumption are decoupled in time. Today this is the case for many subscription
services. Furthermore, Grubb (2009) demonstrated that consumers are overconfident
about their prospective consumption and thus, underestimate their consumption vari-
ance. As a consequence, consumers tend to choose a tariff where the allowance matches
their prospective consumption. However, they underestimate the probability of ex-
ceeding the allowance which in return enables the provider to charge steep marginal
prices. Besides, Ascarza et al. (2012) showed that consumers have a tendency to overuse
a three-part tariff with allowance in comparison to a traditional two-part tariff which
cannot be explained by the shift in the budget constraint. Providers can increase their
revenues by taking advantage of consumers’ bias for allowances. So consumers should
be encouraged to choose three-part instead of two-part tariffs by lowering tariff switch-
ing costs. Jensen (2006) did not take into account allowance specific preferences. On
contrast, she focused on the profitability of three-part tariffs under competition. Under
a duopoly a consumer can always choose an outside option which limits provider’s op-
tions to acquire consumers’ surplus by two-part tariffs. Adding an allowance helps the
provider to overcome this incentive constraint. Consequently, the existence of two-part
tariffs with allowance can be an indicator for a competitive market.
Three-part tariff with cost cap (3PTCC) The cost cap component also allows the cre-
ation of new tariff structures which have not been introduced on the service market
yet. For example, it is possible to charge a fixed fee f3PTCC for a cost cap tariff. In other
words, for a fixed fee a consumer can upgrade his pay-per-use tariff with a cost cap
c3PTCC. The total cost function then changes to:
K(n3PTCC) =

f3PTCC + p3PTCCn3PTCC if f3PTCC + p3PTCCn3PTCC ≤ c3PTCC
c3PTCC otherwise.
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Note that similar to a classical two-part tariff, the average costs are decreasing as long
as the cost cap has not been reached. After the cost cap has been reached, the marginal
costs are zero and thus, the average costs are also converging towards zero.
FIGURE 2.6: Total, marginal and average costs under a three-part tariff with cost cap
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The three-part tariff with cost cap has neither been studied in previous research nor has
it been implemented.
Four-Part Tariff
Finally, all four components can be combined within a four-part tariff. By excluding
single components, e.g., by setting a fixed fee of zero, all earlier presented tariff struc-
tures can be derived from the total cost function of the four-part tariff:
(2.1) K(n4PT) =

f4PT if n4PT ≤ A4PT
f4PT + p4PT(n4PT − A4PT) if A4PT < n4PT ≤ C4PT
c4PT otherwise,
where the critical consumption for reaching the cost cap is
(2.2) C4PT =
c4PT − f4PT
p4PT
+ A4PT
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The average costs under a four-part tariff decrease as long as consumption is within the
allowance and the marginal costs are zero. However, exceeding the allowance results in
an increase in total costs of p4PT for every consumed unit. Therefore, the average costs
are converging against the marginal costs of p4PT. As soon as the cost cap is reached,
further consumption is free of charge and average costs are decreasing towards zero.
It is easy to see in Figure 5.1 that the distribution of total, average and marginal costs
combine all earlier presented tariff structures.
FIGURE 2.7: Total, marginal and average costs under a four-part tariff
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Deutsche Bahn AG is currently the only provider of a four-part tariff on the market to
the best of knowledge. Besides a basic tariff, which is composed of an usage price and
a cost cap, the company offers an advanced tariff with an additional allowance of 30
minutes of usage free of charge per day if consumers pay an additional yearly fixed fee
of 48e.1
TABLE 2.1: Tariff portfolio of Deutsche Bahn’s service “Call a Bike”
basic advanced
fixed fee - 48 e/year
allowance - 30 min/day
minute price 0.08 e/min 0.08 e/min
cost cap 15 e/day 15 e/day
1Tariff schemes are available at Deutsche Bahn’s homepage: http://www.callabike-interaktiv.de/
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Although this tariff scheme has been successfully implemented for renting bicycles,
four-part tariffs have not been offered in other service markets. Furthermore, there has
been no research on four-part tariffs. However, the characteristic structure makes the
four-part tariff an ideal candidate to study the interaction of all tariff components.
2.3 Tariff Choice
Models for tariff choice are based on the theory of discrete/continuous choice models
(Hanemann, 1984; Dubin and McFadden, 1984). These models take into account that
the discrete choice depends partly on the outcome of continuous consumption choice
and vice versa, and should therefore be modeled in a mutually consistent matter (Hane-
mann, 1984; Kridel et al., 1993). For example, a consumer is more likely to make calls
under a flat-rate compared to a pay-per-use tariff and considers this when making a
tariff decision.
The decision process for choosing a tariff j from a set of tariffs J involves two steps.
First, the consumer i evaluates ex ante each tariff based on the expected consumption
and chooses the most attractive respectively. Second, based on the ex post chosen tariff
the consumer decides on his consumption. The evaluation and the actual choice of the
tariff can be modeled in different ways and are explained in the following.
2.3.1 Evaluation Models
Cost minimization The simplest way to evaluate a tariff is by comparing the in-
volved costs. A consumer then tries to minimize his costs. However, this approach
requires either a tariff independent consumption or a consumption statement for each
tariff for consideration. A consumer i evaluates the set of tariffs J based on their costs
Kij(nij)∀j ∈ J. Empirical research has almost exclusively used the comparison of costs
under a fixed usage level. In this vein, researchers such as Train et al. (1987) were able
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to study whether consumers have taken the cost minimizing "right" choice or whether
they exhibit usage independent and tariff specific preferences.
Consumer surplus maximization A more sophisticated approach to evaluate tariffs
is to quantify consumer surplus CSij(nij). Consumer surplus is defined by the differ-
ence between consumers’ willingness to pay WTPij(nij) and the corresponding costs
of Kij(nij), whereas the willingness to pay describes the maximum amount of money a
consumer would pay for every given consumption. Therefore, each tariff is evaluated
by:
(2.3) CSij(nij) = WTPij(nij)− Kij(nij)∀j ∈ J
The knowledge of consumers’ willingness to pay functions is important for nonlinear
pricing. Therefore, several different methodologies have been developed for this pur-
pose (Jedidi and Jagpal, 2009; Miller et al., 2011). The methodologies can build upon
three data sources: historical consumption data, consumption offers and preference
data . Although historical data guarantees the highest validity, it is often difficult to ob-
tain or it does not reflect the object of investigation. Usage offers provide an incentive
compatible mechanism and provide good results for WTP estimation. However, they
are difficult to conduct for services such as telecommunications (Schlereth et al., 2011).
Preference data can be obtained with reasonable effort and this approach has shown to
elicit valid WTP estimation even under hypothetical purchase scenarios (Miller et al.,
2011). Today, open-ended questions (Abrams, 1964) and conjoint analysis (Jedidi and
Zhang, 2002; Wertenbroch and Skiera, 2002) are most often used to identify consumers’
willingness to pay through preference inquiry. Based on the WTP estimate, the con-
sumer is assumed to adjust his consumption so that consumer surplus is maximized.
This concept has been used for tariff choice in theoretical as well as empirical research
(e.g. Bagh and Bhargava, 2013; Kridel et al., 1993; Murphy, 1977; Oi, 1971; Schlereth
et al., 2011).
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Utility Maximization Alternatively, the evaluation of tariffs can be modeled using
utility theory. Thereby, the preference for one tariff is described by:
(2.4) Uij(nij)∀j ∈ J
The utility function can be modeled using a variety of functions with different curve
progressions. Then, the demand function of a service or good can be derived from the
utility function. Using the parameters (βi1,βi2,βi3) to describe a consumer’s preference
for a service or good, the most common approaches to model utility functions are de-
scribed in Table 2.2. As utility functions can be transformed into willingness to pay
functions (Sonnier et al., 2007), the modeling approaches apply to them as well.
Skiera (1999) stated that the quadratic, semi-logarithmic, multiplicative and the mod-
ified exponential functions are the most common to describe consumer utility. These
functions can be compared in several ways. First, there are two parameters to be esti-
mated for all functions as long as externalities can be excluded. In this case an addi-
tional parameter has to be used in order to account for the non-consumption related
utility. Consequently, estimating the utility function always allows to derive the de-
mand function. The reverse is not possible if externalities have to be presumed. Sec-
ond, utility functions differ in their course. While quadratic and the semi-logarithmic
functions exhibit a satiation level with zero marginal utility thereafter, modified expo-
nential and multiplicative functions always assume a positive marginal utility, hence a
consumer would consume the service unlimitedly under zero marginal costs. Choosing
the appropriate function thus depends on whether modeling a consumer’s satiation is
important in the research context. In that case, the quadratic function exhibits an ad-
vantage in modeling due to its linear demand function.
Utility theory has been used in the context of tariff choice in many theoretical as well as
empirical studies (Iyengar et al., 2008; Lambrecht et al., 2007; Narayanan et al., 2007;
Sundararajan, 2004; Schlereth and Skiera, 2012). Earlier studies on consumer tariff
choice are summarized in more detail in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 which develop a
utility theory for consumer choice under tariffs with cost caps.
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2.3 Tariff Choice
2.3.2 Choice Models
The previous section explained how tariffs can be evaluated by either comparing the
tariffs’ total costs or consumer surplus, respectively utility. While total costs require
a consumer statement about the intended consumption under every offered tariff, a
consumer surplus or utility approach make this requirement dispensable. As long as
consumer preferences are known, the expected consumption can be derived from the
maximization of consumer surplus or utility, respectively. However, the evaluation of
tariffs does not necessarily explain tariff choice. There are several alternatives to model
consumer choice which are explained next. For simplicity, the different approaches are
based on utility but may also apply for consumer surplus.
Maximum utility model The maximum utility model, which is also known as the
first-choice rule, assumes that every consumer chooses the product or service with the
highest utility (Green and Krieger, 1988). Hence a consumer chooses the tariff which
solves the following maximization problem:
(2.5) max
j∈J
Uij(nij)
The model assumes a strictly rational choice behavior which may be too idealistic in
practice as utility differences are not taken into account. Whether or not a product
or service is only slightly or dramatically better than its alternatives does not impact
consumer’s choice. This assumption requires consumers to know their own preferences
exactly. As this is rarely true, models which take utility differences into account, e.g.
by assuming choice probabilities, are preferable. However, due to its simplicity first-
choice rules have been implemented in several theoretical works on tariff choice (Bagh
and Bhargava, 2013; Essegaier et al., 2002; Hayes, 1987; Oi, 1971).
Logit choice models An alternative approach to the first choice rule is to take propor-
tions of utilities into account and assign choice probabilities for each alternative. The
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most prominent model for probabilistic choice in marketing literature is the logit choice
model (Train, 2009; Rossi et al., 2005). The assigned choice probability is proportional to
the product’s or service’s utility in relation to the combined utility of all available alter-
natives. Originally derived from Luce (1959) and later extended by McFadden (1974),
the logit formula is derived from the fact that utility is partly unobserved and the corre-
sponding error is extreme value distributed.2 The following discussion is mainly based
on Train (2009), who provides an excellent overview on logit models.
The logit model assumes that the utility a consumer i obtains from alternative j is partly
observed (Vij) by the researcher and partly unknown to the researcher:
(2.6) Uij = Vij + ε ij ∀j ∈ J
McFadden (1974) showed that as long as ε ij is independently, identically distributed
extreme value, the probability for consumer i to choose alternative j is:
(2.7) Pij =
exp(γVij)
J
∑
j=1
exp(γVij)
The representative utility Vij is often specified as a linear combination of preference
parameters such that Vij = β′ixj, where xj describes the observed alternative variables.
Train (2009), however, argued that logit models are not limited to linear functions and
may also include nonlinear representative utility. The parameter γ is a scale param-
eter to adjust for the variance of the unobserved utility. Note that the probability of
choosing one alternative over another is independent of the number of alternatives.
Therefore, the logit models involve the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
property. The logit models exhibit further desirable properties. First, the logit model
ensures Pij ∈ [0,1] as required for probability. Second, the logit probability is S-shaped,
so that a small increase on either a small or a large utility of the alternative has only
a small effect on its choice probability. The logit parameters are generally estimated
using maximum log likelihood algorithms. The logit model’s quality to fit the data is
measured by different goodness of fit indicators such as the likelihood ratio index.
2See McFadden (2001) for a brief history of logit choice models.
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In any case, ordinary binary or multinomial logit models (MNL) have a major short-
coming. Due to the independence of error terms requirement, random taste variation
cannot be considered (Hensher and Greene, 2003; Train, 2009). In most cases the inde-
pendence restriction can be diminished by a proper specification of the representative
utility function. However, if a correlation of errors is assumed, the researcher should
rather use a mixed logit model. By assuming the model’s parameter to be distributed
rather than stated, mixed logit models allow for random taste variation, unrestricted
substitution patterns and correlation of unobserved factors (Train, 2009). Thus, mixed
logit models are the integrals of standard logit probabilities over a density of param-
eters. The model can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train,
2000) and a variety of different behavior specifications can be derived. In addition, its
estimation is computationally simple since the advent of simulation methods (Hensher
and Greene, 2003). The mixed logit probability is the weighted average logit over all
values of β with density f (β):
(2.8) Pij =
∫
Lij(β) f (β)dβ,
with Lij(β) being the logit probability as stated in (2.7). Therefore, these models are
mixed logit as their probability is a mixture of logit probabilities with f (β) as the mix-
ing distribution (Hensher and Greene, 2003). The density function f (β) can be de-
scribed by any distribution, so that the researcher is free to model his expectation about
consumer behavior. Having said this, the mixed logit formula is capable of handling
random coefficients, such that β varies over decision makers. In addition, the speci-
fications are easily adjusted to account for repeated choice. Train explained that the
simplest specification assumes that representative utility varies over respondents but
not within the choice sets t ∈ T one respondent faces. The conditional probability of
respondent i to make a specific choice sequence y = y1, ...,yT is simply the product of
logit probabilities:
(2.9) Liy =
T
∏
t=1
[
Viyt
∑j Vijt
]
29
Chapter 2 Foundations of Tariff Research
Train highlights the suitability of mixed logit for simulation methods for estimation. By
repeatedly drawing from the density function f (β) an unbiased estimator of Pij can be
calculated. These simulated probabilities can be used with log-likelihood functions to
estimate the parameters describing the density function.
Due to its flexibility in describing respondents’ behavior and handling nonlinear utility
functions, logit choice models have been used in several empirical studies on tariff
choice (Goh and Bockstedt, 2012; Ho and Zhang, 2008; Iyengar et al., 2008; Lambrecht
et al., 2007; Schlereth et al., 2011; Train et al., 1989). Chapter 4 provides a more detailed
overview on utility and choice specifications of respective research.
2.4 Tariff Bias
A common assumption about consumer choice of nonlinear tariffs is that consumers do
not have any tariff specific preference and choose, thus, the tariff which maximizes their
surplus. However, earlier research in a wide area of different services have found that
consumers prefer flat rate tariffs to alternative tariffs, even though they would have
been better off not choosing the flat rate.3 Train (1991) coined this effect flat rate bias,
after he found a significant tendency of consumers choosing a flat rate over a matured
tariff in a revealed preference study (Train et al., 1987). Later, Kridel et al. (1993) pro-
vided evidence that a pay-per-use bias also exists, so that tariff specific preferences are
today referred to as tariff biases (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a). Today, there are numer-
ous studies on the existence and causes of tariff biases. Table 2.3 provides an overview.
The following section discusses the definition and existence of tariff biases on the basis
of selected studies as well as the causes of tariff biases which have been identified so
far.
3Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a) and Stingel (2008) provide a detailed overview.
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2.4.1 Existence and Definition of Tariff Bias
The definition of tariff bias is not clear. Some studies define a bias as to be present when
a consumer would have paid less choosing another tariff under his given consumption
level (e.g., Kridel et al., 1993; Narayanan et al., 2007). Figure 2.8 illustrates this bias
definition. Under the assumption that a consumer has a consumption of n˜ units (high-
lighted by the dotted line), choosing a flat rate tariff would yield higher costs compared
to a pay-per-use tariff. In this case, the bias equals the difference in costs between both
tariff alternatives. There has been no discussion so far about a possible spread in cost
deviation from the cheapest tariff alternative that still could be considered as rational
rather than to be biased (Stingel, 2008). As this definition requires detailed information
about consumers’ actual consumption pattern, it has mostly been used with revealed
preference data. This definition, however, does not take into account the two-way de-
pendency of tariff choice and consumption. Other studies (e.g., Train et al., 1987; Lam-
brecht and Skiera, 2006a; Kraemer and Wiewiorra, 2012) relaxed this prerequisite by
defining a bias to be already present as soon as a consumer prefers a specific type of
tariff to another. While this definition is suitable for many stated preference studies,
a quantification of a possible bias is difficult in this case. An exception is Schulze and
Gedenk (2005) who combined both approaches by estimating consumers’ willingness
to pay first which is then used to anticipate consumers’ consumption. For this purpose
the consumption is assumed to yield the optimal consumer surplus. Following this
approach, a consumer is biased when he chooses one tariff over another even though
the anticipated consumer surplus is lower. Figure 2.8 demonstrates this for the case of
choosing between a flat rate and a pay-per-use tariff. If a consumer decides to choose
the flat rate tariff, although the pay-per-use tariff would have yield him a higher con-
sumer surplus (highlighted by dashed lines), then the difference in consumer surpluses
is considered as the extent of the tariff bias.
Tariff biases were found to exist across a wide area of different services. Most re-
search has been conducted in the field of telecommunication services (Train et al., 1987,
1989; Kling and van der Ploeg, 1990; Kraemer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Miravete, 2003;
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FIGURE 2.8: Total costs and consumer surplus under pay-per-use and flat rate tariffs
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Narayanan et al., 2007), but also in other fields such as gym access (Nunes, 2000; Della
Vigna and Malmendier, 2006), journal subscription (Schulze and Gedenk, 2005), public
transportation (Uhrich et al., 2012; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998) and Internet access
(Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Lambrecht et al., 2007). In order to study tariff biases,
actual choice and consumption behavior has been observed in real markets as well as
in choice experiments.
The work of Train et al. (1987) on tariff specific preferences is a seminal paper. The study
analyzed residential consumers’ tariff choice behavior of a local telephone company in
the United States. Using a nested logit model, the authors found a significant impact of
tariff specific preferences on tariff choice and, further, the preference for a flat rate to be
much stronger than the preference for the alternative metered tariff. Later, Kridel et al.
(1993) were the first to confirm the existence of a pay-per-use bias. While studying con-
sumption and tariff choice behavior of citizens of Missouri and Arkansas, they found a
small proportion of consumers who would have been better off by choosing a flat rate
tariff instead of a pay-per-use tariff. Whereas tariff bias research had focused on field
data, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) demonstrated that tariff biases can also be mea-
sured by stated preference experiments. The authors found tariff specific preferences
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for flat rate as well as pay-per-use tariffs in various domains. Tariff biases were found
to exist also in other domains other than telecommunication services, such as public
transport or tourism. The use of stated preference experiments has later been found
to be advantageous to study in detail the causes of tariff biases (Nunes, 2000; Lam-
brecht and Skiera, 2006a). More recently, Uhrich et al. (2012) showed that consumers’
consumption goals impact the extent of flat rate biases. Consuming a service for a he-
donic purpose leads to a significantly higher flat rate bias than consuming a service for
utilitarian purposes. The authors demonstrated in three studies, which used services
with varying hedonic and utilitarian value, that consumption goals have a significant
influence on causes of tariff biases and mediate tariff choice.
Miravete (2003) is one of the few who contradicted that consumers irrationally choose
their tariff and that they do not exhibit a tariff bias. While he agreed that consumers are
guided by their consumption expectations from a static point of view, consumers be-
have rationally under a dynamic consideration and switch tariffs after learning from an
initial mistake. Narayanan et al. (2007) followed this line of argument and stated that
not cost-minimizing tariff choice is caused only ex post due to unexpected consumption
shocks. The fact that consumers under a metered tariff switch more often to minimize
their costs than consumers under a flat rate option can be explained by limited possibil-
ities to learn one’s own consumption pattern. From the authors’ point of view, typical
bills of flat rate tariffs do not include details on consumption and consumers do not
care about consumption because variance has no influence on the bill amount. Goettler
and Clay (2011), who also argued with posterior beliefs, argued that switching costs are
another explanation why consumers tend to remain with a suboptimal tariff. However,
Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Ascarza et al. (2012) showed in recent studies that tariff
specific preferences remain even under learning and uncertainty considerations.
A major shortcoming of past literature on tariff biases is the focus on flat rate and pay-
per-use tariffs. Alternative tariff schemes, such as two-part tariffs, have barely been
studied (Narayanan et al., 2007; Goettler and Clay, 2011). Thus, it remains unclear
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whether previous results can be transferred to, e.g., tariffs with cost caps or whether
new tariff components have a different influence on tariff biases.
2.4.2 Causes of Tariff Bias
Research on causes of tariff biases have focused on flat rate and pay-per-use tariff spe-
cific preferences. Several effects have been found to explain these tariff biases. Whereas
at the beginning of tariff bias research causes were based on rather assumptions, later
empirical research confirmed the impact of these effects to be significant. Today, a to-
tal of five effects is known to drive tariff biases. An overview on related literature is
provided in Table 2.3.
Insurance effect Already in the seminal paper of tariff biases, Train et al. (1987) de-
noted the insurance property of the flat rate tariff as the major driver of flat rate choice.
More precisely, consumers try to avoid cost variation as they are uncertain about their
future consumption (Miravete, 2002). As a result, they are willing to pay a premium to
be insured against high costs in times of of high consumption (Lambrecht and Skiera,
2006a; Train, 1991). Several papers have developed single- and multi-item scales to
study the insurance effect. Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a) and Kraemer and Wiewiorra
(2012) used multi-item scales to measure the perception of the insurance effect and
studied the probability of choosing a flat rate in a stated preference experiment. Both
studies found the insurance effect to be a significant parameter to describe flat rate
choice. Similar results have been found by Mitomo et al. (2009) using a single-item
scale. Furthermore, Schulze and Gedenk (2005) found the insurance effect, measured
by a single item, to explain the extent of the flat rate bias which was measured as the
difference in consumer surplus.
There are several possible explanations for this behavior. First, risk aversion might
be a reason to choose a flat rate tariff, as costs are more certain compared to a more
uncertain alternative tariff option, even if this choice involves higher expected costs.
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TABLE 2.3: Overview on empirical research on tariff biases
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Train et al. (1989) telecom   4
Kling and van der
Ploeg (1990)
telecom   4
Kridel et al. (1993) telecom    
Prelec and
Loewenstein (1998)
telecom, tourism,
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   4
Nunes (2000) delivery service,
leisure service
  4
Miravete (2003) telecom  G#
Schulze and Gedenk
(2005)
journal
subscription
   4 4 4 2
Della Vigna and
Malmendier (2006)
health club
subscription
   4
Lambrecht and
Skiera (2006a)
internet access     4 4 4 2
Lambrecht et al.
(2007)
internet access   
Narayanan et al.
(2007)
telecom    
Stingel (2008) telecom     4 2 4 4
Grubb (2009) telecom    4
Mitomo et al. (2009) telecom  G# 4 4
Wolk and Skiera
(2010)
internet access  G#
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delivery service   4
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However, Nunes (2000) could not find any relationship between risk aversion and tariff
choice. Second, when the price level of the flat rate tariff is used as a reference point,
consumers’ loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) can explain why higher costs
are perceived more negatively than lower costs and, thus, consumers tend to prefer flat
rate tariffs. Finally, Kridel et al. (1993) showed that the flat rate exhibits an option value
irrespective of expected consumption. The authors stated that the mere option to use a
service is valued, even though the service may not be used at all.
Taximeter effect Kridel et al. (1993) listed the aversion of being metered as a possi-
ble explanation for consumers’ preferences for flat rate tariffs. Prelec and Loewenstein
(1998) studied this phenomenon in more detail and concluded that consumers experi-
ence an immediate pain of paying at the time of the purchase. The authors exemplified
that the pleasure of a taxi ride is reduced by the ticking of the taxi meter. Based on this
plausible example, the effect has been named the taximeter effect. Prelec and Loewen-
stein developed an extended mental accounting theory (Thaler, 1985) which accounts
for the interaction between the pleasure of consumption and the pain of paying. Thus,
the pleasure of consumption can be reduced by the pain of paying, however, vice versa
the pain of paying can be alleviated by the prospective consumption. As a consequence,
consumers can exhibit a preference for prepayment which is even stronger for hedonic
services (Uhrich et al., 2012). The choice of a flat rate tariff mentally decouples payment
from consumption. As the flat rate consists of a single payment, subsequent consump-
tion can be experienced as if it were free.
Prelec and Loewenstein verified their proposed model with a conjoint-like analysis by
asking respondents on their travel planning in a stated preference experiment. 35% of
their sample showed a preference for prepayment such as flat rates, while more than
one half preferred pay-per-use payment. However, asking consumers in a subsequent
study whether they would enjoy to phone more under a flat rate or a pay-per-use tariff,
60% of their sample preferred the flat rate option. The authors concluded: "Talking
on the phone is more pleasurable when you don’t have to think about what each call
is costing you" (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998, p.21). Schulze and Gedenk (2005) and
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Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a) showed the applicability of item scales to measure the
taximeter effect and both found a significant impact of the effect on flat rate choice.
Overestimation effect Another possible reason why consumers tend to choose the
wrong tariff is that they are simply over- or underestimating their own prospective
consumption. Mitchell and Vogelsang (1991) stated that a provider’s advertising could
possibly impact consumers’ estimation. Nunes (2000) developed a ratio rule which pro-
vides a cognitive explanation for a tariff bias. The author explained that unexperienced
consumers assign equal probabilities for all possible states of consumption. When a
consumer has to decide between a pay-per-use and a flat rate tariff, he calculates the
break-even point and assigns probabilities for consumption below or above this point.
The ratio rule is defined as the ratio between these two probabilities. Consequently, a
high ratio favors the choice of the flat rate tariff. However, as consumption is naturally
distributed log-normal with values above zero, high consumption is considered to be
more likely and as a result flat rate tariffs are chosen more often. Nunes conducted three
empirical studies to study the effect of the ratio rule. Due to the lack of information on
the distribution of prospective consumption, the author applied the difference between
the maximum consumption a consumer can think of and the break-even level divided
by the difference of the break-even level and the minimum consumption as the ratio:
(2.10) ratio =
nmax − break-even
break-even− nmin
As a result Nunes found the misinterpretation of consumption to be a major driver of
tariff choice and the ratio to be a significant variable to explain flat rate choice. Lam-
brecht and Skiera (2006a) used a similar approach by systematically altering the range
of maximum and minimum consumption in a stated choice experiment, confirming
the results of Nunes. Uhrich et al. (2012) developed a multi-item scale to capture con-
sumers’ tendency to overestimate and found the scale to be a significant variable to
explain flat rate choice. Furthermore, Grubb (2009) provided evidence that consumers
do not only overestimate their prospective consumption, but are also overconfident
that their expectation is correct, which leads to an underestimation of consumption
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variance. Hence, consumers’ tariff choice turns out to be suboptimal ex post. Della
Vigna and Malmendier (2006), who studied consumers’ choice of health club subscrip-
tions, found a similar result. In their case, consumers exhibit a flat rate bias which can
be explained by consumers’ overconfidence about future self-control which leads to an
overestimation of gym attendance. Later, Goettler and Clay (2011) showed that such
posterior beliefs about future consumption are strongly influenced by private signals
which lead to an overestimation of future consumption. In contrast to Nunes, the au-
thors argued that consumers learn their true consumption patter over time. In their
own opinion, overestimation is rather a reason for tariff bias when consumers initially
choose a tariff, but this does not explain why consumers remain with a suboptimal
tariff.
Flexibility effect The flexibility effect has only recently been identified as a driver
of pay-per-use choice. As stated by Kraemer and Wiewiorra (2012), the commitment
of paying a fixed fee independently of the actual consumption under a flat rate tariff
results in two adverse effects which are summarized as the flexibility effect. First, con-
sumers may ex post regret the flat rate choice after realizing that they would have been
better off under a pay-per-use tariff. Thus, consumers try to avoid the cost commitment
by preferring a flexible pay-per-use tariff. Second, consumers may seek to avoid the ex
post regret by exploiting the flat rate with an excessive consumption above the initial
intention. This effect has been coined as the buffet effect by Just and Wansink (2011).
Consequently, consumers who exhibit a strong aversion against the buffet effect or ex
post regret are willing to pay an option premium to remain their flexibility. Using a
single item scale, Schulze and Gedenk (2005) confirmed the flexibility effect to be sig-
nificant on tariff choice - favoring to choose a pay-per-use tariff. Later, the study of
Kraemer and Wiewiorra developed a more sophisticated multi-item scale to measure
consumers’ accordance to the flexibility effect. Similar to Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a),
the authors used a repeated choice experiment and confirmed Schulze and Gedenk’s
findings. However, further analyses of Kraemer and Wiewiorra showed that the flexi-
bility effect does not affect consumers’ willingness to accept a higher usage price under
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a cost cap tariff. This is why the impact of the flexibility effect on more complex tariffs
remains an open question.
Convenience effect Comparing several tariff alternatives and their expected total
bills requires effort. Therefore, some consumers might try to avoid the involved in-
formation costs by choosing the market default tariff (Train, 1991). Kling and van der
Ploeg (1990) showed that households that did not compare tariff alternatives are more
likely to choose a flat rate tariff. Subsequent studies, however, failed to confirm the im-
pact of the convenience effect on tariff choice (Kraemer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Lambrecht
and Skiera, 2006a; Schulze and Gedenk, 2005) with the exception of Stingel (2008). She
provided evidence that in a business-to-business environment the convenience effect
can foster a flat rate bias.
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Chapter 3
Consumer Choice under Cost Cap Tariffs
“The rational man of economics is a maximizer, who will settle for nothing less than the best.”
Simon (1978)
THIS chapter studies the choice and consumption behavior of consumers undercost cap tariffs. The following Section 3.1 develops a theoretical utility model
that is used to derive the optimal consumption pattern under cost cap tariffs and the
conditions under which cost cap tariffs are chosen over pure pay-per-use and flat rate
tariffs by a rational consumer. Afterwards, the proposed model is empirically evaluated
in Section 3.2 by the use of a stated preference study. Overall, the chapter is an adoption
of Koehler et al. (2012a).
41
Chapter 3 Consumer Choice under Cost Cap Tariffs
3.1 Theory of Consumer Choice
3.1.1 Related Literature
With the exception of Kraemer and Wiewiorra (2012), cost cap tariffs have not yet re-
ceived academic attention. Kraemer and Wiewiorra conducted an empirical investiga-
tion of the flexibility effect in tariff choice in which they also considered the cost cap
tariff. They highlighted that there might exist a “cost cap bias”, by which customers
favor cost caps over pay-per-use tariffs and flat rates even if the tariffs yield the same
economic costs. By contrast, for the most part the present section abstracts from any
bias or other irrationality in tariff choice. Instead, a fully rational consumer is assumed,
who may, however, face uncertainty about his preferences (demand). The papers that
are most related to our approach are Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Iyengar et al. (2008).
These papers proposed a similar utility model, however with the intention in mind to
estimate the parameters of the utility function based on observed tariff choice. By con-
trast, we derive a formal utility model with the intention to explain tariff choice. Within
this utility model, tariff choice relies on the preferences of a representative consumer,
and not on an exogenous demand. This modeling approach has the distinct advan-
tage that the demand for tariff usage is derived endogenously and depends also on
the chosen tariff and the pricing structure. Hausman (1985) and Moffitt (1986) lay the
groundwork for these models. The consumer’s calculus in these situations consists of
two steps. First, the utility-optimizing consumption on each tariff segment (e.g., the
pay-per-use or flat rate segment) is calculated; then the segment which maximizes the
overall utility is chosen, subject to the associated optimal consumption decision and the
corresponding bill amount.
3.1.2 Methodology
Tariff choice and consumption under certainty In the following, we focus on the
choice between a pay-per-use, flat rate and cost cap tariff from the point of view of a
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single, representative consumer. Any feasible tariff under one of these three tariff types
can be described by the tuple t = ( f , p, c), where f denotes a fixed base fee which must
be paid independent of the consumption, p is a constant price for each consumption
unit and c stands for a cost cap, i.e., an upper threshold for the total billing amount.
More specifically, for the PU tariff it holds that tPU = (0, pPU ,∞); the FR tariff is charac-
terized by tFR = ( fFR,0,∞); and for the CC tariff tCC = (0, pCC, cCC). Depending on the
tariff and given the consumption level n ≥ 0, a consumer has total costs of
(3.1) Kt(n) =

ft + n pt if ft + npt ≤ ct
ct otherwise.
The consumer’s utility subject to his budget constraint is given by
(3.2) Ut(n) = β1 n− β2 n2 − β3 Kt(n),
where β1, β2, β3 > 0 are the individual preference parameters that express the con-
sumer’s gross utility of consumption relative to the numeraire k. Notice that the utility
function is quasi-concave and thus it implies that optimal consumption is bound, even
at zero marginal costs. However, our results are not limited to this specification and
should hold for any quasi-concave utility function. As noted above, we restrict our
analysis to the interesting case where all parameters are non-negative and cCC > fFR
and pCC > pPU . Moreover, we assume that β1 > β3 pCC, which ensures that the optimal
consumption levels under all tariffs are positive.
In a deterministic setting, where the consumer has no uncertainty about his preferences
β, it is straightforward to show that the optimal consumption level under a PU and a
FR tariff are
n∗PU =
β1 − β3 pPU
2β2
, n∗FR =
β1
2β2
,(3.3)
respectively. The solutions are unique because the utility function is quasi concave and
the corresponding cost function (3.1) is linear (see Hausman, 1985, p. 1257; Iyengar
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et al., 2008). The utility that is derived from these optimal consumption plans is given
by
UPU(n∗PU) =
(β1 − β3 pPU)2
4β2
, UFR(n∗FR) =
β21
4β2
− β3 fFR.(3.4)
A consumer is thus indifferent between a PU and a FR tariff if and only if his preferences
are such that β∗1 = 2β2
fFR
pPU
+ β3 pPU2 . For every β1 < β
∗
1, the consumer prefers the PU tariff
over the FR tariff and vice versa.
The derivation of the optimal consumption under a CC tariff is more complex because
the cost function is concave here. In general, there will thus exist an optimal consump-
tion level for each tariff segment (i.e, before and after reaching the cost cap) of the CC
tariff. Therefore, it is necessary to calculate the utility-maximizing consumption on
each tariff segment before one can then choose the segment that generates the higher
overall utility (cf. Hausman, 1985, p. 1256). In other words, we derive the optimal con-
sumption under a CC tariff under the expectation that the cost cap is not met (i.e., for
the PU-segment) and, independently, under the expectation that it is met (FR-segment),
constraint on the condition that the optimal consumption does not exceed the segment
boundaries. Hence, the candidates for the optimal consumption level under the CC
tariff are given by
n1CC = min{β1 − β3 pCC2β2 ,C}, n2CC = max{
β1
2β2
,C},(3.5)
where C denotes the consumption level that corresponds to the cost cap, i.e., C = cCCpCC .
Notice, that for any p > 0, it follows that n∗PU < n
∗
FR. Thus, at most one of the consump-
tion candidates can exceed bounds and admit the corner solution of C. Furthermore, it
can be shown that whenever a consumption candidate admits a corner solution, then
the other consumption candidate is optimal. Therefore, without loss of generality, we
can restrict our attention to the case where neither consumption candidate admits a cor-
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ner solution. Of course, a rational consumer would choose the consumption candidate
that yields the higher utility. The corresponding threshold β∗∗1 is derived as follows:
UCC(n1CC) = UCC(n2CC)⇔
β∗∗1 = 2β2
cCC
pCC
+
β3 pCC
2
= 2β2C +
β3 pCC
2
(3.6)
If β1 < β∗∗1 , n1CC is realized, otherwise n2CC. However, because pCC > pPU and cCC >
fFR it is immediately clear that UCC(n1CC) < UPU(n∗PU) and UCC(n2CC) < UFR(n
∗
FR).
Thus, independent of which consumption candidate is optimal under a CC tariff, both
are utility dominated by the optimal consumption plans under either the FR tariff, or
the PU tariff.
PROPOSITION 1 ≺CC CHOICE UNDER CERTAINTY. A rational consumer would never
choose a cost cap tariff over a flat rate or pay-per-use tariff if he has certainty about his prefer-
ences/demand.
Tariff consumption under uncertainty In the following, we relax the assumption that
the preferences are known with certainty and assume that β1 is a realization of the ran-
dom variable B1 that is distributed according to the probability density function fB1(β1)
and the corresponding cumulative distribution function FB1(β1). The only assumptions
that are made about FB1 are that (i) FB1(β3 pCC) = 0, which ensures a positive consump-
tion level for all β1 under all tariffs and (ii) that 0 < FB1(β∗∗1 ) < 1, which ensures that
both consumption candidates of the CC tariff, n1CC and n2CC, are chosen with positive
probability. Otherwise, the same logic as under certainty would apply and the CC tariff
would never be chosen by a rational consumer.
Under a FR and a PU tariff, it is easy to see that every realization β1 of the random
variable B1 directly determines the optimal consumption level according to equation
(3.3). Thus, under these two tariffs, the optimal consumption level is derived by a linear
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transformation of the random variable B1. Consequently, the optimal consumption
levels, denoted by NPU and NFR, respectively, are distributed according to
FNPU (n) = Prob(NPU ≤ n) = Prob(
B1 − β3 pPU
2β2
≤ n)
= FB1(2β2n + β3 pPU),(3.7)
FNFR(n) = FB1(2β2n).(3.8)
However, under a CC tariff the distribution of B1 does not linearly transform into the
distribution of the optimal consumption levels. To see this, recall from equation (3.6)
that given the realization β1 of the random variable B1, the consumer will consume
n1CC if β1 < β∗∗1 and n2CC, otherwise. For any β1, p > 0 it follows that n1CC < n2CC.
Thus, the consumption interval
(3.9) ∆ =
(
β∗∗1 − β3 pCC
2β2
,
β∗∗1
2β2
)
=
(
C− β3 pCC
4β2
,C +
β3 pCC
4β2
)
,
which is evenly spaced around the cost cap consumption C and has a width of δ =
β3 pCC/2β2, is never optimal. This is demonstrated by Figure 3.1. The kink in the cost
curve induces the consumer to avoid any consumption around the cost cap level. Intu-
itively, just below the cost cap level, the consumer would rather use the CC tariff like a
flat rate because the negative effect of slightly higher costs is over-compensated by the
positive effect of a much higher consumption level.
Consequently, the distribution of the optimal consumption levels under a cost cap tariff,
denoted by FNCC , has zero mass in the interval ∆ and can be written as follows:
(3.10) FNCC(n) =

FB1(2β2n + pCC) , if n ≤ C− β3 pCC4β2
FB1(2β2C +
β3 pCC
2 ) , if C− β3 pCC4β2 < n ≤ C +
β3 pCC
4β2
FB1(2β2n) , if n > C +
β3 pCC
4β2
PROPOSITION 2 ≺CC CONSUMPTION. A rational consumer of a cost cap tariff will never
(expect to) consume exactly at the level at which the cost cap becomes binding.
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FIGURE 3.1: Consumption under cost cap tariff
D
Note: Cost curve of a a cost cap tariff (solid) and optimal indifference curve (dashed) corresponding to
preference parameter β∗∗1 . The consumer is indifferent between consuming below or above the cost cap
level, but will never consume in the interval ∆ around the cost cap level.
Tariff choice under uncertainty We now investigate the tariff choice of a rational con-
sumer under uncertainty. The representative consumer is considered to be risk-neutral
and thus, he will choose the tariff that maximizes expected utility. From equations (3.4),
(3.5) and (3.6) it follows that
E[UCC] =
∫ β∗∗1
0
(β1 − β3 pCC)2
4β2
fB1(β1)dβ1 +
∫ ∞
β∗∗1
(
β21
4β2
− β3cCC
)
fB1(β1)dβ1
E[UFR] =
∫ ∞
0
(
β21
4β2
− β3 fFR
)
fB1(β1)dβ1(3.11)
E[UPU ] =
∫ ∞
0
(β1 − β3 pPU)2
4β2
fB1(β1)dβ1.
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We can then write the difference in expected utility between a CC tariff and a FR tariff
as follows:
E[UCC]− E[UFR] =
=
1
4β2
∫ ∞
0
β21 fB1(β1)dβ1 −
2β3 pCC
4β2
∫ β∗∗1
0
β1 fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=FB1(β∗∗1 ) E[B1|B1≤β∗∗1 ]
+
β23 p
2
CC
4β2
∫ β∗∗1
0
fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=FB1(β∗∗1 )
−β3cCC
∫ ∞
β∗∗1
fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−FB1(β∗∗1 )
− 1
4β2
∫ ∞
0
β21 fB1(β1)dβ1 + β3 fFR
∫ ∞
0
fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
.
By using cCC = pCC/4β2(2β∗∗1 − β3 pCC) from equation (3.6) we can derive:
E[UCC]− E[UFR] =
β3( fFR − cCC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ FB1(β∗∗1 )
β3 pCC
2β2︸ ︷︷ ︸
δ
(β∗∗1 − E[B1|B1 ≤ β∗∗1 ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
.(3.12)
Equation (3.12) demonstrates that the CC tariff may yield a higher expected utility than
the FR tariff (i) if the cost cap cCC is not much larger than the flat rate price fFR and
(ii) if low values of β1, i.e., β1 < β∗∗1 , are realized with a sufficiently high probability.
The first condition ensures that the first, negative summand of equation (3.12) is not
too small, whereas the second condition ensures that the second, positive summand is
rather large.
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Likewise, the difference between the expected utility of a CC tariff and a PU tariff can
be written as:
E[UCC]− E[UPU ] =
=
1
4β2
(
β23 p
2
CC
∫ β∗∗1
0
fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=FB1(β∗∗1 )
− 2β3(pCC − pPU)
∫ β∗∗1
0
β1 fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=FB1(β∗∗1 ) E[B1|B1≤β∗∗1 ]
− 4β2β3 cCC
∫ ∞
β∗∗1
fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1−FB1(β∗∗1 )
+2β3 pPU
∫ ∞
β∗∗1
β1 fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(1−FB1(β∗∗1 )) E[B1|B1≥β∗∗1 ]
− β23 p2PU
∫ ∞
0
fB1(β1)dβ1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
)
.
Again, replacing cCC = pCC/4β2(2β∗∗1 − β3 pCC) yields:
E[UCC]− E[UPU ] = β34β2
(
β3(p2CC − p2PU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ 2pPU (F(β∗∗1 ) E[B1|B1 ≤ β∗∗1 ] + (1− F(β∗∗1 )) E[B1|B1 ≥ β∗∗1 ])︸ ︷︷ ︸
E[B1]
− 2pCC (F(β∗∗1 ) E[B1|B1 ≤ β∗∗1 ] + (1− F(β∗∗1 )) β∗∗1 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Eˆ≤E[B1]
)
=
β3
4β2
((
pCC − pPU
) (
β3(pCC + pPU)− 2(E[B1] + Eˆ)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ 2
(
E[B1] pCC − Eˆ pPU
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
.(3.13)
Equation (3.13) reveals that the expected utility of a CC tariff may exceed that of a PU
tariff if (i) the minute-price of the CC tariff, pCC, is not much larger than the minute-
price of the PU tariff, pPU and (ii) if high values of β1, i.e., β1 > β∗∗1 are sufficiently
likely. Again, the first condition ensures that the first, negative summand of equation
(3.13) is not too small, whereas the second condition ensures that the second, positive
summand is rather large because E[B1] Eˆ.
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FIGURE 3.2: Optimal tariff choice for different preference levels and uncertainty levels
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Note: The figure is derived for the values pPU = 0.10, pCC = 0.12, cCC = 45, fFR = 40, β2 = 0.001, β3 = 1.
Notice that in order for the CC tariff to dominate both the FR and the PU tariff, the con-
sumer must face a sufficiently high probability for low and high values of β1. Evidently,
the CC tariff must additionally be reasonably priced in comparison to the FR and PU
tariff.
3.1.3 Example
To exemplify the impact of the probability distribution and the pricing of the CC tariff
on the choice of CC tariffs, consider the following uniform probability density function
of B1:
(3.14) fB1(β1) =

1/range , if offset− range/2 < β1 < offset + range/2
0 , otherwise
It is characterized by the two parameters offset and range which characterize the ex-
pected level of the preference parameter β1 and the level of uncertainty about β1, re-
spectively.
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Figure 3.2 shows the optimal tariff choice of a risk-neutral consumer for different values
of offset and range. In line with Proposition 1, the CC tariff is never optimal if the level
of uncertainty is too low. In this case and depending on the offset of the preference
parameter, i.e., whether the consumer is a ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ user, the FR or PU tariff is
chosen respectively. In reverse, the CC tariff is optimal in a region that is characterized
by an intermediate offset level and a large range. Intuitively, this means that the CC
tariff is optimal when a consumer has a high uncertainty about his demand, with both
a high probability that the demand will be low and and a high probability that the
demand will be high.
Figure 3.3 additionally demonstrates the impact of the pricing of the CC tariff on tar-
iff choice. More precisely, the figure shows the indifference hyperplanes between the
different tariff options along the dimensions pCC/pPU, cCC/ fFR and offset. It is easy to see
that the PU and FR tariff are chosen over the CC tariff if the latter is priced too high, i.e.
if pCC/pPU or cCC/ fFR are sufficiently large, respectively. In this case, the choice between
the FR and the PU tariff is independent of the pricing of the CC tariff, of course, and
depends only on the expected level of demand (offset).
To conclude, the example demonstrates that CC tariffs may indeed present an optimal
tariff choice for a rational and risk-neutral consumer under certain parameter condi-
tions. In particular, these depend on a consumer’s level of uncertainty about his pref-
erences, which, by equations (3.7) and (3.10), directly translates into demand uncer-
tainty.
PROPOSITION 3 ≺CHOICE OF CC TARIFFS UNDER UNCERTAINTY. A (reasonably
priced) cost cap tariff may be chosen over a flat rate and a pay-per-use tariff by a risk-neutral
consumer in the face of a sufficiently high demand uncertainty.
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FIGURE 3.3: Optimal tariff choice for different preference levels and parametrizations of the cost
cap tariff
Cost cap tariff has been altered by its price levels (pCC/pPU and cCC/ fFR). The figure is derived for the values
pPU = 0.10, fFR = 40, β2 = 0.001, β3 = 1 and range = 1.
3.1.4 Discussion
Summary of results This section has developed a theory on consumer utility under
cost cap tariffs by which the optimal consumption and choice under this new tariff
type can be determined. Under a reasonable set of assumptions, we find that a rational
consumer with no uncertainty in his preferences would never choose a cost cap tariff, as
it is either dominated by a pay-per-use or a flat rate tariff. However, cost cap tariffs are
an optimal tariff choice for those consumers that face considerable uncertainty about
their future demand, such that both, relatively low and relatively high consumption
levels are considered feasible. In this case, cost cap tariffs provide an insurance against
extraordinary high costs (like a flat rate), but also cost flexibility in case of low demand
(like a pay-per-use tariff).
Limitations and future research The present model merely considers the rational
choice of a risk-neutral consumer. However, as stated in Chapter 2 earlier research
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found that the rational tariff choice is systematically biased, e.g., due the insurance ef-
fect (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a), the flexibility effect (Kraemer and Wiewiorra, 2012),
or the overestimation effect (Nunes, 2000). The extend of a bias for cost cap tariffs, in
particular in relation to the well-known flat rate bias, should therefore be considered in
theoretical models in more detail by future research.
3.2 Empirical Validation
In the following, the previously developed utility theory is evaluated based on stated
preference data.
3.2.1 Methodology
We contracted with a professional marketing research agency to conduct an online sur-
vey with a sample that is representative of the population of German mobile telephony
users. A total of 122 respondents completed the survey, which consisted of two parts.
In the first part, respondents had to imagine that they use a PU tariff for mobile tele-
phony and that this is the only tariff type available to them. In a repeated open-
ended question design (Miller et al., 2011) the respondents had to estimate their av-
erage monthly mobile telephony usage (in minutes), given minute prices (in e/min)
of pPU = {0.40,0.20,0.10,0.05}. Consequently, four price consumption tuples were re-
ported for every respondent.
In the second part, respondents were presented six different mobile telephony tariffs.
Each tariff type (PU, CC, FR) occurred twice with two different price levels (see Table
3.1). For each tariff, respondents had to estimate their maximum, minimum and aver-
age monthly usage (in minutes). In addition, the attractiveness of each tariff had to be
rated on a seven-point scale (1=very unattractive, 7=very attractive).
53
Chapter 3 Consumer Choice under Cost Cap Tariffs
TABLE 3.1: Tariffs to be evaluated by respondents
PU CC FR
base fee ( f ) 0 (0) e 0 (0) e 20 (25) e
minute price (p) 0.10 (0.13) e/min 0.12 (0.15) e/min 0.00 (0.00) e/min
cost cap (c) 0 (0) e 25 (30) e 0 (0) e
Note: High price level in parentheses.
The data from the first part of the survey is used to estimate the individual pref-
erence parameters (E[B1],β2). We know from equation (3.3) that E[NPU ] = (E[B1] −
β3 pPU)/(2β2). Without loss of generality we further normalize β3 = 1. Using the
four consumption price tuples [E[NPU ], pPU ]it from each respondent i, an ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) can be conducted for each individual in order to estimate the
parameters (E[B1],β2).
To derive fB1(β), a uniform distribution as in (3.14) centered around E[B1] (i.e., offset)
is assumed. Whereby range is computed from the stated minimum and maximum us-
age under the PU tariff of the second part of the survey. According to (3.3), the range
becomes
range = β1max − β1min = 2β2(nmax − nmin).
We then evaluate our theoretical model in two different ways. First, the theoretically
expected usage is compared to the average usage under each given tariff reported in
the second part of the survey. Second, the theoretically derived expected utility is used
as a predictor for the actual rating of these tariffs.
3.2.2 Results
Evaluation of the usage prediction Given the individual estimates, a respondent’s
expected usage is calculated according to equations (3.7), (3.8) and (3.10) for each of
the six tariffs. We use an OLS regression (Model 1 in Table 3.2) to study the correla-
tion of predicted and reported average usage, while controlling for the different tariffs
and price levels. In order to account for individual differences in rating behaviour, a
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TABLE 3.2: Fixed-effects OLS regressions of model predictions on reported values
(1) (2)
Average usage Tariff rating
Expected usage 0.901∗∗∗ (0.147)
Expected utility 0.058∗∗∗ (0.006)
High price −26.903∗∗∗ (7.062) −0.162 (0.116)
CC tariff 9.354 (6.390) 0.381∗∗ (0.146)
FR tariff 73.069∗∗∗ (10.214) 2.509∗∗∗ (0.149)
Constant −1.168 (20.123) 2.284∗∗∗ (0.165)
Observations 6x122 6x122
R2 0.806 0.536
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
fixed-effect estimation is considered.1 The regression coefficient is significant and with
0.901 close to one, indicating a good prediction quality. However, the theoretical model
has a slight tendency to overestimate the reported usage. This is particularly true for
the reported usage under the tariffs with a high price level. Moreover, we find that
respondents tend to overestimate their usage under a FR tariff. This so-called overesti-
mation effect is well-known from previous research (see, e.g., Nunes, 2000). Finally, the
regression model explains 80.6 % of the total variance, indicating a good model fit.
Evaluation of utility prediction Given the individual preference parameters, the util-
ity for each tariff is predicted according to equations (3.11). A respondent’s expected
utility under a given tariff is then regressed on his rating for this tariff, using the same
regression model and controls as before. Model 2 in Table 3.2 shows that there exists
a significant and positive relationship between the expected utility derived from the
theoretical model and a respondent’s tariff rating. Moreover, a significant portion of
the total variance can be explained, which indicates a good model fit. Furthermore, we
find a significant tariff bias. In comparison to the PU tariff, the CC tariff is assigned a
0.381 higher rating score, everything else equal. By far the largest bias is found for the
FR tariff, however. This finding is in line with earlier research on tariff bias (see, e.g.,
Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a).
1This means that each respondent is allowed to have an individual intercept, whereas the regression
coefficient is constrained to be the same across all respondents.
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3.2.3 Discussion
Summary of results The results provide evidence for the validity of the implied util-
ity model for consumption under cost cap tariffs. By the use of stated preference data
from a simple repeated open-ended question design, respondents’ individual prefer-
ence parameter were estimated. The subsequently calculated utility is a significant ex-
planatory variable to explain tariff choice. Furthermore, the predicted consumption is
strongly correlated with actually stated average consumption.
Limitations and future research There are, however, two major shortcomings of the
model as well as its empirical validation. First, the utility model is restricted to con-
sumer choice under two-part tariffs and does not take into account a potential con-
sumption allowance. Second, the empirical validation is limited in its calculation of
consumer uncertainty, as it is determined under rather strict specifications. Thus, the
following chapter develops an extended utility model with a more sophisticated em-
pirical analysis to overcome these shortcomings.
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Consumer Choice under Four-Part Tariffs
“I hate being on the phone”
A survey respondent
THIS chapter extends the previously proposed model on consumer behavior to ac-count for four-part tariffs. Due to the complexity of four-part tariffs a theoretical
approach is difficult. Therefore, the model is empirically validated by a repeated choice
experiment with subsequent hierarchical Bayes mixed logit estimation of respondents’
preference parameters. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides an
overview on earlier research on tariff choice. Deduced from these studies, a discrete/
continuous choice model is developed in Section 4.2 along with an estimation of con-
sumers’ preference parameters. The results in Section 4.3 show the superiority of the
extended model to alternative approaches in all evaluation criteria. The chapter closes
with a summary of the results and an overview of prospective future research.
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4.1 Related Literature
Research on nonlinear pricing is rooted in welfare economics (Leland and Meyer, 1976;
Murphy, 1977; Schlereth and Skiera, 2012) and has been mainly studied from a theo-
retical perspective (Bagh and Bhargava, 2013; Essegaier et al., 2002; Hayes, 1987; Sun-
dararajan, 2004). Yet, there has been an increase in empirical research (Danaher, 2002;
Iyengar et al., 2008; Lambrecht et al., 2007; Schlereth et al., 2010) within the last decade.
An important aspect of modeling of consumer behavior under different tariffs is the
literature on discrete/continuous choice models (Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Hane-
mann, 1984). These models assume that a discrete choice and a continuous choice are
made simultaneously. Applied to the case of tariffs, this assumption would state that a
consumer already knows his exact consumption under every tariff alternative. Hence,
the discrete choice of a tariff incorporates the continuous consumption choice. These
models have been extended in several ways, such as incorporating attrition probabili-
ties (Danaher, 2002). Even more, Lambrecht et al. (2007) demonstrated the importance
of ex ante uncertainty about the continuous consumption choice at the time of dis-
crete tariff choice. This study revealed that consumers have significant uncertainty
and that the extent of such uncertainty is heterogeneous over consumers. As a con-
sequence, uncertainty decreases consumer surplus and increases provider’s revenues.
Consequently, the discrete choice is made under the expectation of continuous choice.
Subsequent studies provided further evidence for this finding (Goettler and Clay, 2011;
Iyengar et al., 2008). Under the assumption of uncertain consumption, Iyengar et al.
(2008) and Schlereth et al. (2011) developed a methodological approach to infer con-
sumer preferences from a repeated choice experiment. The authors showed the su-
periority of their models in estimating individual consumption. The models consider
the two-way dependency of consumption and price under three-part tariffs. Related
studies improved the understanding of consumption under tariff specific characteris-
tics. Ascarza et al. (2012) and Lambrecht et al. (2007) studied tariffs with allowance and
flat rate tariffs and found a significant increase of consumption under such tariffs. Fur-
thermore, Ho and Zhang (2008) focused on the effect of fixed fee framing of two-part
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tariffs on consumer churn rates. They found a relationship of consumers’ loss aver-
sion on market outcomes. Iyengar et al. (2011) studied the framing of pay-per-use and
traditional two-part tariffs. The authors found that consumers derive a lower utility
from consumption under the two-part tariff which cannot be explained by income ef-
fects. The so called “access fee effect” impacts consumers’ retention, consumption and
provider’s pricing policy. Later, Goh and Bockstedt (2012) confirmed the importance
of fixed fees in the connection with allowances as an anchor to initially evaluate tariff
attractiveness, which in turn impacts decision making. Another more recent advance-
ment in choice modeling is the consideration of learning effects (Ascarza et al., 2012;
Goettler and Clay, 2011; Iyengar et al., 2007; Narayanan et al., 2007). These models
account for consumer learning effects on their consumption uncertainty. By receiv-
ing feedback on ex post consumption consumers can adjust previous tariff choice and
overcome a potential tariff bias (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a). However, only revealed
preference studies were able to account for learning effects as they require observations
over time. While previous research focused on two and three part tariffs, Schlereth and
Skiera (2012) showed the portability of the discrete/continuous choice model to novel
nonlinear pricing schemes. In this vein, Schlereth and Skiera studied consumer choice
under bucket pricing plans, under which consumers pay a fixed fee allowing them to
use a service up to a set allowance.
As proposed by Schlereth and Skiera (2012), empirical research can be separated into
approaches using revealed (Ascarza et al., 2012; Goettler and Clay, 2011; Iyengar et al.,
2007; Lambrecht et al., 2007; Narayanan et al., 2007) and stated consumer preferences
(Iyengar et al., 2008; Schlereth and Skiera, 2012). Revealed preferences can be acquired
from actual consumption and choice observations in the field. Therefore, revealed pref-
erences feature high external validity. In contrast, controlled experiments are used to
reveal stated preferences. Although having lower external validity, stated preferences
imply the possibility to vary tariff conditions and to observe consumers’ reactions.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the most recent empirical research on tariff choice
and consumption. The previous references are categorized in several ways. First, mod-
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eling the utility function can be differentiated by either using an additive or quadratic
approach. Whereas the additive utility function is simply the sum of consumers’ part
worth utilities from tariff components, the quadratic utility function accounts for the re-
lationship of perceived tariff utility and consumption. As discussed in Chapter 2, using
a quadratic approach involves more complex calculations, but in turn also allows incor-
porating diminishing marginal utility, and to model consumption satiation level. With
the exception of Ho and Zhang (2008) and Goh and Bockstedt (2012) who combined
choice experiments with field observations, earlier research studied consumer behav-
ior by either using revealed or stated preferences. Further modeling aspects include the
consideration of uncertainty, the use of learning models, and aspects of tariff framing
as discussed before. Table 4.1 points out the gap of research on innovative nonlinear
pricing approaches, which has only been considered by Schlereth and Skiera (2012) so
far.
Deduced from earlier research, this chapter develops a quadratic utility model for con-
sumer choice of four-part tariffs incorporating consumer uncertainty in consumption
preference. As the focus of this study is the interaction of all four tariff components, a
controlled variation of the components is essential. Thus, a stated preference approach
with a repeated choice experiment is used to study consumer behavior. Although this
approach allows to control for framing effects, it is, however, limited in its applicability
to study learning effects.
4.2 Methodology
A four-part tariff j can be described by a tuple tj = ( f j, Aj, pj, cj). In accordance to Chap-
ter 2, f j describes a fixed fee which has to be paid upfront. Often a consumer i acquires
an allowance Aj for a limited consumption free of charge. Exceeding the allowance re-
sults in consumption which is further priced with a usage price pj. The total costs Kij,
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TABLE 4.1: Overview on empirical research on tariff choice and consumption
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Danaher (2002) consumption rate &
consumer retention
  2PT
Iyengar et al.
(2007)
choice &
consumption
learning
    3PT
Lambrecht et al.
(2007)
choice &
consumption with
uncertainty
    3PT
Narayanan et al.
(2007)
choice &
consumption
learning
   2PT
Iyengar et al.
(2008)
choice &
consumption with
uncertainty
   3PT
Ho and Zhang
(2008)
effects of tariff
framing
 G#   2PT
Iyengar et al.
(2011)
effects of tariff
framing
   2PT
Goettler and
Clay (2011)
choice &
consumption
learning
    2PT
Schlereth et al.
(2011)
choice &
consumption
measurement
  G# G# 3PT
Redden and
Hoch (2011)
heuristic choice    3PT
Ascarza et al.
(2012)
effects of tariff
framing
     3PT
Goh and
Bockstedt (2012)
effects of tariff
framing
    3PT
Iyengar and
Jedidi (2012)
choice &
consumption under
quantity discounts
 G#  2PT
Schlereth and
Skiera (2012)
innovative pricing    2PT
this research innovative pricing     4PT
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however, can never exceed the predefined cost cap cj. Consequently, the total costs a
consumer has to pay under a four-part tariff depends on his usage nij:
(4.1) Kij(nij) =

f j if 0≤ nij ≤ Aj
f j + pj(nij − Aj) if Aj < nij ≤ Cj
cj otherwise,
with Cj being the corresponding consumption to reach cost cap cj
(4.2) Cj = (cj − f j)/pj + Aj.
Note that the four-part tariff includes every possible tariff subcase (see Section 2.2) by
adjusting tj = ( f j, Aj, pj, cj) accordingly. This includes traditional two-part tariffs (tj =
( f j,0, pj,∞)) and three-part tariffs with allowance (tj = ( f j, Aj, pj,∞)).
Model Development Consider now a consumer i who has to choose one alternative
j from a choice set with J tariffs. At that point in time the consumer assumes ex ante his
consumption nij under this tariff and spends his remaining budget on an unobservable
outside good zij. In doing so his utility increases in consumption with a decreasing
rate. Assuming that the consumer is certain about his consumption, namely his ex
ante consumption is equivalent to the ex post consumption, consumer’s utility Uij is
equivalent to:
(4.3) Uij = βi1nij − βi2n2ij + βi3zij
subject to consumer’s budget constraint
(4.4) wi = Kij(nij) + zij pz
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where Kij denotes the total costs under a four-part tariff in dependence on consumer’s
consumption, and wi describes his available budget. The resulting relationship between
wi, nij and zij with pz = 1 are visualized in Figure 4.1.
FIGURE 4.1: Budget constraint under four-part tariff
Aj Cj
nij
wi - fj
wi-fj-pjHCj-AjL
zij
The utility function is specified by a quadratic function as described in Section 2.3,
which guarantees satiation si = βi1/2βi2 in consumption (Iyengar et al., 2008; Schlereth
and Skiera, 2012). βi1 determines the increase in utility from consumption, while βi2
determines the diminishing rate. Lastly, a preference for the outside option is described
by βi3. Thus, preferences are described by ~βi and vary across consumers. Under the
assumption that the consumer exhausts his budget, the indirect utility function can be
obtained by substituting zij = (wi−Kij(nij))/pz. Without loss of generality, the price of the
outside good is normalized to pz = 1, so that the indirect utility function becomes:
(4.5) Uij =

βi1nij − βi2n2ij + βi3(wi − f j) if 0≤ nij ≤ Aj
βi1nij − βi2n2ij + βi3(wi − f j − (nij − Aj)pj) if Aj < nij ≤ Cj
βi1nij − βi2n2ij + βi3(wi − f j − (Cj − Aj)pj) if Cj < nij
The budget constraint is piecewise convex as well as concave as illustrated in Figure
4.1. Hence, there is no unique solution to the maximization problem (Hausman, 1979).
Yet, the budget constraint can be considered by two convex sections (low, high) di-
vided by Cj. Each section yields a unique solution to the maximization problem, so
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that the global optimum can be identified by U∗ij = max(U
low
ij ,U
high
ij ) as stated by Haus-
man (1985). It is easy to see that due to the convexity of the budget constraint and the
concavity of the utility function the break-even consumption of the cost cap will never
be optimal. Therefore, there is an abrupt rise in consumption at β∗i1 = 2βi2Cj + βi3 pj/2
as already described in Section 3.1.2. For simplicity it is assumed that consumers al-
ways decide to consume within the low section if their utility is indifferent.
Maximizing the indirect utility function under these specifications entails the con-
sumer’s optimal demand function n∗ij:
(4.6) n∗ij =

βi1
2βi2
if 0≤ n∗ij ≤ Aj
βi1−βi3 pj
2βi2
if Aj < n∗ij ≤ Cj
βi1
2βi2
if Cj < n∗ij
Aj otherwise.
Note that optimal demand is independent of f j and wi because income effects are ex-
cluded. If a consumer’s satiation si is small enough, consumption stays within the
allowance Aj. However, if consumption is within (Aj,Cj], the monetary perception of
pj causes a reduction in consumption. Substituting optimal demand into the indirect
utility function yields consumer’s optimal utility:
(4.7) U∗ij =

β2i1
4βi2
+ βi3(wi − f j) if 0≤ nij ≤ Aj
(βi1−βi3 pj)2
4βi2
+ βi3(wi − f j + Aj pj) if Aj < nij ≤ Cj
β2i1
4βi2
+ βi3(wi − f j − (Cj − Aj)pj) if Cj < nij
So far a rational consumer has been assumed to exactly anticipate his usage under a
given tariff - whereby the ex ante consumption was equivalent to its ex post. How-
ever, earlier studies have shown that this specification may not reflect actual consumer
behavior (Lambrecht et al., 2007) and that consumers may be uncertain about their
consumption preferences (Grubb, 2009; Hayes, 1987; Kridel et al., 1993). Hereafter, con-
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sumer preference βi1 is assumed to be a realization of the random variable Bi1 dis-
tributed according to the probability density function f (βi1) and the corresponding
cumulative distribution function F(βi1).
As a consequence, optimal consumption n∗ij is distributed as well being dependent on
βi1. Figure 4.2 illustrates this dependency. As βi1 determines the increase in utility
from consumption, the optimal consumption level increases linearly in βi1 as long as
consumer’s satiation level is below the tariff allowance. The consumer exhausts exactly
the allowance as long as βi1 ∈ [β˜i11 = 2βi2Aj, β˜i12 = 2βi2Aj + βi3 pj]. This is because
his satiation level si is above the allowance and a negative perception of βi3 pj reduces
his willingness to further consume. As soon as this preference exceeds the threshold
β˜i12 = 2βi2 Aj + βi3 pj optimal consumption increases further. Finally, at β˜i13 = 2βi2Cj +
1/2βi3 pj consumption jumps from linear pricing to consumption under the cost cap.
Hereafter, consumption follows consumer’s satiation similar to consumption below the
allowance. Because si itself is linearly dependent on βi1, consumption rises linearly
again. Taking uncertainty into account, the consumer considers the whole nonlinear
FIGURE 4.2: Optimal consumption as a function of preference parameter
2Βi2Aj 2Βi2Aj+Βi3pj 2Βi2Cj+12Βi3pj
Βi1
Cj
nij
spectrum of the four-part tariff. The four possible sections can be summarized as:
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i) consume below the allowance,
0≤ nij ≤ Aj⇔ 0≤ βi1 ≤ β˜i11 = 2βi2Aj
ii) consume exactly the allowance,
Aj = nij⇔ β˜i11 = 2βi2Aj ≤ βi1 ≤ β˜i12 = 2βi2Aj + βi3 pj
iii) consume with marginal price pj per minute,
Aj < nij ≤ Cj⇔ β˜i12 = 2βi2Aj + βi3 pj < βi1 ≤ β˜i13 = 2βi2Cj + 1/2βi3 pj
iv) consume within cost cap,
Cj < nij⇔ β˜i13 = 2βi2Cj + 1/2βi3 pj < βi1
Hence, prior to deciding for a tariff alternative, a consumer has only an expectation
about future consumption. After the decision has been taken, the actual ex post con-
sumption can differ from the expected ex ante consumption. Therefore, the model
takes into account the intertemporal nature of the choice and consumption decisions
(Miravete, 2002), instead of a simultaneous specification (Hanemann, 1984; Dubin and
McFadden, 1984). A consumer considers preference uncertainty and then evaluates the
tariff based on his expected utility which is:
E(Uij) =P(0≤ βi1 ≤ β˜i11) E(Uij | 0≤ βi1 ≤ β˜i11) +(4.8)
P(β˜i11 < βi1 ≤ β˜i12) E(Uij | β˜i11 < βi1 ≤ β˜i12) +
P(β˜i12 < βi1 ≤ β˜i13) E(Uij | β˜i12 < βi1 ≤ β˜i13) +
P(β˜i13 < βi1) E(Uij | β˜i13 < βi1)
The relationship between βi1 and the corresponding utility Uij are illustrated in Figure
4.3.
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FIGURE 4.3: Optimal utility as a function of the preference parameter
2Βi2Aj 2Βi2Aj+Βi3pj 2Βi2Cj+12Βi3pj
Βi1
Uij
Using the optimal indirect utility function from Equation (4.7) yields:
E(U∗ij) =(4.9)
(F(β˜i11)− F(0)) E(β
2
i1 | 0≤ βi1 ≤ β˜i11)
4βi2
+
(F(β˜i12)− F(β˜i11))
(
E
(
βi1 | β˜i11 < βi1 ≤ β˜i12
)
Aj − βi2A2j
)
+
(F(β˜i13)− F(β˜i12))
E
(
β2i1 | β˜i12 < βi1 ≤ β˜i13
)− E(βi1 | β˜i12 < βi1 ≤ β˜i13)βi3 pj + (βi3 pj)2
4βi2
+
(1− F(β˜i13)) E(β
2
i1 | β˜i13 < βi1)
4βi2
+
βi3(wi − f j) + (F(β˜i13)− F(β˜i12))(βi3Aj pj)− (1− F(β˜i13))(Cj − Aj)pj
Note that the expected utility is twofold. Firstly, there is the expected utility gained
from consumption conditionally on each section; secondly, the expected disutility from
involved costs. It is easy to see that the variance of βi1 is crucial for the probability to
consume within different sections of the tariff.
It is reasonable to believe that βi1 is distributed lognormal lnβi1 ∼N (µi,σ2i ), since then
increasing utility with consumption would be assumed. Under this specification, the
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corresponding density function f (βi1) and the cumulative density function F(βi1) be-
come:
f (βi1) =
1
βi1
√
2piσ2i
exp(−1
2
(
lnβi1 − µi
σi
)2
)(4.10)
F(βi1) =Φ
(
lnβi1 − µi
σi
)
(4.11)
with Φ() denoting the cummulative standard normal distribution. Hence, the ex-
pected values are:
E
(
βi1 | β˜i1k < βi1 ≤ β˜i1(k+1)
)
=
exp(µi + σ
2
i /2) +
Φ
(
σi − ln β˜i1k−µiσi
)
−Φ
(
σi − ln β˜i1(k+1)−µiσi
)
Φ
(
ln β˜i1(k+1)−µi
σi
)
−Φ
(
ln β˜i1(k)−µi
σi
)
E
(
β2i1 | β˜i1k < βi1 ≤ β˜i1(k+1)
)
=
exp(2µi + 2σ2i ) +
Φ
(
2σi − ln β˜i1k−µiσi
)
−Φ
(
2σi − ln β˜i1(k+1)−µiσi
)
Φ
(
ln β˜i1(k+1)−µi
σi
)
−Φ
(
ln β˜i1(k)−µi
σi
)
∀k ∈ {0,1,2,3}
Nevertheless, the expected utility is not dependent on the assumption of a lognormal
distribution and may work with any other function as well.
In summary, a consumer’s tariff choice is dependent on the expected utility across tar-
iff alternatives. Uncertainty in preference affects utility in two ways simultaneous by
varying both consumer’s consumption as well as the likelihood of consuming within
different sections of a tariff alternative.
Model Estimation The proposed model is estimated using a hierarchical Bayes mixed
logit approach (Allenby and Rossi, 1999; Train, 2001, 2009). In doing so, a consumer
i ∈ I faces several choice sets t ∈ T including J alternatives. It is assumed that the
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consumer chooses the alternative j which maximize his utility. However, the researcher
is not able to observe all factors impacting consumer’s utility which are only known to
the consumer. This leads to an error term eijt which is assumed to be distributed iid
extreme value over consumers, alternatives, and choice occasions. Using McFadden’s
random utility model (McFadden, 1974), a consumer’s utility becomes:
(4.12) U˜ijt = E(Uijt) + eijt,
where E(Uijt) is the expected utility as described by Equation (4.9). Due to the fact
that calculating the expected costs under nonlinear pricing schemes is a complex task
(Redden and Hoch, 2011; Viswanathan et al., 2005), it is reasonable to believe that con-
sumers differ in their ability to cope with such a decision problem. Hence, a consumer
having problems handling the complexity should exhibit a larger variance in his er-
ror term. Consumer’s degree of choice rationality is described by γi which also states
consumers ability to handle choice complexity (Ho and Zhang, 2008). Let θi sum-
marize all parameters describing consumers’ observed utility and choice rationality,
i.e. θ
′
i = (µi,σi,βi2,βi3,γi). Furthermore, consumers’ tariff decisions are described by
y
′
i = (yi11, ...,yijt), with yijt = 1 when consumer i chooses alternative j in choice set t and
zero otherwise. The choices of the full sample are denoted by Y = (y1, ...,yI). Using
the mixed logit as described in Equation (2.7), the likelihood of consumer i’s observed
choices, conditional on θi is then:
(4.13) L(yi | θi) =∏
t
∏
j
(
exp(γiE(Uijt))
∑j exp(γiE(Uijt)) + 1
)yijt
Note that γi equals the logit precision parameter (Train, 2009). Hence, when a consumer
exhibits a random choice behavior, γi becomes zero, while γi =∞ describes a consumer
always choosing the alternative with the highest observed utility.
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To account for consumer heterogeneity, the individual parameters are assumed to be
distributed lognormal with mean θ¯ and covariance matrix Ω: lnθ ∼ N (θ¯,Ω). The un-
conditional likelihood is then the integral of L(yi | θi) over all θ.
(4.14) L(yi | θ¯,Ω) =
∫
L(yi | θi) f (θi | θ¯,Ω)dθ
In order to draw from the posterior distribution, priors for θ¯ and Ω are described
noninformative as θ¯ is distributed multivariate normal and Ω is distributed inverted
Wishart (Iyengar et al., 2008; Train, 2009). By definition, the joint posterior distribution
becomes:
(4.15) K(θ¯,Ω,θi∀i | Y) ∝∏
i
L(yi | θi) f (θi | θ¯,Ω)k(θ¯,Ω)
As expected consumption is nonlinear, the applicability of classical maximum likeli-
hood methods is difficult (Rossi and Allenby, 2003). However, using a hierarchical
Bayes procedure allows a fast and simple way to draw from the posterior distribu-
tion (Train, 2009). Thereby, each θi is considered to be a parameter along with θ¯ and
Ω. Drawing parameters conditional on the other parameters result in values which
converge to draws from the joint posterior distribution. After convergence has been
reached, the mean and standard error of the parameters can be calculated from addi-
tional draws and provide information on the individual consumer level. Drawing pa-
rameters is realized by the use of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods which
are described in Figure 4.4
Study Design A repeated choice study on mobile telephony tariffs was conducted in
order to evaluate the proposed model’s ability to predict consumer choice. The choice
study was embedded in an online questionnaire1 alongside questions on respondents’
consumption behavior and demographics. Respondents faced thirteen choice sets in
random order which consisted of three alternative four-part tariffs and a no-choice op-
tion. In order to face respondents’ heterogeneity and to avoid strictly dominant alter-
1The full questionnaire is available in Appendix A.2.3.
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FIGURE 4.4: Hierarchical Bayes estimation as described by Train (2009)
Step 2 (Gibbs Sampling): Treat 𝜃, 𝜃𝑖  as known 
 
Draw from posterior on Ω, which is distributed Inverted Wishard with 
𝐾 + 𝐼 degrees of freedom and scale matrix (𝐾𝑁 + 𝐼𝑆1), where 
𝑆1 =
1
𝐼
 (𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃)(𝜃𝑖 − 𝜃)′𝑖 , 𝐾 denotes the dimension of 𝜃 and N 
denotes the scale 𝐾-dimensional identity matrix. 
Step 3 (Metropolis Hastings): Treat 𝜃, Ω as known 
 
Draw from the posterior for each respondent‘s 𝜃𝑖  which is 
𝐾 𝜃𝑖 𝜃, Ω, 𝑦𝑖 ∝ 𝐿 𝑦𝑖 𝜃𝑖 𝑓 𝜃𝑖 𝜃, Ω . Draws are conducted using the 
Metropolis Hastings algorithm: 
a) Start with value 𝜃𝑖
0 
b) Draw K independent values from a standard lognormal density 
function and label them 𝜂1 
c) Create trial value of 𝜃𝑖
1 as 𝜃 𝑖
1 = 𝜃𝑖
0 + 𝜌𝐿𝜂1, where 𝜌 is a scalar 
specified by the researcher and 𝐿 is the Choleski factor of Ω 
d) Draw standard uniform variable 𝜗1 
e) Calculate the ratio: 
𝐹 =
𝐿 𝑦𝑖 𝜃 𝑖
1)𝑓(𝜃 𝑖
1|𝜃, Ω)
𝐿 𝑦𝑖 𝜃𝑖
0)𝑓(𝜃𝑖
0|𝜃, Ω)
 
f) If 𝜗1 ≤ 𝐹, accept 𝜃 𝑖
1 and let 𝜃𝑖
1 = 𝜃 𝑖
1 and reject 𝜃 𝑖
1 otherwise 
g) Repeat the process many times. For high enough t, 𝜃𝑖
𝑡  is a draw from 
the posterior 
Step 1 (Gibbs Sampling): Treat 𝜃𝑖 , Ω as known 
 
Draw from posterior on 𝜃, which is 𝑁 𝜃 ,
Ω
𝐼
 with sample mean 𝜃  of the 
𝜃𝑖  and 𝐼 equals the sample size. 
  
Ω|𝜃, 𝜃𝑖∀𝑖 
𝜃𝑖|𝜃, Ω 
𝜃|Ω, 𝜃𝑖∀𝑖 
joint 
posterior 
𝜃, Ω, 𝜃𝑖∀𝑖 
assign 
prior
𝜃0, Ω0, 𝜃0𝑖∀𝑖 
Note: Repeating these steps for many iterations results to draws from the joint posterior distribution. After
convergence is achieved, estimates and standard errors of the parameters can be obtained from the draws.
A detailed describtion is provided in Train (2009).
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natives, two arrangements have been made. First, three different heterogeneous de-
signs have been implemented to accommodate for respondent’s heterogeneity (Sandor
and Wedel, 2005). As satiation levels differ between respondents, it is more likely for
respondents with low or high consumption to encounter a dominant alternative. By
generating choice sets adjusted on satiation levels for each consumer group, the num-
ber of dominant choices is reduced. Group specific choice sets have been created with
an aggregated customization approach (Arora and Huber, 2001) using parameter esti-
mates from an earlier pilot study. Second, each D-optimal design was revised using an
utility-balance approach (Huber and Zwerina, 1996) to guarantee the absence of domi-
nant alternatives in any choice set. Each tariff alternative was composed of a fixed fee,
a usage price, an allowance as well as a cost cap with either three or four different lev-
els. The possible levels were chosen to be discrete instead of continuous for statistical
reasons (Kanninen, 2002). They are described in Table 4.2.
TABLE 4.2: Tariff component levels for low, medium and high consumption group
group (l)ow (m)edium (h)igh
fixed fee
fl = {0 e,5 e,7.5 e,10 e}
fm = {0 e,15 e,17.5 e,20 e}
fh = {0 e,25 e,27.5 e,30 e}
usage price
pl = {0 e/min,0.10 e/min,0.15 e/min,0.20 e/min}
pm = {0 e/min,0.10 e/min,0.15 e/min,0.20 e/min}
ph = {0 e/min,0.10 e/min,0.15 e/min,0.20 e/min}
allowance
Al = {0 min,25 min,50 min}
Am = {0 min,100 min,150 min}
Ah = {0 min,300 min,450 min}
cost cap
cl = {15 e,20 e,∞}
cm = {30 e,40 e,∞}
ch = {40 e,50 e,∞}
The proposed levels reflect actual market price levels at the time of the study. The tariff
alternatives were created by the Cartesian product f × p × A × c for each consumer
group separately. Note that defining the tariff alternative allows to exclude a single
component by including the appropriate level, e.g. f = 0 excludes the fixed fee. This
approach allows modeling of any one-part, two-part or three-part tariff. Possible exam-
72
4.2 Methodology
ples include the pay-per-use and flat rate tariff. An exemplary choice set is illustrated
in Table 4.3.
TABLE 4.3: Exemplary choice set for medium consumption
tariff component Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
None
fixed fee 20 e 0 e 17.50 e
usage price 0 e/min 0.15 e/min 0.10 e/min
allowance 0 min 0 min 150 min
cost cap without 30 e 40 e
Your choice:
At the beginning of the questionnaire respondents were introduced to the tariff design
by explaining each tariff component as well as their interaction. Two control questions
were used to guarantee that every respondent did in fact understand the survey design.
Afterwards, satiation levels have been approximated using an open-ended contingent
valuation approach (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Miller et al., 2011). Based on the ap-
proximated satiation level, respondents were redirected to the group specific choice
sets.
Data Collection A total sample of 1,000 respondents were recruited in collaboration
with a professional panel provider. The respondents were selected to be representa-
tive in gender, age and household income for the German mobile telecommunications
market.2 All respondents passed a screening procedure which ensured that they under-
stood the tariff choice task prior to starting the repeated choice experiment. Moreover,
the online questionnaire included three validity questions. The first question controlled
for study attention by asking respondents to give a specific answer to a control ques-
tion. The second question controlled for answer consistency by comparing answers of
the same question in the middle and at the end of the questionnaire. The third question
controlled for truthfulness by directly asking the respondents whether they have an-
swered truthfully. 140 respondents were excluded from further analysis due to failing
these control questions. A further 14 respondents were excluded due to an unreason-
2Sample demographics are illustrated in Appendix A.2.1.
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ably low response time. Lastly, 100 respondents consistently choosing the non-choice
option were not included in the analysis due to absence of choice information. The re-
sulting sample included 746 respondents of whom 365 (48.93%) were female and 381
(51.07%) were male.
4.3 Results
Out of the thirteen choice sets, two choice sets were randomly selected for each re-
spondent as hold-out sets. MCMC estimation (Train, 2009) was based on the remaining
eleven choice sets for each respondent resulting in 8206 (=746×11) discrete choice de-
cisions. In addition to the proposed model with (Model 2) and without uncertainty
(Model 3) (see Equations 4.7 and 4.9), an extended model with consideration of the flat
rate bias (Train, 1991; Lambrecht et al., 2007) was estimated (Model 4). For this reason,
an additive term ςi has been used to account for consumers’ preference for flat rate
tariffs tFR = ( fFR,0,0,∞):
(4.16) U˜ijt = E(Uijt) + ςi Ij + eijt,
where Ij is an indicator function which is one if tariff j is a flat rate tariff and is zero
otherwise. The three proposed models, which take the interplay of consumption and
choice into account, are compared with a traditional conjoint approach using an addi-
tive utility function (Model 1), i.e.:
(4.17) U˜ijt = β
′
i( f j, pj, Aj, cj)
′
+ eijt.
The models were estimated using 50,000 MCMC iterations. The initial 25,000 draws
were discarded as burn-in iterations. Of the remaining 25,000 every tenth draw was
used for the final parameter estimation (Arora and Huber, 2001; Iyengar and Jedidi,
2012). Convergence was assessed by monitoring all draws (see Appendix A.1). The
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models are compared by considering their internal validity and predictive validity. Ta-
ble 4.4 summarizes the results.
TABLE 4.4: Internal and external validity
internal validity external validity
SLL Log BF HR MAD HR MAD
Model 1 -9,688 - 36.79% 0.12 33.18% 0.14
Model 2 -8,310 1,378 54.96% 0.21 51.81% 0.30
Model 3 -8,186 1,502 60.54% 0.20 56.30% 0.27
Model 4 -8,165 1,523 66.20% 0.20 60.52% 0.27
Notes: SLL: simulated log-likelihood, Log BF: log Bayes factor,
HR: hit rate, MAD: mean absolute deviance
Internal validity The model fit is evaluated by comparing the simulated log likeli-
hood (SLL) (Train, 2001) as well as the deduced log Bayes factor (BF) (Kass and Raftery,
1995) together with the mean absolute deviation (MAD) (Schlereth and Skiera, 2012)
of the distribution of respondents’ choice likelihood and the internal hitrate. The sim-
ulated log likelihood was calculated based on 2,000 draws of the estimated posterior
distributions. The log Bayes factor is calculated as the difference of the simulated log
likelihood between each model and the additive utility model which serves as a base-
line. The log BF is a well-known measure for comparing different behavioral models
on the basis of their data fit (Iyengar et al., 2008; Iyengar and Jedidi, 2012; Schlereth and
Skiera, 2012), while penalizing model complexity. A model is said to have a strong su-
periority over a comparable model if BF > 5 (Kass and Raftery, 1995, p.777). The mean
absolute deviation is a measure to account for variability and has previously been used
to describe individual choice probabilities (Brazell et al., 2006; Schlereth and Skiera,
2012). The MAD is calculated by first determing each respondent’s average individ-
ual choice probability over all choice sets and subsequently calculating the mean of the
absolute deviation of each individual choice probability from the mean sample proba-
bility. Lastly, the hitrate describes the relationship between predicted and actual choice,
whereas choice is predicted using a maximum utility choice model (see 2.3.2).
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It is evident that the additive utility model (Model 1) performs the poorest when con-
sidering the SLL and the internal hitrate. The poor internal validity can be explained
by the missing consideration of the interplay of nonlinear pricing and consumption.
The fact that the base consumption model (Model 2) shows a very strong superiority
compared to the additive model with a log BF of 1,378 emphasizes the importance of
the simultaneous consideration. All consumption models (2-4) exhibit reasonable high
hitrates of 54.96% up to 66.20%, while not differing in their mean absolute deviation.
However, the results show that taking uncertainty into account strongly increases the
model fit, considering the SLL as well as the internal hitrate. This is in line with earlier
findings (Lambrecht et al., 2007; Iyengar et al., 2008) which found a strong impact of
uncertainty in consumption towards tariff choice. Although the implementation of a
flat rate bias in Model 4 only slightly increases model fit considering by a BF of 21, it still
increases the internal hitrate considerably by 5.66% and does therefore perform best in
fitting the observed data.
External validity Two out of the thirteen choice sets each respondent have faced were
individually and randomly excluded from parameter estimation. These hold-out sets
are used to evaluate each model’s external validity by its hitrates and MAD of choice
probabilities. Besides the reduced number of observed choice decision, all measures
were determined in the same way as described before. The results in Table 4.4 confirm
the results of the internal validity comparison. Again, the additive Model 1 predicts
respondents’ hold out choice poorly and performs only slightly better than a random
choice model with a hitrate of 25%. In addition, Model 4 with uncertainty and flat
rate bias outperforms all comparable models considering its prediction power of tariff
choice.
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Chapter 4 Consumer Choice under Four-Part Tariffs
Parameter estimation The parameter estimates from Models 2-4 are reported in Table
4.5 by their posterior mean and the corresponding 95% confidence interval. All esti-
mated parameters are significantly different from zero and exhibit the expected signs.
As described before, Model 3 and 4 differ from 2 by incorporating uncertainty in con-
sumption preference. While there are no significant differences in parameter estimates
between Model 3 and 4, the results show that taking uncertainty into account leads to
significantly different parameter estimates. First, the increase in utility in relation to
the decrease in marginal utility defines consumer satiation level si as described before.
Consequently, the differences in consumers’ parameters lead to different satiation lev-
els between uncertainty and certainty models. The distribution of satiation levels as
described in Table 4.5 show that discounting uncertainty results in higher satiation.
However, all expected satiation levels are within a reasonable range and are close to
the German average consumption of 70 minutes per month, as reported by the OECD
(2011, p.123). Second, taking uncertainty into account while choosing a tariff increases
task complexity. This is reflected by a lower logit precision parameter under uncer-
tainty models and confirms earlier findings of Ho and Zhang (2008). Finally, marginal
utility of income is higher under uncertainty models.
4.4 Discussion
Summary of results The purpose of this section was to develop a behavioral model
for four part tariffs. The model was empirically evaluated by the use of a conjoint ex-
periment with a representative sample of German mobile telephony consumers. The
results of the conjoint experiment provide evidence that it is important to account for
the two way dependency of consumption and choice, as well as for uncertainty in con-
sumer preferences to fully understand consumer choice of four-part tariffs. Consid-
ering the model fit, the model’s ability to explain the observed choice data as well as
predicting choice is further increased by taking the flat rate bias into account. The com-
parison of the parameter estimates reveal that not accounting for uncertainty leads to
an overestimation of satiation levels and a lower marginal utility of income.
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Limitations and future research There are several limitations of this study, which
may inspire future research. First, the conjoint experiment is in its nature an almost
static observation. It does not provide any information on how consumers learn about
their preferences over time and consequently adapt their consumption pattern. Consid-
ering the new cost cap component, it is especially interesting to see how fast consumers
change their behavior when their existing tariff is upgraded with a cost cap compo-
nent. Therefore, a field experiment with revealed preferences and an extension of the
proposed utility model to account for learning effects (Ascarza et al., 2012) is a promis-
ing future approach.
Second, the proposed model only accounts for psychological effects in a limited way by
using a bias parameter. Yet, it is reasonable to believe that the psychological effects also
impact tariff choice besides flat rate tariffs. It is therefore desirable to model effects such
as the taximeter and insurance effect in a more general manner in order to make them
applicable to four-part tariffs. Thereby, an approach based on prospective accounting
theory (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998) together with prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979) seems to be a promising starting point.
Third, the proposed model is based on the random utility theory of McFadden (1974).
However, choosing from a set of four-part tariff is a challenging task. It is likely that
consumers use heuristics to simplify their decision problem. Common heuristics in-
clude conjunctive, disjunctive, and compensatory screening rules. Gilbride and Al-
lenby (2004) demonstrated the use of a two stage decision model to account for these
screening rules. The proposed model’s fit may benefit from an extension in this vein.
Lastly, the model has only been used to study phone consumption. However, recent
cell phone contracts consist of several tariffs including Internet consumption and text
messaging. From a practitioner’s perspective it would be interesting to see how these
different services are substituted. A promising approach to address this question is to
extend the proposed model for a tariff combination case and control for substituting
effects.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Tariff Portfolio Design
“Competitive strategies for pricing access services are quite complex to analyze.”
(Essegaier et al., 2002)
THIS chapter shifts the perspective to service providers, as it studies the optimaldesign of tariff portfolios with cost cap components using a simulation approach.
The chapter is organized as follows: First, past research on optimization of tariffs from
theoretical and empirical perspectives are discussed in Section 5.1. Deduced from past
research, a methodology to identify the optimal tariff portfolio with cost cap tariffs is
presented in Section 5.2. Using the empirical data of Chapter 4, optimal tariff portfolios
are estimated under monopolistic and competitive scenarios in Section 5.3. Detailed
sensitivity analyses deepen the understanding of these optimal tariffs. Section 5.4 closes
the chapter with a summary of the results and discusses promising future research.
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5.1 Related Literature
There have been several extensions on tariff optimization since the seminal paper of Oi
(1971).1 Even with consideration to existing detailed research on theoretical perspec-
tives of tariff pricing, innovative approaches have led to ongoing theoretical research
(Essegaier et al., 2002; Sundararajan, 2004; Bagh and Bhargava, 2013). In contrast, em-
pirical research has been scarce. However, within the last decade an increase in empir-
ical research can be observed (Ascarza et al., 2012; Danaher, 2002; Iyengar et al., 2008;
Lambrecht et al., 2007; Schlereth et al., 2011).
Iyengar and Gupta (2009) point out three decisions to take while implementing an op-
timal tariff portfolio: First, a provider has to decide which type of tariff he wants to
offer his consumers. Second, the number of offered tariffs has to be defined before and
finally the optimal pricing of each tariff has to be assessed. In the following, results and
approaches of past theoretical and empirical research are summarized.
5.1.1 Theoretical Research
Monopoly The seminal research on optimal tariff design was undertaken by Oi (1971)
in his study on Disneyland’s two-part pricing dilemma. The study follows the question
whether access services should charge a high fixed fee and provide the service for a
low usage price, or vice versa, attracting consumers with a low access fee and charge
high monopolistic usage prices. Oi stated that an optimal two-part tariff can easily be
determined when all consumer are identical with respect to their utility function and
income. In this case, the optimal fixed fee equals the consumer surplus enjoyed by
the consumer under the given two-part tariff. As consumer surplus is increasing with
smaller usage prices, the optimal usage price equals the marginal costs. The same logic
applies to a market with consumers who are different in income and taste. A discrim-
inating monopoly would charge a different fixed fee of every consumer according to
1See Wilson (1993); Iyengar and Gupta (2009) for a detailed discussion of past research.
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his consumer surplus, setting the usage price at marginal costs. However, such pricing
policy would certainly not withstand antitrust inspection. Consequently, Oi analyzed a
single optimal two-part tariff to serve two heterogeneous consumer types. The theoret-
ical results showed that a deviation of the usage price from marginal costs can increase
profits depending on consumers’ demand functions. This may also include offering the
service for a usage price below marginal costs, as the subsequent loss can be more than
compensated through a higher fixed fee. Oi further discussed the possibility to increase
profits by excluding consumers from consumption by rising the fixed fee. Thereby, the
price elasticity of the served consumers with respect to the fixed fee determines the
distribution of consumer surpluses and thus the provider’s profit.
Murphy (1977) extended the model of Oi (1971). In his case, a provider is not able to
identify different consumers ex ante. Murphy stated that a provider can increase profits
using alternative multi-part tariffs in contrast to a simple two-part tariff. He showed
that several tariff alternatives can serve as a monitoring device which allows some de-
gree of price discrimination ex post. One alternative is the so called declining three-part
tariff which is a two-part tariff with an option for a price discount after a specific quan-
tity. In this way additional consumer welfare can be extracted from consumers with
higher willingness to pay. A similar result is achieved by providing several two-part
tariffs which are tailored to match consumers’ willingness to pay. Consumers then
self-select their optimal tariff. Finally, Murphy argued that the costs of administrating
additional and more complex tariffs may exceed the revenue increase of these tariffs.
Essegaier et al. (2002) released a detailed study on the effects of consumer heterogene-
ity on access service pricing when the provider’s capacity to serve the consumers is
constrained. Due to the characteristics of services, the authors assumed the marginal
costs to be zero. The results under a monopolistic setting differ in consumers’ evalu-
ation of the service. If the market consists of a majority of more valuable light users,
the monopolist should focus on them only when his capacity is not large enough to
cover market demand. Heavy users, however, should only be served with increasing
capacity. This goal is achieved by using a two-part tariff. Essegaier et al. highlight that
83
Chapter 5 Optimal Tariff Portfolio Design
the two-part tariff is not used to price discriminate but rather to achieve the optimal
consumer mix under limited capacity. As soon as the monopolist’s capacity is capable
of serving the total demand, the monopolist should change to a flat rate pricing, as it
is the most efficient way to penetrate the whole market. However, when heavy users
are more valuable, the pricing of access services changes. The monopolist should try
to attract more heavy users than light users. Charging a pay-per-use tariff with a high
minute price achieves this goal. With increasing capacity the minute price should be
lowered until all heavy users are served. Afterwards, the monopolist wants to attract
light users as well. However, as a further decrease of the minute price would lower his
revenue, he should instead offer a signing bonus. Similar to Oi (1971), Essegaier et al.
find that subsidizing one group may be optimal, such as providing a negative fixed fee
in this case.
Sundararajan (2004) studied nonlinear pricing of information goods by using pay-per-
use and flat rate tariffs. Similar to Essegaier et al. (2002), marginal costs of producing an
additional information good are assumed to be zero and consumers are heterogeneous
and unknown to the monopolist. An assumption unique to Sundararajan is the consid-
eration of transaction costs. Transaction costs occur by administrating tariffs. Especially
pay-per-use tariffs require a steady monitoring of consumers’ usage and hence induce
higher transaction costs. Flat rate tariffs in contrast, require only a single transaction
per billing period. The consideration of transaction costs has several implications for
nonlinear pricing of information goods. Sundararajan showed that a profit maximiz-
ing provider has to consider the involved transaction costs while designing the optimal
pay-per-use tariff. An increase in transaction costs results in a higher minute price. As
a result, the fraction of consumers adopting such a tariff decreases. The design of the
optimal pay-per-use tariff is independent of the introduction of an additional flat rate
tariff. The latter does, however, increase a monopolist’s profit. Therefore, a monopolist
should always offer pay-per-use tariffs in combination with flat rate tariffs in markets
with transaction costs. Introducing a flat rate tariff will result in a shift of formerly
pay-per-use consumers to a flat rate. By charging a fixed fee, the monopolist avoids the
transaction costs under a pay-per-use tariff and thus increases profit. In order to find
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the optimal combination of pay-per-use and flat rate tariffs, the monopolist should first
determine the optimal pay-per-use tariff. Afterwards, the optimal fraction of flat rate
consumers has to be identified and the fixed fee has to be set accordingly. Sundararajan
concluded that an increase in transaction costs increases the fraction of consumers un-
der flat rate tariffs. Monopolist’s profit is decreasing in transaction costs up to a point
where all consumers have adopted a flat rate tariff and profits are thus constant.
In a recent article, Bagh and Bhargava (2013) studied a provider’s tariff portfolio deci-
sion when tariff management costs are significant enough to impose a constraint on the
number of tariffs. Bagh and Bhargava revisited the earlier concern of Murphy (1977)
that the optimality of a menu of two-part tariffs might be questionable when an addi-
tional tariff generates higher costs than revenue. There are several causes for increasing
costs with additional tariffs. A menu of tariffs requires more information about con-
sumer preferences and hence increases information and decision costs. Furthermore,
consumers often fail to choose a tariff at all when they are overwhelmed with a large
menu. This generates further costs of explaining and guiding consumers’ choices. Fi-
nally, more tariffs require also additional advertising and communication costs. Al-
together, these costs may limit the number of tariffs and their complexity. Bagh and
Bhargava studied the optimal design of tariff portfolio under such tariff size constraint.
Thereby, a single three-part tariff with allowance can outperform a menu of two-part
tariffs while requiring even less information about the consumer distribution. A menu
of two-part tariffs is limited by the fear of high-value consumers choosing the tariff de-
signed for the low-value segment. In contrast, a single three-part tariff can outperform
the menu of two-part tariffs by adjusting the allowance equal to the usage of low-value
consumers under corresponding two-part tariff and charging a fixed fee equal to the
total costs under such. Thus, the minute price can be assigned to optimally price dis-
criminate high-value consumers. Bagh and Bhargava showed that these results are
stable, as long as the low-value segment accounts for enough market share. Further-
more, a menu of three-part tariffs might always outperform a menu of two-part tariffs
as long as tariff size is limited and consumer distribution is right skewed. Lastly, as
there is less information required to design the optimal three-part tariff in comparison
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to the two-part tariff, the three-part tariff is also the better choice with respect to tariff
management costs.
Competition Hayes (1987) was one of the first to study two-part tariff pricing un-
der competition. From a theoretical perspective, competition seemed to eliminate the
existence of two-part tariffs, as every competitor has an incentive to charge a one-part
tariff and still earn nonnegative profits. Hayes showed that in the presence of consumer
uncertainty, it is still profitable for competitors to charge two-part tariffs. Under the as-
sumption of zero profits in competitive markets, charging a fixed fee has to result in a
usage price below marginal costs. Consequently, service consumption in relation to an
outside good increases. Hayes concluded that consumer utility decreases in low states
of uncertainty and increases in high states of uncertainty under two-part tariffs. This is
because the marginal utility of income is greater in states of high uncertainty and the
two-part tariff is a form of insurance and strictly preferred by consumers. The results
are extended by the case in which consumers’ uncertainty is heterogeneous over con-
sumers. In this case, several two-part tariffs can be offered to each type of consumer.
The utility function and probability density function of uncertainty determines the op-
timal combination of fixed fee and usage price.
Besides considering tariff pricing under a monopoly, Essegaier et al. (2002) also studied
the effects of consumer heterogeneity and provider capacity constraint under a com-
petitive scenario, where one provider with a larger capacity competes against another.
The author found several possible equilibria under the assumption that light users are
more valuable. The providers can be either local monopolists, secret handshakers or
competitors. The three scenarios are explained in the following. If the combined ca-
pacity is not large enough to cover all light consumers, both providers will act as local
monopolies and charge two-part tariffs similar to a monopolistic setting. The two-part
tariff remains the best pricing approach even if the larger capacity provider also serves
some heavy users. If the capacity of the small provider increases, the larger provider
will have an incentive for a secret handshake strategy where the market is covered but
the providers do not compete. He leaves more of his capacity idle and respectively
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market demand unmet. This way, a flat rate tariff is optimal for the larger provider
while the smaller provider continues charging a two-part tariff. The large provider has
too much to lose if he competes against the small capacity provider who is best posi-
tioned to compete for light users. At last, if both providers have sufficient capacity to
cover the market, flat rate tariffs is a provider’s best choice as it focuses on the number
of consumers he can attract instead of a consumer mix. If heavy users are more valu-
able, Essegaier et al. showed that the earlier results differ slightly. Providers should
start pricing their services with a pay-per-use tariff as long as capacity is low. When
capacity increases, two-part tariffs should be used to acquire the desired mix of light
and heavy users. Again, if the capacity is large enough to meet the market demand,
intense price competition will lead to flat rate pricing of both providers.
5.1.2 Empirical Research
Monopoly Danaher (2002) was one of the first studies using revealed preferences to
study the optimal design of two-part tariffs for pricing access services. The introduc-
tion of a new telecommunication service was studied in an experimental setting to in-
vestigate the effect of fixed fee and usage price on consumption and attrition. Danaher
developed a model that incorporated consumption and attrition under a subscription
service, and estimated consumers’ characteristics by maximizing the log likelihood of
attrition. The author found that fixed fee elasticity is considerably lower than usage
price elasticity. Furthermore, the fixed fee has a stronger effect on consumer retention,
and usage price a stronger effect on consumption. Danaher used the parameter esti-
mates to derive the optimal fixed fee and usage price by using partial derivates of the
provider’s expected total revenue function. An important feature of the revenue func-
tion is the incorporation of consumer acquisition cost due to attrition. Ignoring these
costs result in unreasonable fixed fees. Moreover, the obtained fee and price were simi-
lar to market price levels at the time of the study.
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Lambrecht et al. (2007) focused on the impact of consumer uncertainty on tariff choice.
The authors found uncertainty to be a key driver of tariff choice. In line with Danaher
(2002), prices affect tariff choice more than consumption. Lambrecht et al. developed a
discrete/continuous choice model where consumers make a continuous consumption
decision conditional on tariff choice. The model’s parameters were estimated based on
consumption data of a German DSL provider. Using the estimated parameters, Lam-
brecht et al. studied the impact of consumer uncertainty on provider’s revenue by
numerically integrating over the distribution of unobserved consumption. The authors
showed that increasing uncertainty leads consumers to choose tariffs with higher al-
lowance. Three-part tariffs, thereby, can well exploit consumers’ uncertainty due to
their nonlinear structure. Thus, their results indicate that providers may increase their
revenues by offering three-part tariffs with a consumption allowance instead of a tradi-
tional two-part tariffs.
Ascarza et al. (2012) studied the effect of an usage allowance on tariff choice above
and beyond the shift in consumers’ budget constraints. The authors use a dis-
crete/continuous choice model that accounts for the valuation of allowance to esti-
mate consumer preference parameters. These parameters are used to study the effect
of lowering consumers’ costs to switch to another tariff on provider’s revenue. The au-
thors thereby accounted for consumers’ preference for three-part tariffs. Ascarza et al.
showed that decreasing switching costs increases provider’s revenue due to consumers
switching to more profitable three-part tariffs. This shift is due to a strong preference
for free consumption under an allowance. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that
eliminating an alternative two-part tariff can increase revenues further, due to forcing
consumers into three-part tariffs.
The innovative pricing scheme of bucket tariffs was studied by Schlereth and Skiera
(2012). Under such tariff, a consumer pays a periodic fixed fee in order to use a service
up to a set allowance. Schlereth and Skiera developed a discrete/continuous choice
model and estimated preference parameters based on stated preferences from a con-
joint experiment. The authors used these parameters in a simulated annealing algo-
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rithm in order to optimize bucket and three-part tariffs. Schlereth and Skiera found
that the specification of the discrete/continuous choice model has an important impact
on provider’s profit. More precisely, non-optimal prices due to a failure in modeling
the influence of service attributes leads to a profit loss of up to 22.75% of the optimal so-
lution. Furthermore, their results indicate that a menu of three bucket tariffs performs
best in exploiting consumers’ heterogeneity. The authors also compare different tariffs
with one another. Two-part, three-part, and bucket tariffs perform equally well as long
as the number of tariffs is sufficiently large enough. However, if the number of tariffs
is restricted to one, the bucket tariff generates less profit than two- or three-part tariffs
and only outperforms an optimal pay-per-use tariff.
Competition The study of Iyengar et al. (2008) used a stated preference approach in
order to identify consumers’ preference parameters. Similar to Lambrecht et al. (2007),
Iyengar et al. took uncertainty and the nonlinear character of three-part tariffs into
account while modeling consumers’ utility under the latter. The authors studied the ef-
fect of fixed fee, usage price and allowance by the use of a sensitivity analysis. The au-
thors controlled for attrition by multiplying the expected revenue by consumers’ choice
probability of each tariff. The interplay of increasing revenue and a decreasing choice
probability from increasing either the fixed fee or the usage price leads to optimal lev-
els for both. Revenue is also increasing with an increasing allowance due to a higher
choice probability. However, the marginal gain decreases due to consumers’ satiation.
Iyengar et al. used the estimated preference parameters to simulate tariff competition.
Using a grid search, the authors identified the optimal three-part tariff for a new market
entrant into an existing mobile telephony service market. The grid was composed by
an incremental increase of each tariff component. The optimal tariff was identified by
multiplying tariff choice probability with the expected revenue from each consumers’
consumption under respective tariff. The results of the proposed choice model are rea-
sonably close to actual market data and outperform standard conjoint approaches.
In a more recent study, Schlereth et al. (2011) analyzed the optimal pricing of metered
tariffs. Based on preference parameters estimated from a stated preference experiment,
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Schlereth et al. used a simulated annealing approach to investigate profit, revenue, total
consumption, and consumer share of alternative tariffs. Based on the seminal findings
of Oi (1971) and Murphy (1977) on the optimality of two-part tariffs, Schlereth et al.
demonstrate how the separated stepwise reduction of the fixed fee and usage price
impacts tariff attractiveness from a monopolist’s perspective. The transformation of the
optimal two-part tariff towards either a pay-per-use or flat rate tariff results in a profit
decrease in both cases. However, whereas the share of consumers under an optimal
pay-per-use tariff increases, the share decreases under an optimal flat rate tariff. On
the other hand, the consumption per consumer decreases under a pay-per-use tariff
and increases under a flat rate tariff. Furthermore, Schlereth et al. studied tariff choice
behavior by introducing an additional tariff within an oligopoly setting. The authors
thereby differ between expansion, switching and cannibalization effects. The authors
emphasize the importance of cannibalization effects for profit gain. Only if a reasonable
number of new consumers to the market (expansion) and consumers of the competing
provider (switching) can be acquired, cannibalization can be overcome and profits can
be increased.
Table 5.1 summarizes earlier research on optimal tariff portfolio design. Both theoretical
as well as empirical research have addressed the design of tariffs in competitive as well
as monopolistic markets. It is not surprising that with the exception of Danaher (2002)
all empirical studies used a stated preference approach as the optimization of tariffs
within the field is expensive and difficult to operate. In general, tariffs are used to price
discriminate consumers. Therefore it is not surprising that all studies have addressed
consumer heterogeneity. However, consumer choice behavior is often modeled differ-
ently. Especially consumer uncertainty has mainly been addressed in empirical studies.
While most studies included an incentive constraint on tariff choice, the impact of the
option to opt out on tariff choice probability has been considered almost solely by em-
pirical studies. In contrast, theoretical research has focused in more detail on provider’s
attendant circumstances such as capacity constraint, transaction costs and tariff man-
agement costs. As these details are often not released by the providers, empirical stud-
ies often lack these aspects or base their models on public market information. With the
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exception of Schlereth and Skiera (2012), all earlier studies focused on established one-,
two-, or three-part tariffs. Hence, research on innovative tariff pricing is limited.
TABLE 5.1: Overview on research on optimal tariff portfolios
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Oi (1971)  G#  
Murphy (1977)   
Hayes (1987)     
Essegaier et al. (2002)    
Sundararajan (2004)   
Bagh and Bhargava (2013)   
empiricism
Danaher (2002)   
Lambrecht et al. (2007)   
Iyengar et al. (2008)     G#
Schlereth et al. (2011)   G#
Schlereth and Skiera (2012)    
Ascarza et al. (2012)    
this research      
This chapter is studying the effect of the cost cap component on service provider’s tariff
portfolio. It is an open question whether adding a cost cap component to the existing
tariff structure increases profits. Tariffs with cost caps are thus analyzed in a monop-
olistic as well as a competitive market scenario. In addition, the impact of marginal
costs are studied in more detail. Consumer choice follows the holistic approach pre-
sented in Chapter 4, including consumer uncertainty as well as the option to opt out.
However, neither switching and tariff management costs nor capacity constraints are
considered.
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5.2 Methodology
Tariff optimization is difficult to accomplish in ongoing markets. This is because the in-
troduction of new tariffs is expensive due to ,e.g., advertising of the tariff, modification
of the billing process, and training of the sales personal. Furthermore, consumers can
get confused by a varying number of tariff alternatives within a short time. Simulation
approaches are thus a reasonable alternative which are furthermore able to predict con-
sumer behavior for novel tariff structures. However, the optimization of tariffs quickly
becomes a complex problem due to the variety of optimization parameters. Obviously,
whereas a simple one-part tariffs only includes one price component to optimize, a
four-part tariff already includes four components. This number multiplies quickly as
soon as several tariffs are optimized as a portfolio. Many earlier studies (e.g. Danaher,
2002; Iyengar et al., 2008; Lambrecht et al., 2007) focused on grid search techniques to
identify the optimal tariff design. Grid search techniques, however, are only capable
to handle a small number of tariffs to optimize together with a small number of re-
spondents within a reasonable computing time (Schlereth et al., 2010). Schlereth et al.
compared several heuristic methods on their ability to optimize nonlinear tariffs. The
authors found that simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick et al., 1983) performs best and is
also able to handle large samples. The advantage of simulated annealing compared
to alternative heuristics is its ability to overcome local solutions. This is because the
algorithm randomly accepts solutions with an inferior value of the target function.
However, the increment to accept alternative solutions is reduced over time so that
the algorithm converges against the global solution (Eglese, 1990). Furthermore, the
solution depends only marginally on the initial values, making the algorithm flexible
and robust (Aarts and Korst, 1988; Schlereth et al., 2010). Eglese (1990) named the ease
of implementation, its applicability to a wide range of optimization problems, and the
high quality of solutions as further advantages of the simulated annealing algorithm.
Providers’ profits are modeled using the classical framework of indirect segmentation
where a provider cannot identify consumers ex ante but can offer a portfolio of tar-
iffs so that consumers do self-select into separate consumer segments (Rothschild and
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Stiglitz, 1976; Bagh and Bhargava, 2013). Thereby, the provider has to balance care-
fully the trade-off between tariff choice and consumption. An increase of the general
price level through higher usage prices, fixed fees or cost caps may increase profits,
but it also increases the chances of consumers to opt out. Furthermore, higher usage
prices decrease the overall consumption level (Danaher, 2002) and may decrease prof-
its. The provider has to maximize the expected sum of all consumers’ I profit over his
whole tariff portfolio J, whereas the expected consumer profit from one tariff is based
on consumer’s probability to choose the tariff times his expected consumption. Thus,
the maximization problem of the provider becomes:
(5.1) maxΠ =∑
j∈J
∑
i∈I
PijE(piij)
The expected profit E(piij) a single consumer i produces from a tariff j depends on
his uncertainty which maps into his consumption. Additionally, the provider faces
marginal costs of k j.
E(piij) = Prob(nij ≤ Aj)( f j − k jE(nij | nij ≤ Aj))(5.2)
+ Prob(Aj < nij ≤ Cj)( f j + E(nij | Aj < nij ≤ Cj)(pj − k j)− Ajk j)
+ Prob(Cj < nij)(cj − k jE(nij | Cj < nij))
The probability Pij of consumer i to choose tariff j follows the logit formula (Train,
2009) and depends on the one hand on the expected utility he derives from consump-
tion under tariff j. The expected utility E(Uij) is estimated similar to Equation (4.9)
from Chapter 4. On the other hand, the choice probability depends on consumer’s ra-
tionality factor γi. The rationality factor controls whether a consumer rather chooses
tariffs randomly or chooses the tariff yielding the highest utility. Finally, a consumer
has always the opportunity to opt out, deciding not to choose any tariff. Not choosing
any tariff alternative yields an expected utility of zero. Thus, the individual probability
becomes:
(5.3) Pij =
exp(γiE(Uij))
∑j exp(γiE(Uij)) + 1
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The pricing decision of the service provider on fixed fees, usage prices, allowances and
cost caps over his whole tariff portfolio impacts profits both directly and indirectly. In-
creasing price levels directly influences individual expected profits E(piij). However,
increasing price levels also decrease tariff choice probability and increase the probabil-
ity of consumers to opt out. The presented approach to model provider’s profit takes
into account both circumstances. Consequently, profits depend nonlinearly on tariff
components. Figure 5.1 illustrate the dependency of provider’s profit of a four-part
tariff on different usage prices and cost caps in a monopoly setting without marginal
costs.2 The graph illustrates well the effect of usage price on expected profits. An initial
FIGURE 5.1: Profit of four part tariff under different usage prices and cost caps
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increase of usage price increases profits. The increase, however is diminished by a de-
creasing consumption rate and a higher rate of consumers opting out. A low cost cap
2Further figures on alternative tariffs can be found in Appendix A.2.3.
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increases the probability to choose a tariff, but it does also decrease the revenues from
consumption.
Simulating annealing provides an efficient algorithm to optimize several tariff compo-
nents simultaneously and has therefore been used to acquire the following optimiza-
tion results. Consumer choice is based on parameter estimates obtained from the mixed
logit hierarchical Bayes estimation presented in Chapter 4.
5.3 Results
Tariff optimization has been conducted under monopoly as well as a competitive mar-
ket to demonstrate the impact of including cost cap components within the tariff port-
folio.
5.3.1 Optimal Tariff Portfolio under Monopoly
Initially, optimal tariff design is studied under monopoly. Thereby, the provider offers
solely one tariff and consumers have to decide whether to choose this tariff or to opt out.
It is assumed that the marginal costs for providing the service is zero. This assumption
is later relaxed and the effect of increasing marginal costs on optimal tariff design is
thereby further analyzed.
Simulation results Table 5.2 summarizes the optimal price component parametriza-
tion for all possible tariffs, including usage price, fixed fee, allowance and cost cap.
Besides these components, several quality criteria are reported as well. First, the ex-
pected profit is the sum over all consumers’ profits times consumers’ tariff choice prob-
ability as described in Equation (5.1). Consumer share measures the expected share
of consumers to choose any tariff and not to opt out. Each respondent anticipates a
consumption under a given tariff. The total expected consumption is the sum over all
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anticipated consumptions times the tariff choice probability. Finally, profit (consump-
tion) per consumer is the ratio of the profit (total consumption) to the expected number
of consumers.
TABLE 5.2: Optimal tariffs under monopoly
tariffs
PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
usage price ¢/min 11.90 21.20 6.49 6.48 7.01 7.02
fixed fee e 23.48 15.79 15.79 15.41 15.41
allowance min 0 0
cost cap e 40.32 61.98 62.03
profit e 5,181 7,304 6,148 7,987 7,987 8,163 8,163
consumer
share
% 84.52 39.89 80.59 39.35 39.37 39.52 39.50
total
consumption
104min 4.35 13.46 5.17 5.17 5.17 6.13 6.13
profit per
consumer
e/con 8.22 23.48 10.23 27.21 27.20 27.69 27.70
consumption
per consumer
min/con 69.05 449.68 97.45 175.97 176.07 208.04 207.93
Note: Highest values in boldface.
A comparison of the expected profits reveals that the addition of a cost cap component
always increases profits of tariffs with usage prices. For instance, extending a pay-per-
use (PU) into a two-part tariff with cost cap (2PTCC) increases profits by 967e, which
is equivalent to a profit increase of 18.66%. Similar, but smaller results can be achieved
by upgrading a traditional two-part tariff (2PTF) into a three-part tariff with cost cap
(3PTCC) with an increase of of 2.20% or by upgrading a three-part tariff with allowance
(2.20%). Hence, it is concluded that:
PROPOSITION 4. A monopolist with zero marginal costs can always increase his profits by
extending his one-, two-, or three-part tariff with a cost cap component.
Standard pricing literature (Wilson, 1993) state that consumers with high satiation level
should be charged with low marginal costs to yield highest profits. However, charging
a low minute price comes at the expense of smaller revenues from consumers with low
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consumption. Adding a cost cap uncouples the optimal pricing, as the minute price can
be designed to face consumers with low satiation levels and the cost cap accordingly
to exploit profits from high satiation consumers. Furthermore, the cost cap can exploit
consumers’ additional willingness to pay due to their uncertainty. Consumers valuate
the cost cap according to one’s probability to reach the cap and by the cap induced
increased consumption level. The results provide evidence for this proposition, as ex-
pected consumption is higher under tariffs with cost cap than its counterpart without.
Consequently, the expected profit per consumer increases as well. Expected profits per
consumer range between 8.22e and 27.70e and are in line with the German average of
23.00e reported by the OECD (2011).
Additionally, the results confirm the proposition of Oi (1971) that heterogeneous con-
sumers are best served by appointing usage prices above marginal costs, as all usage
prices are above the anticipated zero marginal costs. Furthermore, consumer choice
and consumption behavior under one-part and two-part tariffs without cost caps con-
firm earlier findings of Schlereth et al. (2011). Profits under a two-part tariff with fixed
fee and usage price are higher than profits under either pay-per-use or flat rate tariffs.
Furthermore, deviation of the optimal two-part tariff towards a pay-per-use (flat rate)
tariff increases (decreases) consumer share and decreases (increases) average profit and
consumption per consumer at the same time. However, none of the tariffs is chosen by
all consumers, which is in line with Oi’s finding that it is profit increasing to exclude a
fraction of consumers.
Surprisingly, the results show that extending a tariff scheme with an allowance option
does not increase provider’s profit and a provider is advised to offer no allowance.
This finding remains true under a three-part tariff with allowance as well as under a
four-part tariff. Similar results have been found by Schlereth and Skiera (2012), who
also do not find any profit differences between two- and three-part tariffs. Still, this
finding contradicts earlier studies of Lambrecht et al. (2007) and Ascarza et al. (2012).
Lambrecht et al. (2007) stated that tariffs with a higher allowance and fixed fee can
better exploit consumer uncertainty in consumption. However, the authors solely fo-
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cused on tariff choice behavior between two given tariffs and did not study how to
implement an optimal tariff design based on consumer heterogeneity. Thus, the ques-
tion which tariff a provider should offer is hardly answered. The proposed provider
model in this study, in combination with a simulated annealing approach, optimized
tariff components while taking into account consumers’ choice and consumption de-
cisions. Nevertheless, Ascarza et al. (2012) showed that consumers exhibit a bias for
free minutes under an allowance, which leads to an overuse of three-part tariffs. A
sensitivity analysis revealed that when consumers do not exhibit such preferences a
three-part tariff is no longer more profitable than a two-part tariff. However, account-
ing for an allowance bias does not improve the predictive power of the proposed model
(see Appendix A.2.3 for details). Bagh and Bhargava (2013) showed that allowances are
only profit increasing as long as a homogeneous low-value consumer segment is large
enough. Therefore, the heterogeneity of consumer preferences in the applied sample
might be another explanation why allowances do not increase tariff profits.
PROPOSITION 5. Offering an allowance does not increase monopolist’s profit.
With this allowance limitation and the fact that extending a tariff with a cost cap always
increases profit, it can be concluded that:
PROPOSITION 6. The three part tariff with cost cap is the profit maximizing tariff a monopolist
can offer.
Yet, profit maximization is not always the only goal providers aim for. Not surprisingly,
consumer share is the highest under a pay-per-use tariff and two-part tariff with cost
cap. As the first consumption unit is only charged by a usage price, most consumers
decide to choose a tariff even though their consumption is low. In contrast, linking a
tariff with a fixed fee naturally forces consumers to opt out, as the initial utility thresh-
old is too high. Thereby, the results partly confirm earlier findings of Danaher (2002). A
higher usage price, as seen under a two-part tariff with cost cap compared to a pay-per-
use tariff, reduces expected consumption but does only marginally impact consumers
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to choose a tariff. In general, the results provide evidence that charging a fixed fee de-
creases consumer retention. Comparing the level of the fixed fee between a flat rate
tariff and a traditional two-part tariff seems to have no impact on consumer retention.
However, as these tariffs are not identical and the effect of fixed fee and usage price
under a two-part tariff cannot be distinguished, the variation of usage price and fixed
fee are discussed in more detail.
Sensitivity analysis Figure 5.2 shows the results of a sensitivity analysis on the ex-
pected number of consumers and their expected consumption. The expected number
of consumers is described as the share of the total sample. Whereas the expected con-
sumption is the average of each consumer’s optimal consumption under the given tar-
iff times the probability to choose the tariff. This definition allows to study the effect
of varying tariff components on choice and consumption simultaneously under con-
sideration of consumers’ option to opt out. As discussed earlier, an optimal tariff of
a monopolistic provider does not include any allowance. Therefore, only tariffs with
no allowance are further analyzed in Figure 5.2. Based on the optimal price levels as
stated in Table 5.2, usage prices are varied with a step size of 0.1¢ within an interval of
[−5¢,+5¢] and fixed fees as well as cost caps with a step size of 0.1ewithin an interval
of [−5e,+5e].
Comparing the sensitivity results of the pay-per-use and flat rate tariff confirms ear-
lier findings of Danaher (2002). Variation of usage price only slightly affects consumer
attrition, which is more sensitive to a variation of the fixed fee under a flat rate tariff.
As expected, average expected consumption decreases with an increasing usage price.
Consumption, however, increases with an increasing fixed fee. Danaher named this
effect censoring which results from high consumption consumers who still choose the
tariff under a higher fixed fee, while low consumption consumers decide to opt out.
The censoring effect can be observed over all tariff types including a fixed fee compo-
nent. However, the reaction towards a variation of usage price depends on the given
tariff. While the decrease in average expected consumption remains almost the same
under a traditional two-part tariff compared to a pay-per-use tariff, attrition rate is more
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FIGURE 5.2: Sensitivity analysis of usage price, fixed fee and cost cap on expected consumers
and consumption
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sensitive towards a usage price increase when a fixed fee is present. As the fixed fee
is used to exploit consumer surplus, an increase of the usage price affects consumers’
probability to opt out much more strongly than under a pay-per-use tariff. The same
effect can be observed under a three-part tariff with cost cap which exhibits a fixed
fee as well. Furthermore, under tariffs including a fixed fee in combination with a us-
age price, the variation of either component has a similar effect on consumer attrition,
which contradicts earlier findings of Danaher.
The introduction of a cost cap component has side effects on the sensitivity of usage
price variation on average expected consumption. Under a two-part as well as un-
der a three-part tariff with cost cap the average expected consumption remains stable,
although the number of expected consumers decreases. A possible explanation is that
consumers who do not exploit the cost cap decrease their consumption but continue us-
ing the tariff. This decrease compensates the earlier mentioned censoring effect. How-
ever, the cost cap does not have any effect on fixed fee sensitivity, which remains almost
similar under a three-part tariff with cost cap compared to a traditional two-part tariff.
The variation of the cost cap itself has no effect on the expected number of consumers
and an almost diminishing effect on expected consumption. A possible explanation is
that a variation of the cost cap only affects consumers whose consumption level is close
to the critical cost cap consumption level. Therefore, only a small proportion of con-
sumers will change their consumption behavior due to a change of the cost cap level.
On the other hand, the sensitivity results show that when a consumer decides to con-
sume below instead of above the critical cost cap consumption level, he still prefers to
remain with the given tariff instead of opting out.
Results of the sensitivity analysis of expected profits, which are illustrated in Figure
5.3, provide insight on the robustness of profits considering varying tariff components.
Profits under different tariffs all follow an inverted U-shaped trend over tariff compo-
nents. The shape is based on an initial increase of profit due to a higher price level, with
a decreasing rate due to consumers starting to opt out with a higher probability or de-
creasing their consumption. At a given point, the profits decrease, as the increase from
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higher price levels are overcompensated by decreases from consumer attrition. The re-
sulting curvature of profits differ between components as well as tariffs. In general,
profits are more sensitive to usage price variation than to fixed fee variation. As seen in
Figure 5.2, the increase of usage prices do not only affect attrition, but also the expected
consumption level, which reinforces profit reduction. Compared to fixed fee and usage
price, cost cap variation has only a marginal impact on provider’s profit. As explained
earlier, the optimal cost cap only counts for a small fraction of consumers with high
consumption who react almost inelastic to variation of the cost cap component.
PROPOSITION 7. Profits and consumer attrition are less sensitive to a variation of the cost cap
than to variations of the usage price or fixed fee.
Similar to the earlier sensitivity findings, the censoring effect applies to the average
profit per consumer, as it is increasing under tariffs with fixed fees when either the
usage price or the fixed fee is increased. In contrast, average profits remain stable under
tariffs without fixed fees such as the pay-per-use tariff as well as the two-part tariff with
cost cap.
Marginal costs In order to study the effect of marginal costs on provider’s profits,
tariff components have been optimized under marginal costs of 1¢ and 5¢, which are
within the range of the termination rate of 3.4¢ in the German mobile telecommunica-
tion market at the time of the study (Bundesnetzagentur, 2012). The resulting expected
profits are shown in Table 5.3 in absolute values as well as in comparison to the optimal
profits under a monopoly with zero marginal costs. As expected, profits decrease with
increasing marginal costs. The results, however, show that the decrease is not linear,
but rather with a slight diminishing trend. The strongest reduction occurs under the
flat rate as well as under tariffs with a cost cap component. As demonstrated earlier,
consumption under a flat rate tariff is the highest and only limited by consumers’ per-
sonal satiation level. Consequently, increasing marginal costs have the strongest effect
on profits under flat rate tariffs. The same logic applies to consumers who reach the cost
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FIGURE 5.3: Sensitivity analysis of profit on usage price and fixed fee
−0.05 0 0.05
4000
5000
6000
10
20
30
40
usage price variation
PU
−5 0 5
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
fixed fee variation
FR
−0.05 0 0.05
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
usage price variation
2PT−F
−5 0 5
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
fixed fee variation
2PT−F
−0.05 0 0.05
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
usage price variation
2PT−CC
−5 0 5
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
cost cap variation
2PT−CC
−0.05 0 0.05
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
usage price variation
3PT−CC
−5 0 5
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
fixed fee variation
3PT−CC
−5 0 5
6000
7000
8000
10
20
30
40
cost cap variation
3PT−CC
 
 
expected total profit in Euro
expected profit per consumer in Euro
103
Chapter 5 Optimal Tariff Portfolio Design
cap and thereafter consume for free. The only possibility to reduce overall consump-
tion under such tariffs is by either increasing the fixed fee to force consumers to opt out
or to increase the cost cap component so that the probability to hit the cap decreases.
In contrast, providers offering pay-per-use tariffs can face decreasing profit margins by
increasing usage prices and thus decrease overall consumption. In general, providers
react on increasing marginal costs by increasing the price level itself, which results to a
lower number of expected consumers (see Table D.1 in the Appendix for more details)
and overall consumption. A similar effect has been proposed by Sundararajan (2004)
with respect to increasing transaction costs.
TABLE 5.3: Impact of marginal costs on profits under monopoly
tariffs
PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
¢/min 5,181 7,304 6,148 7,987 7,987 8,163 8,163 e
( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) %
1¢/min 4,759 5,965 5,565 7,483 7,483 7,576 7,576 e
(-8.15) (-18.33) (-9.48) (-6.31) (-6.31) (-7.19) (-7.19) %
5¢/min 3,321 2,006 3,523 5,659 5,659 5,659 5,659 e
(-35.90) (-72.53) (-42.70) (-29.15) (-29.15) (-30.67) (-30.67) %
Notes: Percental deviance from zero marginal costs in parentheses.
Highest values are highlighted in bold.
As a consequence, the advantage of extending existing tariffs with a cost cap, as
proposed earlier, decreases with marginal costs and even is negligible after a certain
marginal cost level. The results show that under marginal costs of 1¢ extending a pay-
per-use or a traditional two-part tariff with a cost cap is still profit increasing. However,
unlimited consumption after reaching the cap is already causing a loss under marginal
costs of 5¢. Therefore, a provider increases the cost cap component to a level at which
the cap becomes irrelevant for consumers’ consumption decision.
PROPOSITION 8. Increasing marginal costs diminish the advantage of extending a tariff with
a cost cap component.
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The earlier finding that providing an allowance is not profit increasing remains stable
under different marginal costs.
5.3.2 Optimal Tariff Portfolio under Competition
This section extends the previous counterfactual simulations by including static compe-
tition. The optimal tariff portfolio is identified in three different competitive scenarios.
Scenario A assumes that a monopolist is offering a single tariff (either pay-per-use or
flat rate tariff) on the market. It is then discussed which tariff a new competitor should
offer when he enters the market. In Scenario B the competition pressure is more intense
as it is assumed that there are two incumbents who are already offering a pay-per-use
as well as a flat rate tariff. Again, the profitability of different tariff alternatives which
a new competitor could offer are analyzed. Finally, Scenario C assumes the case of an
incumbent duopoly with both incumbents offering a single tariff. This time, however,
it is discussed whether it is reasonable for one of the incumbents to offer an additional
tariff and which could be the best tariff extension.
It is important to note that in all three scenarios switching costs are not considered, al-
though earlier research showed their possible influence on tariff choice (Goettler and
Clay, 2011). Competitive pressure is simulated by the use of three different price levels
(Low, Medium, High). The minute price of the pay-per-use tariff was varied by {5¢/min,
10¢/min, 15¢/min} and the fixed fee of the flat rate tariff by {20e, 30e, 40e}, which reflect
common price levels in the German mobile telecommunication market at the time of
the study. Moreover, the influence of marginal costs is further analyzed in a competi-
tive setting. In contrast to the earlier study of Sundararajan (2004), marginal costs are
assumed to be independent of the tariff scheme. For every possible combination of pre-
dominant tariff, competitive pressure and marginal costs, profits of every possible new
tariff scheme were approximated by the use of simulated annealing.
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Scenario A: Market entry into monopolistic market Figure 5.4 demonstrates the
profitability of extending tariffs with a cost cap component under different marginal
costs and competitive pressure. Note that the left column shows the case where the
monopolist solely offers a pay-per-use tariff, whereas in the right column solely offers
a flat rate tariff. Not surprisingly, the expected profits decrease with an increase of
marginal costs. As proposed by Wilson (1993), expected profits also decrease under
higher competitive pressure, i.e. low price levels. Yet, the results demonstrate the ro-
bustness of the applied methodology. Similar to the monopoly findings, it can be seen
in Figure 5.4 that extending an existing tariff with a cost cap is always profit increasing
under zero marginal costs. However, increasing marginal costs diminishes the superi-
ority of the cost cap component until being irrelevant. The progression of profits shows
that the decrease depends on the competing tariff. Under marginal costs of 1¢ it is still
profit increasing to offer a cost cap in order to compete against an existing pay-per-use
tariff. But it is no longer beneficial if the flat rate tariff is the predominant tariff irrespec-
tive of competitive pressure. Under high marginal costs, only upgrading a pay-per-use
tariff with a cost cap is beneficial in case of medium to high price levels. Furthermore,
the variation of the competitive price levels shows that an increasing competitive pres-
sure diminishes the superiority as well. This result is stable independent whether the
competing tariff is a pay-per-use or flat rate tariff.
PROPOSITION 9. Increasing competitive pressure diminishes the advantage of extending a
tariff with a cost cap component.
The profits of all possible tariffs with varying marginal costs and competitive pres-
sure are summarized in Table 5.4. The profits are further compared in Figure 5.5. The
competitive scenario has several implications for optimal tariff design in contrast to a
monopolistic setting. In contrast to the monopolistic results of Table 5.2, a cost cap tariff
can in fact produce higher profits compared to flat rate tariffs, as long as the predom-
inant tariff on the market is a pay-per-use tariff (see Figure 5.5). Under such market
conditions, even a traditional two-part tariff can be displaced as long as marginal costs
are reasonably low. Furthermore, the results show that in contrast to the earlier mo-
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FIGURE 5.4: Effect of cost cap component on profits for competing tariffs (PU|FR) under vary-
ing competitive price levels and marginal costs
(A) competing against PU (B) competing against FR
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TABLE 5.4: Profits under competing tariffs (PU|FR) with varying competitive price levels and
marginal costs
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tariffs
PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
0¢ /
m
in
L PU 2,287 1,896 2,372 2,356 2,359 2,556 2,556
L FR 2,355 5,096 4,071 5,100 5,100 5,219 5,219
M PU 3,729 2,953 3,944 3,849 3,851 4,016 4,022
M FR 3,136 6,281 5,254 6,318 6,318 6,475 6,475
H PU 4,489 3,693 4,825 4,784 4,784 5,017 5,018
H FR 3,727 6,774 5,803 6,859 6,859 7,231 7,231
1¢ /
m
in
L PU 1,704 541 1,736 1,772 1,773 1,788 1,790
L FR 2,063 3,701 3,530 4,069 4,069 4,069 4,069
M PU 3,209 1,495 3,331 3,318 3,320 3,384 3,387
M FR 2,829 5,046 4,685 5,439 5,439 5,439 5,439
H PU 4,022 2,263 4,282 4,290 4,291 4,421 4,423
H FR 3,420 5,470 5,222 6,117 6,117 6,422 6,422
5¢ /
m
in
L PU 276 14 276 339 339 339 339
L FR 1,396 6 2,006 2,537 2,537 2,537 2,537
M PU 1,446 145 1,446 1,527 1,527 1,527 1,527
M FR 2,089 462 2,782 3,640 3,640 3,640 3,640
H PU 2,393 344 2,409 2,574 2,574 2,574 2,574
H FR 2,519 1,478 3,202 4,320 4,320 4,320 4,320
Note: Expected profits are in e. Highest profits are in bold.
nopolistic findings, including an allowance can be profit increasing under competition.
This is because offering an allowance increases consumers’ probability to choose one’s
tariff (Iyengar et al., 2008; Jensen, 2006). Due to more outside options in a competitive
market, the higher choice probability compensates possible loss from giving away free
minutes. In case the predominant tariff on the market is a pay-per-use tariff, a new com-
petitor is best advised to offer a four-part tariff as long as marginal costs are medium
or low. However, the three-part tariff with cost cap is the best offer to compete against
a predominant flat rate.
Nevertheless, comparing profits under high marginal costs reveals that it is always op-
timal for a provider to enter the market with a traditional two-part tariff to acquire the
optimal mix of consumers (Essegaier et al., 2002). This optimal profit cannot be further
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FIGURE 5.5: Profits under competing tariffs (PU|FR) with varying competitive price levels
and marginal costs
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increased by either including an allowance or cost cap. The additional revenue from at-
tracting more consumers with an allowance or from an enhanced price discrimination
with a cost cap does not outweigh the loss of providing the service for free under the
allowance, respectively cost cap.
PROPOSITION 10. In a competitive market it is always optimal to offer a traditional two-part
tariff when marginal costs are high.
Scenario B: Market entry into duopolistic market So far it has been assumed that
only a single tariff is offered on the market. However, this is rarely the case in mature
service markets. Next, instead of a single tariff, both, a pay-per-use and a flat rate tariff
are offered at different price levels. Again, the new competitor offers only a single tar-
iff. The expected profits under these considerations are shown in Figure 5.6 and listed
in Table 5.5. As expected, the overall expected profits of the new competitor decrease
FIGURE 5.6: Profits under competing tariffs (PU&FR) with varying competitive price level and
marginal costs
over all possible tariff schemes due to the increased competitive pressure. Again, the
four-part tariff is the optimal tariff when marginal costs are zero or very small. High
marginal costs of 5¢ favor the implementation of a traditional two-part tariff. How-
ever, under zero and small marginal costs, cost cap tariffs substantially perform better
in almost every case in comparison to pay-per-use, flat rate and traditional two-part tar-
iffs. The same result applies for the comparison of the three-part tariff with allowance
option versus the same with cost cap option. Thus, it can be concluded that:
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TABLE 5.5: Profits under competing tariffs (PU&FR) with varying competitive price level and
marginal costs
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tariffs
PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
0¢ /
m
in L PU&FR 1,612 1,762 2,085 1,974 1,974 2,255 2,255
M PU&FR 2,575 2,864 3,248 3,016 3,016 3,289 3,337
H PU&FR 3,291 3,655 4,316 3,836 3,836 4,420 4,423
1¢ /
m
in L PU&FR 1,157 444 1,228 1,266 1,267 1,274 1,274
M PU&FR 2,171 1,399 2,592 2,398 2,398 2,635 2,638
H PU&FR 2,914 2,232 3,674 3,339 3,339 3,760 3,762
5¢ /
m
in L PU&FR 210 4 210 253 253 253 253
M PU&FR 940 9 940 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022
H PU&FR 1,724 22 1,728 1,873 1,873 1,873 1,873
Note: Expected profits are in e. Highest profits are in bold.
PROPOSITION 11. Tariffs with cost cap components are more flexible in competing against
existing tariffs in a matured market than any other tariff scheme.
Scenario C: Tariff extension in duopolistic market The last scenario discusses the
case of a duopoly where two incumbents are already offering a pay-per-use or a flat
rate tariff and one decides to extend his tariff portfolio by offering an additional tariff
on the market. Figure 5.7 compares the expected profits of every possible tariff ex-
tension. Table 5.6 lists all possible profits of an incumbent who is already offering a
pay-per-use tariff. In contrast, Table 5.7 lists profits from offering an additional tariff
along an existing flat rate tariff. If the incumbent is already offering a pay-per-use tar-
iff, offering an additional four-part tariff yields the highest expected profit as long as
marginal costs are low. However, the advantage of the four-part tariff is diminished
under medium and high marginal costs as it can be seen on the first column of Figure
5.7. In this case, a traditional two-part tariff is the best additional tariff the incumbent
can offer. The traditional two-part tariff is also the best offer, if the incumbent is some-
how restricted to extend his tariff portfolio only with one- and two-part tariffs. In case
the incumbent’s predominant tariff is a flat rate tariff, three- and four-part tariffs with
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FIGURE 5.7: Profits under competing and supplement tariffs (PU|FR) with varying competi-
tive price level and marginal costs
(A) competing against FR with supple-
ment PU tariff
(B) competing against PU with supple-
ment FR tariff
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cost cap components are the best addition to the tariff portfolio. Thereby, four-part tar-
iffs outperform any tariff alternative under low and medium marginal costs. Yet, high
marginal costs abolish the advantage of the allowance so that a three-part tariff with a
cost cap is the better offer. If the incumbent, however, is restricted to more simple tariff
schemes the traditional two-part tariff becomes the best addition.
TABLE 5.6: Profits under supplement (PU) and competing tariff (FR) with varying competitive
price level and marginal costs
m
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ta
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ff
tariffs
PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
0¢ /
m
in L FR 2,541 3,367 2,965 3,375 3,375 3,435 3,375
M FR 3,368 4,754 4,409 4,765 4,765 4,840 4,840
H FR 3,875 5,861 5,369 5,861 5,861 5,867 5,950
1¢ /
m
in L FR 2,064 2,061 2,247 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300
M FR 3,030 3,619 3,741 3,828 3,828 3,828 3,828
H FR 3,591 4,796 4,754 4,955 4,955 5,056 5,056
5¢ /
m
in L FR 210 4 210 253 253 253 253
M FR 1,743 1,571 1,744 1,913 1,913 1,913 1,913
H FR 2,573 2,436 2,635 3,021 3,021 3,021 3,021
Note: Expected profits are in e. Highest profits are in bold.
TABLE 5.7: Profits under supplement (FR) and competing tariff (PU) with varying competitive
price level and marginal costs
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tariffs
PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
0¢ /
m
in L PU 2,837 2,306 2,865 2,879 2,881 2,903 2,906
M PU 4,317 3,317 4,380 4,379 4,387 4,432 4,442
H PU 5,098 3,939 5,159 5,226 5,230 5,286 5,290
1¢ /
m
in L PU 1,617 982 1,640 1,664 1,664 1,680 1,680
M PU 3,314 1,959 3,366 3,362 3,364 3,407 3,411
H PU 4,340 2,546 4,389 4,452 4,454 4,503 4,505
5¢ /
m
in L PU -2,845 -3,021 -2,821 -2,811 -2,811 -2,797 -2,797
M PU -585 -1,441 -555 -573 -573 -546 -546
H PU 1,383 -72 1,422 1,452 1,452 1,486 1,486
Note: Expected profits are in e. Highest profits are in bold.
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5.4 Discussion
Summary of results This chapter proposed a methodology to study optimal tariff
design based on stated consumer preferences, both under a monopolistic as well as
competitive consideration. The use of simulated annealing offered the possibility to
study the effects of different tariff schemes, including novel four-part tariffs, without
the necessity to implement these tariffs in an actual mobile telecommunications mar-
ket. Therefore, simulation results provide a profit forecast where novel tariff schemes
cannot be easily implemented in real markets.
The results under a monopolistic consideration showed that the implementation of a
cost cap component into tariffs with usage prices always increases provider’s profits.
The highest profits can be achieved by offering a three-part tariff with cost cap. Sur-
prisingly, offering an additional allowance component does not improve monopolist’s
profits. The effect of fixed fees and usage prices on consumer attrition and expected
consumption were studied by the use of a sensitivity analysis. Results on pay-per-use
and flat rate tariffs concerning consumer attrition and consumption correspond to ear-
lier findings of Danaher (2002). While fixed fee mainly influences attrition, consump-
tion is both influenced by increasing usage prices and fixed fees, due to the censoring
effect. In contrast to earlier findings, increasing usage prices under two- and three-part
tariffs induce consumer attrition in a similar fashion as fixed fees. Even more, a varia-
tion of the cost cap component barely influences attrition and consumption due to the
small number of consumers consuming within a critical range of the cost cap. The same
argument applies for profits which are not sensitive to cost cap variation, but to usage
price and fixed fee variation. Additionally, the impact of marginal costs on optimal
tariff profits has further been analyzed. The results show that the superiority of the
cost cap component decreases with increasing marginal costs. In general, a monopolist
should face an increase in marginal costs by an overall increase of the price level to se-
lect more profitable consumers. Furthermore, tariffs with the option to consume with
zero usage prices suffer the most of increasing marginal costs.
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The effect of marginal costs also remains under a competitive consideration. However,
the profit maximizing tariff depends not only on marginal costs but even more on the
competitive scenario. Three different cases have been analyzed. First, a new competitor
offers a new tariff in a market with a single predominant tariff, which can either be a
pay-per-use or flat rate tariff, offered by an established incumbent. Extending tariffs
with a cost cap component increases profit in almost any case. The results show that the
new competitor should offer a four-part tariff as long as marginal costs are reasonably
low. In contrast to the monopoly, offering an allowance increases provider’s profit due
to attracting competitor’s consumers. The second case involves a market where two
predominant tariffs are offered at the same time. While a four-part tariff remains the
profit maximizing option, a cost cap tariff also outperforms any other one- or two-
part tariff in this case. The third case involves two incumbents each offering either a
pay-per-use or a flat rate tariff. If one provider decides to offer an additional tariff,
the four-part tariff is the best option as long as marginal costs are low. Otherwise, the
traditional two-part tariff as originally proposed by Oi (1971) creates the highest profit
synergies.
Limitations and future research There are several limitations of the proposed ap-
proach, which may foster future research. First, the proposed consumer choice model
is based on a random utility model and do not take into account possible switching
costs. However, Goettler and Clay (2011) showed that charging a switching fee results
in consumers sticking with one tariff. Second, the results are based on a single tariff de-
cision and does not take into account consumer choice behavior over time. Tariffs with
cost cap components may be more attractive under a dynamic scenario. Especially un-
der switching costs considerations, the hybrid character of a two-part tariff with cost
cap reduces the risk of being stuck with the wrong tariff after learning one’s own con-
sumption behavior. Third, incumbents were assumed not to react on competitors intro-
ducing new tariff schemes into the market. While this static consideration permits an
understanding of beneficial tariff portfolios, its forecast of market equilibrium is lim-
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ited. Therefore, a game theoretical extension (Steiner and Baumgartner, 2009) of the
proposed approach should be addressed in future research.
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Chapter 6
Perception of Cost Cap Tariffs
“The existence of both flat-rate and pay-per-use bias contradicts the assumption that
consumers choose the tariff that leads to the lowest billing rate for a given amount of usage.”
(Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a)
THE last chapter focuses on the perception of cost cap tariffs from a psychologicalas well as physiological perspective. Tariff choice is known to be influenced by
psychological effects which causes consumers to exhibit a tariff bias. They then end up
choosing tariffs which are financially not optimal. In Section 6.1 the effects known to
explain tariff biases are examined in order to understand their interplay with the cost
cap component on tariff choice. The study reveals that the choice of cost cap tariffs
is significantly influenced by psychological effects. Then, Section 6.2 proposes a new
methodology to measure the psychophysiological perception of tariffs. The method-
ology is exemplarily applied to explain the perception of the taximeter effect under
various tariffs. At last, the effect of framing is studied in more detail in Section 6.3. By
conducting a stated preference experiment the study shows that the description of the
cost cap component significantly increases the probability to choose a cost cap tariff.
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6.1 Tariff Bias under Cost Cap Tariffs
This section studies the influence of psychological effects known to influence tariff bi-
ases on cost cap tariff choice. The study is based on the stated preference experiment
discussed earlier in Chapter 4 and presented in Appendix A. Comparing consumers’
choice between a pay-per-use, flat rate and cost cap tariff reveals a significant influence
of all known psychological effects. It wasn’t expected, however, that the taximeter ef-
fect is not in favor of the cost cap component. Yet, the insurance property is found to
be the strongest driver of cost cap tariff choice.
6.1.1 Related Literature
Earlier research found a strong tendency to prefer flat rate tariffs (Lambrecht and Skiera,
2006a; Train, 1991) and a similar bias was found in Chapter 4 where a flat rate bias pa-
rameter ς was introduced into the proposed utility model. Several psychological effects
have been found to explain the tendency to prefer a flat rate. Among the most impor-
tant are the taximeter effect (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998), the insurance effect (Train
et al., 1987), as well as the overestimation effect (Nunes, 2000; Uhrich et al., 2012). The
taximeter effect states that consumption is less pleasurable if it is linked to marginal
payment - or as Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) stated - the consumer suffers from the
pain of paying. Flat rate tariffs decouple the pain of paying by separating payment and
consumption. Furthermore, Train et al. (1987) explained that consumers are rather loss
averse and therefore choose a flat rate to insure themselves against high bills. Limited
foresight and the tendency to overestimate future consumption also leads to choosing
a flat rate, as the expected break-even point to alternative tariffs such as pay-per-use
tariffs is rather reached (Nunes, 2000). Moreover, Kraemer and Wiewiorra (2012) dis-
cussed a flexibility effect which argues against flat rate choice due to the fact that con-
sumers tend to prefer tariffs under which the total bill adjusts to actual consumption.
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It is reasonable to believe that several of these effects have a similar impact on tariffs
including the new cost cap component. More precisely, as the cost cap provides an
upper ceiling, the insurance effect should dictate consumers to choose a cost cap tariff
over a pay-per-use tariff. In addition, the flexibility property of a cost cap should favor
its choice over a flat rate tariff. However, it is not clear whether the taximeter effect is
alleviated by the cap.
6.1.2 Methodology
To study the perception of the cost cap component in more detail, one choice set with
three tariff options and a no-choice option was included as an addition to the conjoint
analysis of Chapter 4. Thereby, the choice set included a predefined pay-per-use (PU)
together with a flat rate tariff (FR). Besides these one-part tariffs, which have been in-
tensively studied for possible biases before (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a), respondents
could also choose a linear tariff with a cost cap (CC). At last, respondents were also
able to choose none of the presented tariffs. Based on an indirect consumption self-
assessment, consumers were separated into three groups and redirected to group spe-
cific questionnaires. Each group then faced a choice set which was adopted with consid-
eration to price levels in order to account for consumer heterogeneity in consumption
(Sandor and Wedel, 2005). Table 6.1 summarizes the tariffs which were presented to the
low consumption group. The additional choice sets can be found in Appendix A, Table
A.4.
TABLE 6.1: Choice sets for evaluating tariff perception
PU CC FR
fixed fee ( f ) 0 e 0 e 7.50 e
minute price (p) 0.15 e/min 0.17 e/min 0.00 e/min
cost cap (c) ∞ e 8 e ∞ e
Note: Tariffs are presented for low consumption group only.
A multi-logit analysis has been conducted to explain the impact of individual psycho-
logical effects on tariff choice. For this purpose, multi-item scales which were used
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before to identify consumers’ perception of the taximeter, insurance, overestimation
and flexibility effects (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Uhrich et al., 2012; Kraemer and
Wiewiorra, 2012) were included in the survey. All questions have been adopted to ac-
count for tariffs with cost caps.1 The new multi-item scales have been validated by
the use of a exploratory factor analysis and were found to have an adequate model fit
(see Appendix A, Table A.2 for details). The scales were used as an explanatory vari-
able in the multi-logit choice analysis. Further explanatory variables include dummy
coded variables controlling the consumption group along tariff utility. The utility that
consumers perceive under the given tariffs was calculated by the use of the proposed
utility model of (4.9) and the estimated parameters presented in Chapter 4. Note that
the estimated flat rate parameter was unconsidered in the utility calculation, as the pur-
pose of the study was to explain causes of tariff biases by the use of multi-item scales
which likely correlate with the estimated parameter.
6.1.3 Results
Respondents’ tariff choices are illustrated in Figure 6.1. 26% of the respondents has
chosen a cost cap tariff, which demonstrates the general attractiveness of the new tariff.
Besides the choice of the pay-per-use tariff (31%), the majority of respondents have
chosen the flat rate tariff (41%) which might be an indication for a possible flat rate
bias. In general, the low number of only 2% of non-choices demonstrate that all tariffs
were reasonably priced.
Respondents’ choice behavior was further analyzed by a mulit-logit analysis with the
cost cap tariff as the baseline. It should be noted that non-choices have been excluded
from the analysis. Table 6.2 summarizes the results. The multi logit model (1) in Ta-
ble 6.2 solely includes the calculated tariff utility alongside of the control variables for
group affiliation. The calculated utility is a significant explanatory variable for tariff
choice. A high pay-per-use utility increases the chances of choosing a pay-per-use tar-
iff, while a high flat rate utility does so for flat rate choice. This result supports the
1All questions related to the bias multi-item scales can be found in Appendix A, Table A.1.
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FIGURE 6.1: Share of chosen tariff schemes by respondents
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
tariff choice
share of chosen tariff schemes
PU FR CC
Note: The figure shows the share of chosen tariffs in relation to the decisions of all 746 respondents. The
16 non choices in the choice set are shown as a blank bar.
external validity of the proposed utility model. The multi logit models (2) and (3) are
extended by the psychological effect scores based on the multi-item scales. Thereby,
tariff utility remains a robust significant variable for explaining tariff choice. Finally, all
models exhibit a reasonably high Nagelkerke R2.
The analysis of psychological effects provides a better understanding of consumers’
psychological tariff perception. The results show that all psychological effects are sig-
nificant variables to explain pay-per-use over cost cap tariff choice. The insurance effect
is the strongest driver for consumers to choose a cost cap tariff over a pay-per-use tariff,
both economically as well as statistically. Furthermore, there is a tendency that con-
sumers who exhibit a strong taximeter effect favor a cost-cap tariff over a pay-per-use
tariff. This finding suggests that consumption dependent pricing does not foster the
taximeter effect per se, but rather depends on the tariff structure as a whole. The flexi-
bility and overestimation effects are significant under the second model at a 0.01 level,
but are less significant when taking the expected utility into account as well. A possible
explanation might be the utility model’s ability to take uncertainty into account. The
overestimation effect leads to choosing a cost cap tariff, which is not surprising, as a
higher expected consumption makes the cost cap tariff more attractive in comparison
to the pay-per-use tariff. However, the flexibility effect is perceived stronger under the
pay-per-use tariff.
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TABLE 6.2: Multi-logit analysis on pay-per-use and flat rate versus cost cap tariff choice com-
pared to low-usage group
(1) (2) (3)
pay-per-use medium group −0.720∗∗ −0.013 −0.328
(0.226) (0.239) (0.251)
high group −0.622+ 0.583 0.177
(0.348) (0.393) (0.414)
pay-per-use utility 0.663∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.111)
flat rate utility −0.003∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
taximeter effect −0.362∗∗ −0.243+
(0.135) (0.140)
insurance effect −1.247∗∗∗ −1.012∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.156)
flexibility effect 0.529∗∗∗ 0.388∗
(0.146) (0.152)
overestimation effect −0.538∗∗∗ −0.328∗
(0.152) (0.161)
constant 0.551∗∗∗ −0.129 0.173
(0.159) (0.176) (0.190)
flat rate medium group 0.638∗∗ 0.485∗ 0.523∗
(0.204) (0.212) (0.217)
high group 0.698∗ 0.353 0.440
(0.289) (0.324) (0.328)
pay-per-use utility 0.009 0.005
(0.019) (0.021)
flat rate utility 0.012∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
taximeter effect 0.205 0.171
(0.129) (0.131)
insurance effect −0.467∗∗∗ −0.514∗∗∗
(0.134) (0.139)
flexibility effect −0.306∗ −0.263∗
(0.123) (0.126)
overestimation effect 0.296∗ 0.262∗
(0.121) (0.125)
constant 0.166 0.165 0.271
(0.166) (0.159) (0.173)
Observations 730 730 730
Nagelkerke R2 0.302 0.310 0.400
Note: + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Considering the choice between a flat rate and cost cap tariff, especially the insurance,
flexibility and overestimation effects are significant variables to explain tariff choice.
First, the framing of the cost cap tariff seems to induce a stronger perception of the
insurance effect and hence leads to a higher chance of choosing a cost cap tariff. The
framing might also explain the stronger perception of flexibility under a cost cap tar-
iff, as its associated costs partly depend on consumption. Second, the overestimation
effect significantly explains flat rate choice. Similar to the previous argumentation, re-
spondents who overestimate their possible consumption have a stronger tendency to
prefer a flat rate tariff, as a higher consumption level favors the cost advantage of a flat
rate tariff. Finally, there is no significant influence of the taximeter effect on respon-
dents’ choice between a flat rate and a cost cap tariff. In line with the previous finding
that consumers, exhibiting a taximeter effect, have a tendency to prefer a cost cap to a
pay-per-use tariff, this finding suggests that the taximeter effect is perceived less strong
under the cost cap tariff.
Overall, the multi-logit analysis shows that the influence of the flexibility and overes-
timation effect on cost cap tariff choice depends on the alternative option. While the
taximeter effect only significantly influences the choice between a cost cap and a pay-
per-use tariff, the insurance effect is the only effect that increases chances to choose a
cost cap over both a pay-per-use and flat rate tariff.
PROPOSITION 12. The insurance effect is the major driver for cost cap tariff choice.
6.1.4 Discussion
Summary of results The influence of psychological effects on cost cap choice has been
studied by the use of a stated preference experiment. Respondents had to choose be-
tween a pay-per-use, flat rate and a cost cap tariff and report their psychological tariff
perception by answering several multi-item scales. A multi-logit analysis revealed the
influence of the insurance, taximeter, flexibility as well as overestimation effect on tar-
iff choice. More precisely, the insurance effect is the major driver for choosing a cost
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cap tariff. In addition, the findings suggest that the taximeter effect is alleviated by the
insurance property of the cost cap. Furthermore, the influence of flexibility and over-
estimation on cost caps depends on the tariff alternative. While flexibility is stronger
perceived under cost cap than flat rate tariffs, it is not perceived as strongly as under a
pay-per-use tariff. In a similar fashion overestimation leads consumers to prefer a cost
cap tariff to a pay-per-use tariff, but not over a flat rate tariff.
Limitations and future research The study solely considered consumers’ tariff prefer-
ence, which is one possible definition of tariff biases as discussed in Chapter 2. The ex-
perimental setting did not allow for financial consequences of consumers’ tariff choice.
Hence, the financial extent of cost cap tariff biases could not be evaluated. However,
service providers are especially interested in the extent of such biases and adjust their
pricing accordingly. Schulze and Gedenk (2005) provide a possible extension of the
proposed experiment by estimating the willingness to pay along tariff choice. Adopt-
ing their framework on tariffs with cost caps promises insights into the extent of biases.
Furthermore, other psychological effects than the ones discussed in this study might
further explain tariff choice. Schwartz et al. (2002) showed that consumers in fact might
feel worse as the number of choice alternatives increases due to being overstrained by
the choice task. Schwartz (2004) later named this phenomena the “paradox of choice.”
Consumers differ in their psychological reaction to handle situations with increasing
number of choice alternatives. Thus, the paradox of choice might explain as well the
tariff bias and provide an explanation why providers offer an overprovision of tariffs
(Miravete, 2004).
6.2 Psychophysiological Perception of Tariffs
Tariff choice has been shown to be biased through a number of psychological effects.
Whereas the previous study used multi-item scales to identify the importance and exis-
tence of these effects, this section presents how consumers’ perceptions of various tar-
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iffs can be assessed through psychophysiological measurements. Such measurements
cannot be influenced by the respondents’ free will and thus provide an objective scale
of tariff perception. This approach also helps in overcoming potential common method
biases. Moreover, its use can readily measure the perception of various complex tar-
iffs without necessitating prior construction and validation of multi-item scales. The
use of psychophysiological measurements is applied and validated in an experiment in
which respondents have to place several costly hotline calls under different tariff types.
The experiment was specifically designed to manage to control for differences in the
perception of the taximeter effect. In addition to a pay-per-use and a flat rate tariff, a
hybrid cost cap tariff is considered for which the perception of the taximeter effect was
previously unknown. The psychophysiological measurements indicate that the cost
cap tariff is similarly perceived to a pay-per-use tariff. The section is an adoption of
Koehler et al. (2012b).
6.2.1 Related Literature
The pricing of services and products is undoubtedly considered to be one of the main
premises for their success (Bub et al., 2011; Fritz et al., 2011). In service industries like
telecommunications, flat rates and pay-per-use tariffs are palpably the two most promi-
nent pricing schemes. However, several empirical studies have shown that consumers
have a tendency to prefer flat rates (unmetered) over pay-per-use (metered) tariffs (e.g.
Kridel et al., 1993; Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Nunes, 2000; Schulze and Gedenk,
2005; Train et al., 1987) even if they yield the same costs. This is known as the flat rate
bias (Train, 1991).
From a psychological perspective, one of the main differences between pay-per-use and
flat rate tariffs is that costs are sunk in a flat rate plan and, consequently, consumers do
not need to worry about the costs of their current or future usage. The underlying the-
ory is mental accounting (Kivetz, 1999; Shefrin and Thaler, 1992; Soman and Lam, 2002;
Thaler, 1985), which assumes that consumers keep different mental accounts with vir-
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tual budgets for consumption. When a consumer makes a purchase, he or she debits
the costs from the respective mental account. Each mental account transaction causes
pain that lowers the pleasure of the purchase (Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). This effect
has been coined the taximeter effect and is considered to be one of the main drivers of
the flat rate bias (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Prelec and Loewenstein, 1998). Several
other drivers of flat rate bias were also suggested in the literature. The most relevant
of these are the overestimation effect (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Miravete, 2003;
Nunes, 2000) and the insurance effect (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a; Train et al., 1987).
The overestimation effect relates to the fact that consumers have a tendency to overes-
timate their expected usage. This increases the likelihood of preferring a flat rate. The
insurance effect denotes that consumers prefer to be insured against unexpectedly high
costs of usage. Such insurance is offered by the flat rate tariff, but not by a pay-per-use
tariff.
The first and to-date most comprehensive study that has related these psychological ef-
fects to tariff choice was by Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a). The authors first developed
and validated psychometric multi-item scales (Nunnally, 1978) in order to measure re-
spondents’ self-assessment of the strength of the taximeter and insurance effects in the
context of pay-per-use and flat rate tariffs (Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006b). These scales
were then used in two separate studies. The first study was exclusively based on survey
data from 241 students of management in which tariff perception (via the scales) and
tariff bias (via choice sets) were collected simultaneously. In this study, the taximeter
and insurance effects were found to explain the flat rate bias at a 1% significance level.
The second is a ground-breaking study in assessing tariff perception. For the first time,
tariff perceptions were collected via a survey and combined with transactional data
on tariff biases. Based on 941 observations, the taximeter and insurance effects were
now only significant at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. This decline in observed
significance level when the dependent variable was collected with a different method
can be interpreted as an indication for the existence of a common method bias (Bagozzi
et al., 1991; Chang et al., 2010; Jo, 2000; King and Bruner, 2000; Podsakoff et al., 2003;
Richardson et al., 2009).
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This is a well-documented phenomenon in behavioral research, which may result in
an inflation of the observed relationships - particularly as a result of the so-called self-
report bias, which stems from the existence of a common source or rater (Podsakoff
et al., 2003). Hence, studies that rely exclusively on a self-assessment of tariff choice
and tariff perception from the same survey (like the first study by Lambrecht and Skiera
(2006a), but unlike their second) are prone to exhibit a systematic measurement bias.
This is, however, common practice in many studies conducted in a similar fashion,
most of which used the original or slightly adapted scales from Lambrecht and Skiera
(e.g. Gerpott, 2009; Kraemer and Wiewiorra, 2012; Mitomo et al., 2009; Schulze and
Gedenk, 2005).
This section departs from the common practice in two fundamental ways. First, a
new approach in assessing tariff perceptions by means of psychophysiological mea-
surements is suggested. In particular, the approach relies on previous insights from
psychophysiology that find a strong relationship between a subject’s emotional state
and physiological correlates, such as the heart rate or skin conductivity (Bradley et al.,
2008; Hubert and De, 1990). This relationship is established through the autonomous
nervous system, which normally acts outside of conscious awareness and, therefore,
cannot be directly influenced by free will (Cacioppo et al., 2007). Thus, it is proposed
and conjectured that heart rate measurements provide an objective and direct proxy for
the perception of tariffs; in this vein, a common method bias can be overcome. Second,
this new approach on tariff perception implies that subjects actually experience the tar-
iff under investigation during the measurements, e.g., by placing calls in a laboratory
experiment or in the field. This complements the previous approach in which respon-
dents were asked to imagine a hypothetical scenario. Although the methodological
foundations of survey research are well advanced and established in marketing, the re-
sponses of the survey participants to hypothetical questions nevertheless lack incentive
compatibility and therefore might not reflect true behavior (Falk and Heckman, 2009;
Smith, 1976). Another decisive advantage of the proposed methodology is that it can be
readily applied to measure and compare the perception of complex, multi-part tariffs
without the need to construct and validate appropriate psychometric item scales first.
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This is demonstrated with respect to measuring the taximeter effect under the so-called
cost cap tariff, which is a two-part tariff that is a hybrid between a pay-per-use tariff
and a flat rate. Thus, ex ante it is unclear whether the taximeter effect under the cost
cap tariff is perceived similarly under a pay-per-use tariff or a flat rate.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. First, the theoretical background
for psychophysiological measurements of tariff perception is established. Next, the
design of a laboratory study is developed in which this new methodology is applied
and validated with respect to the perception of the taximeter effect under a pay-per-use,
flat rate, and cost cap tariff. Thereafter the results are presented and discussed. Finally,
the article concludes with a summary and insights for practice and future research.
Theoretical Background on Psychophysiological Measurements Physio- or neuroe-
conomic studies (Adam et al., 2011; Camerer et al., 2005; Wang and Minor, 2008) have
become an established toolset in economics during the last two decades, resulting in
both incremental and radical changes in the understanding of economics and decision
making. Camerer et al. argued that automatic processes, which are faster than con-
scious deliberations, and finely tuned affective (emotion) systems have not been consid-
ered in economics so far. Particularly, the heart rate is a well-known proxy for emotions
in psychophysiology (Berntson et al., 2007; Wang and Minor, 2008). Specifically in the
context of this section, new neuropsychological findings on the perception of money
are of relevance (Breiter et al., 2001; Crone et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2000; Gehring
and Willoughby, 2002). In a physioeconomic experiment, Crone et al. analyzed the
reaction of the heart rates of participants during gambling tasks with disadvantageous
and advantageous options. The authors found that overall the respondents’ heart rates
slowed down following loss relative to reward outcomes. In addition, they were able to
show that the heart rate is sensitive to the magnitude of punishment rather than the fre-
quency of punishment. More specifically, analyzing phasic changes in heart rate allows
the perceived averseness of the external stimulus to be evaluated, the so-called valence.
The more negative a stimulus is perceived; typically the stronger is the subject’s aver-
age deceleratory heart rate responses (ADHRRs) (Bradley et al., 2008). The ADHRR has
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been found to be a valid, reliable and sensitive measure of emotional processing (Wang
and Minor, 2008).
In addition, the ADHRR is moderated by a person’s heart rate variability, as it is well
known that heart rate variability explains individual differences in regulated emotional
response to a large degree (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006; Suetterlin et al., 2011). It can
be assessed by means of the so-called LFHF ratio and SDNN. The LFHF ratio corre-
sponds to the ratio of the low-frequency (LF) and high-frequency (HF) components of
the heart rate. The SDNN refers to the standard deviation (SD) of time intervals be-
tween successive "normal" (N) heart beats (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006). Low LFHF
ratio and high SDNN values reflect that a specific subject has a greater capacity for reg-
ulated emotional responses, respectively. Therefore, these measures must be used as
control variables when considering the ADHRR as a measure for tariff perception.
Research Hypotheses on the Validation of the Method Based on these insights it is
reasonable to expect that, controlling for heart rate variability, a person’s perception
(valence) of a certain tariff can be assessed by measuring his or her deceleratory heart
rate response while he or she is exposed to the tariff (external stimulus). For example,
the taximeter effect, if present, was initially described as a pain of paying (Prelec and
Loewenstein, 1998). Thus, subjects that have to place a call under a flat rate tariff should
not experience such a pain. By contrast, subjects that place the same call under a pay-
per-use tariff, and are thus exposed to the taximeter effect, should experience a pain
of paying with each cost tick. However, the psychophysiological basis of the taximeter
effect was never tested, although it was already posited by Camerer et al. (2005) as an
open research question: "While there is no direct evidence that paying is painful, the as-
sumption that paying hurts can explain many market phenomena which are otherwise
puzzling. An example is the effect of payment- neutral pricing schemes on choices" (p.
36).
In order to test this conjecture and to validate the methodology, subjects are exposed
to either a pay-per-use or a flat rate tariff condition during a controlled laboratory ex-
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periment by asking them to place a series of costly hotline calls. During the calls, the
ADHRRs are measured. The experiment is designed such that only the taximeter effect
is feasible.2 Complementary to previous studies, the experimental methodology em-
ployed in this study allows letting participants actually experience a (controlled) tariff
situation. In particular, it can be presumed that under the pay-per-use tariff each cost
tick (i.e., when incrementing the costs of the call) is perceived as a negative external
economic stimulus. Subjects should therefore experience such an event with a negative
valence. Consequently, if this methodology is valid, the taximeter effect, which results
from the linkage of usage and payment, should induce a stronger ADHRR to cost ticks
under a pay-per-use tariff than under a flat rate tariff. In order to demonstrate the
applicability of the approach, the following hypotheses are tested:
HYPOTHESIS 1. Participants’ ADHRR to relevant stimuli (cost ticks) are stronger under
the pay-per-use tariff than under the flat rate tariff.
Furthermore, in order to exclude that the possible difference in ADHRR was caused by
some economic irrelevant stimulus and not by a cost tick, the following hypothesis is
also tested:
HYPOTHESIS 2. Participants’ ADHRR to relevant stimuli are stronger than participants’
ADHRR to irrelevant stimuli.
In order to show that the proposed methodology is valid, both research hypotheses
must be confirmed.
Research Hypothesis on the Perception of the Cost Cap Tariff The methodology’s
ability to assess tariff perception for more complex tariffs is demonstrated by investi-
gating the taximeter effect under the so-called cost cap tariff. This new tariff is a hybrid
tariff between a flat rate and a pay-per-use plan.3 The cost cap tariff is a metered pay-
2The details of the experimental design are described in the next subsection.
3This tariff type was introduced to the German mobile communications market in May 2009 by
O2/Telefonica.
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per-use plan until a predefined cost cap is reached, at which point it effectively becomes
an unmetered flat rate. It is especially interesting to study the perception of the cost cap
tariff, because it separates the insurance effect from the taximeter effect. Under a flat
rate plan the alleviation of the taximeter effect is inevitably coupled to the insurance
effect. In reverse, under a pay-per-use plan the taximeter effect arises in the absence
of a cost insurance. These circumstances make the cost cap tariff an ideal candidate to
demonstrate the above psychophysiological methodology, because one is able to study
how the taximeter effect is perceived under a pay-per-use tariff with cost cap. In other
words, using the cost cap tariff allows the measurement of the taximeter effect in the
presence of a cost insurance. In this setting, it is open how the taximeter effect is per-
ceived.
On the one hand, the advertisement campaign for the cost cap tariff suggested that
the taximeter effect is not present under the cost cap tariff. The ad proclaimed "Are
you counting cents per minute? We do not want you to think about the phone call
when making a phone call."4 Note that the promise of the advertisement is directly
related to Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) seminal description of the taximeter effect
when they wrote: "Talking on the phone is more pleasurable when you don’t have to
think about what each call is costing you" (p. 21). Following this view, the taximeter
effect under the cost cap tariff should be perceived similar as under the flat rate tariff,
where the taximeter effect does not exist by definition. On the other hand, because
usage is metered until the cost cap becomes binding, the taximeter effect may well exist
under the cost cap tariff. Then, the cost cap tariff and flat rate tariff should be perceived
differently. Hypothesis 3 investigates which conjecture is rather true:
HYPOTHESIS 3. Participants’ ADHRR to relevant stimuli are stronger under the cost cap
tariff than under the flat rate tariff.
4Translated from German. Original advertisement available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbyctGmoZ5w.
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6.2.2 Methodology
Experimental Design The intention of this study is to measure the perception of the
taximeter effect more directly through psychophysiological measurements in a con-
trolled laboratory setting. To this end, the participants were exposed to a lifelike ex-
perience of being put on hold at a costly hotline under either a flat rate, pay-per-use,
or cost cap tariff. A between-subjects design was selected, in which students were
randomly and exclusively assigned to one of the three tariff conditions (flat rate, pay-
per-use, and cost cap). The participants were then told that they had to place eight calls
to a hotline, which would inform them about a voucher code that could be redeemed
for money.5 During each call, the participants were put on hold for an unknown period
of time with no possibility to opt out. Four of the eight calls had a short waiting time of
one minute and the other four a long waiting time of two minutes. The subjects did not
know about these expected waiting times. Short and long calls were selected in ran-
dom order. Additionally, each call was randomly and individually extended by up to
29 seconds. This design was chosen in an effort to balance two opposing factors: On the
one hand, a high degree of control could be achieved by taking the psychophysiological
measurements repeatedly under the same conditions. On the other hand, conditioning
effects of the subjects that result from the repetition of the same call durations could be
avoided. In addition, the economic costs should be kept identical across the different
tariff conditions.
While considering calls of different lengths, the impact of billing periods of different
lengths were also considered. To this end, two different voucher redemption schemes
were deliberated. In one set of treatments the voucher could be redeemed after each
call. In another set of treatments the voucher was redeemed only after all eight calls
were completed.
Under a pay-per-use tariff, respondents had to pay 1.29e for every 30-second time in-
terval that they were on hold in the hotline, whereas flat rate respondents paid a fixed
5The complete introduction for participants is available in the Appendix C
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amount of 3.87e for short and 6.45e for long calls. Under a cost cap tariff, the partici-
pants had to pay the pay-per-use rate (1.29e for each 30-second interval) until the cost
cap was reached. The cost cap was set at the level of the corresponding flat rate, i.e., at
3.87e for short calls and at 6.45e for long calls, respectively. This price structure was
chosen to ensure comparability between the pay-per-use, flat rate, and cost cap treat-
ments. Given a per-minute price under the pay-per-use treatments of 1.29e, the flat
rate price as well as the cost cap have to be different for long and short calls in order to
guarantee comparability between the treatments. For the cost cap treatments the same
per-minute rate as for the pay-per-use and the same cost cap as for the flat rate were
chosen in order to guarantee similar treatment conditions for measuring the taximeter
effect.6 Finally, calls that were placed under a cost cap or a flat rate tariff were extended
for another 30 seconds to control for differences in perception of the taximeter effect af-
ter reaching the cost cap. However, these time extensions had no impact on the actual
costs of the respondents. This price structure was chosen to ensure that all subjects had
the same account balance after all hotline calls were completed, independently of the
voucher redemption scheme or tariff. Moreover, it achieves that a negative balance at
the end of a call could not occur. The account balance was paid out in real money at the
end of the experiment.
The participants were informed about the number of calls they had to make, the costs
of placing a call, and the value of the voucher. In particular, as mentioned above, there
were two different voucher redemption schemes in effect that were equally assigned in
each treatment. Under the first scheme, the participants received a voucher of 1.50e
value after each call, which was immediately balanced to their account. Under the
second scheme, the participants received only a part of a voucher code after each call
and could, therefore, only redeem the voucher with a total value of 12.00e after all
eight calls had been completed. Participants were able to review the elapsed call time,
6Clearly, actual providers of cost cap tariffs will likely charge a premium on the per-minute rate or set
the cost cap higher than the costs for a comparable flat rate. In any case, this will rather emphasize
the taximeter effect under cost cap tariffs. Therefore, when a taximeter effect is found under cost cap
tariffs, it is rather underestimated.
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call budget, and accumulated costs of the current call at any time on their computer
screen.
Finally, it is emphasized that the subjects did not select their tariff themselves and were
uninformed about the alternative tariff possibilities, such that regret effects could be ex-
cluded (between-subjects design). Therefore, differences in the tariff perception of the
participants between the three tariff conditions can be solely attributed to the taximeter
effect.
Taximeter and Reference Events In the experiment, several different external stimuli
were deliberately introduced in order to be able to disentangle the relevant from the
irrelevant stimuli. While being on hold, the subjects in all treatments were exposed
to neutral ("elevator") music, which was played to them over headphones. The music
was interrupted every 15 seconds by either a taximeter event (relevant stimulus) or a
reference event (irrelevant stimulus) in alternating order.
Taximeter events, which occurred every 30 seconds, are characterized by a highlighting
of the accumulated costs in red alongside with an acoustic signal. For participants
under a pay-per-use tariff or under a cost cap tariff before reaching the cost cap, this
taximeter event appeared at the same time at which the costs were incremented by
1.29e. Therefore, these taximeter events are said to have a cost tick.7 By contrast,
participants in the flat rate condition and participants in the cost cap condition after
reaching the cost cap received the same taximeter event (i.e., color highlighting and
acoustic signal) but did not experience the cost increase (no cost tick).
Reference events, which occurred every 30 seconds and 15 seconds before each taxime-
ter event, are simply characterized by a voice message saying "Please hold the line".
This acoustic reference event was identical for all participants and did not coincide with
7In the past, a similar acoustic signal, called "minute beep" was present in all Siemens mobile phones.
Today, the same feature is available through third party applications for Android and Symbian phones
as well as the Apple iPhone.
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a change in costs (cost tick) in any of the three tariff conditions. Figure 6.2 summarizes
the structure of hotline calls exemplarily for the short calls.
FIGURE 6.2: Structure of hotline calls
Procedure and Psychophysiological Measurement The experiment was pro-
grammed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 150
students, 111 male and 39 female, were recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004)
from different academic programs at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology to partic-
ipate in the experiment during two weeks in July 2010. Out of the 150 participants
in the experiment, physiological measurements could be successfully obtained for 129
(41/45/43 in the flat rate/cost cap/pay-per-use tariff conditions, respectively). Due
to technical issues with one measurement device, the data of 21 participants was not
properly recorded and thus had to be discarded from further analysis.
During each call, the heart rates of the participants were measured. Following the rec-
ommendations of Jennings et al. (1981), the electric activity of the heart was measured
by means of an electrocardiogram (ECG). The heart rate was then quantified by mea-
suring the time between successive R-waves in the ECG. The ECG recording is based
on a two-lead method with single-use electrodes placed on the left and right wrist. The
guidelines of the Society for Psychophysiological Research regarding heart rate studies
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were taken into account (Jennings et al., 1981) in order to exclude any measurement arti-
facts. Furthermore, the subjects were visually separated from the recording equipment.
Between two consecutive calls, a one minute rest period was introduced such that the
physiological values could return to an individual normal level. At the beginning of the
experiment, participants had to complete a five minute rest period. In the subsequent
analysis, changes in heart rate are evaluated relative to the average heart rate in the
rest period in order to account for interpersonal differences. Moreover, the heart rate
measurements that were taken during this initial rest period are used to compute the
LFHF ratio and SDNN.
Because the taximeter events occur at fixed time intervals, anticipatory effects have
to be considered in measuring the ADHRR. Anticipatory reactions can occur several
seconds before the actual event (Bechara and Damasio, 2005), whereas a psychological
reaction to external stimulation occurs up to five seconds after the external stimulus
(Bradley et al., 2008). Therefore, all physiological reactions are considered relevant that
occur up to five seconds before an event and up to five seconds after an event. More
precisely, the individual ADHRR of each participant is measured as the average of the
difference between his/her maximum heart rate (up to five seconds before an event)
and his/her minimum heart rate (up to five seconds after an event).
6.2.3 Results
In order to test the research hypotheses, the average physiological reaction (ADHRR) to
the taximeter and reference events is considered and compared by means of ordinary
least squares regression (OLS) analysis. More specifically, the participants’ ADHRR
is regressed on the treatment variables (cost cap, pay-per-use and voucher type, all
encoded as dummy variables8), the event type (reference or taximeter event) as well
as control variables for the call duration and interpersonal differences in physiological
reaction (LFHF ratio and SDNN).
8Consequently, the flat rate treatment serves as a benchmark in this and all further regressions.
136
6.2 Psychophysiological Perception of Tariffs
For the first set of regressions, a total of four ADHRR values are computed for each of
the 129 participants: One for each combination of short and long calls, and taximeter
and reference events. This results in a total of 516 observations for all treatments. In
order to control for the fact that some observations come from the same subject, robust
standard errors clustered by subject are used in all regressions.
Model 1 in Table 6.3 only considers the observations from the flat rate and pay-per-
use treatments to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed as participants’
ADHRR to taximeter events is significantly stronger than to reference events. In addi-
tion, the ADHRR is significantly stronger in the pay-per-use treatment as compared to
the flat rate treatment. This confirms Hypothesis 1.
Moreover, the used voucher redemption scheme, i.e., billing periods of different length,
does not have an effect on the participants’ physiological responses. However, the
ADHRR is found to be significantly weaker under long calls than under short calls.
This indicates that the taximeter effect may decay over time. Finally, the participants’
individual psychophysiological characteristics (SDNN and LFHF ratio) have a signifi-
cant impact on the observed measurements (Appelhans and Luecken, 2006). The signs
of all effects are as expected. In summary, these results confirm the validity of the pro-
posed methodology.
Model 2 in Table 6.3 shows the results of the regression when the observations of the
cost cap treatment are also included. Here the ADHRR is computed over all taximeter
events, i.e., before and after reaching the cost cap. Whereas the previous results are un-
changed, it can be observed that the ADHRR under the cost cap tariff are significantly
stronger than under the flat rate tariff. This result only holds at the 10% level. The rea-
son is that there are obvious differences between the subjects’ ADHRR before and after
reaching the cost cap. If the ADHRR is computed using only taximeter events before
reaching the cost cap (see Model 3 in Table 6.3), the ADHRR increase under the cost cap
tariff (compared to the flat rate tariff) is significant at the 0.1% level. In summary, this
confirms Hypothesis 3.
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TABLE 6.3: Regression on ADHHR in comparison to flat rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
pre & post pre & post pre only pre vs. post
Pay-per-use 0.797∗ 0.814∗ 0.822∗
(0.330) (0.333) (0.337)
(Pre) Cost cap 0.549+ 1.393∗∗∗ 1.006∗
(0.304) (0.314) (0.487)
Post Cost Cap −0.661∗
(0.310)
Event 0.948∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 0.798∗∗ 0.942∗∗
(0.299) (0.227) (0.249) (0.356)
Long call −0.927∗∗∗ −0.973∗∗∗ −1.145∗∗∗ −0.385
(0.233) (0.195) (0.211) (0.341)
Voucher 0.564 0.305 0.171 −0.185
(0.339) (0.263) (0.269) (0.453)
SDNN 0.513∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.0907) (0.0619) (0.0684) (0.137)
LFHF Ratio −0.127+ −0.136∗∗ −0.124∗ −0.240∗∗
(0.0694) (0.0493) (0.0476) (0.0714)
Constant 0.137 0.106 0.113 1.679
(0.734) (0.571) (0.628) (1.136)
Observations 336 516 516 688
R2 0.265 0.321 0.339 0.253
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.311 0.330 0.246
Standard errors in parentheses
Robust clustered standard errors by subject
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
138
6.2 Psychophysiological Perception of Tariffs
In order to investigate the difference in reaction to taximeter events before and after
reaching the cost cap further, an individual’s ADHRR is computed for the last taximeter
event and the last reference event before reaching the cost cap, and the first taximeter
and reference event after reaching the cost cap. As there was exactly one taximeter
and reference event after reaching the cost cap, this procedure achieves that averages
are computed over the same number of events before and after reaching the cost cap,
thus ensuring comparability. The ADHRR is compared to the flat rate treatment only,
because there were no taximeter events without cost tick under the pay-per-use tariff.
In total, this yields eight observations per subject (four as above, before and after the
cost cap was reached, respectively) in each of the two tariff conditions, totaling to 688.
Model 4 in Table 6.3 shows the results, where "post cost cap" is a dummy variable
that indicates whether the cost cap was reached. In this way the results can be directly
compared to results of the previous regressions. While the main results are qualitatively
unchanged9, it can additionally be observed that a subject’s ADHRR under the cost cap
tariff is significantly decreased after the cost cap has been reached. While this result
seems intuitive, because the cost cap tariff effectively becomes a flat rate at this point,
also notice that the net effect in comparison to the ADHRR of participants in the flat
rate treatment remains positive. In summary, it can therefore be concluded that the
taximeter effect under the cost cap tariff prevails (at least for some time), even after the
cost cap has been reached.
6.2.4 Discussion
Summary of Results In this section, a psychophysiological methodology was pre-
sented to measure the perception of tariffs, which is a complementary approach to pre-
vious survey-based approaches. Perception is measured through objective physiologi-
cal responses in terms of the participants’ heart rates. In this way, the perception can be
assessed more objectively and potential issues due to common method variance can be
9With the exception that the duration of the call does not seem to have a significant influence anymore.
This is likely to be driven by the fact that for this regression only the two neighboring taximeter and
reference events are considered.
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avoided. Moreover, the proposed methodology does not require the construction and
validation of psychometric scales. The methodology was validated by studying the
taximeter effect of consumers during telephone calls under a flat rate, pay-per-use and
cost cap tariff. In a controlled laboratory environment, participants were exposed to a
lifelike experience of a costly hotline call under one of these three tariffs. Under these
conditions it is shown that the individual average deceleratory heart rate response is an
indicator for the taximeter effect: Under a pay-per-use tariff, participants experience a
significantly stronger physiological response than participants with a flat rate tariff.
Furthermore, the applicability of this new methodology was demonstrated with respect
to measuring the perception of the taximeter effect under the new cost cap tariff, which
is a hybrid between a flat rate and a pay-per-use tariff. Contrary to the announcements
of recent advertisement campaigns, it was found that the insurance property of the cost
cap tariff does not alleviate the taximeter effect. Thus, the cost cap tariff is perceived
similar as a pay-per-use tariff, particularly before the cost cap is reached. However,
the results also indicate that the perception of the taximeter effect under cost cap tariffs
prevails (at least for some time) even after the cost cap has been reached. Although
the taximeter effect is significantly reduced after the cost cap was reached, it is still
stronger than under a comparable flat rate tariff. This finding, however, contradicts
earlier results of Section 6.1. This might be due to differences between expected and
actual perception of tariffs, which should be studied in more detail by future research.
Implications for Practice Increased competition has lead the firms in the service and
communications sector to differentiate themselves through innovative and appealing
pricing schemes (Bub et al., 2011; Mueller et al., 2012; Lambrecht et al., 2012). The results
of the study highlight how the application of methods from neuro- and psychophysiol-
ogy to marketing can contribute to a deeper understanding of the consumers’ emotions
to different tariff options. Service providers can directly use these methods to gain a
better understanding on the perception of their tariffs. In the context of the telecom-
munications industry, for example, firms may be interested to combine the processing
power of smart phones with wireless physiological measurements. For instance, heart
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rate measurements can be easily realized in the field by means of wearable sensor tech-
nology. In this vein, the firms can conduct field experiments and assess how consumers
physiologically respond to different tariffs while using their own mobile phones. By
conducting such measurements in the daily environment of consumers, a high degree
of external validity can be achieved. This in turn can help telecommunications firms to
design tariffs that are tailored to the specific needs of various consumer groups.
For example, this study shows that the taximeter property prevails even in the pres-
ence of a cost insurance. Therefore, from a managerial point of view, the results of this
study question the recent advertisement campaign of mobile communications compa-
nies, which emphasize that the cost cap tariff is an opportunity to call without experi-
encing a pain of paying. With respect to the cost cap tariff, it is therefore advisable to
focus more on the fact that this tariff offers increased flexibility in comparison to a flat
rate.
Limitations and Future Research Since this section proposes a new methodological
approach to measuring tariff perception, there are several promising future topics to
be addressed by this methodology and existing limitations yet to be overcome. For
example, although the methodology does not require the construction and validation
of effect or tariff specific scales, the measurement of psychophysiological indicators
does not differentiate between different sub effects per se. If this is the goal of the
researcher, a careful experimental design is mandatory, by which it is possible to disen-
tangle these effects. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe that the negative perception
of the taximeter effect does not increase linearly with an increase in the marginal price.
Whereas this study focused on the validation of the new methodology and has therefore
considered the same marginal prices in all treatments for comparability, future research
may focus on the impact of different marginal prices on the perception of the taximeter
effect. Furthermore, in this study the participants were randomly assigned to one of
the tariff conditions. Therefore, tariff choice and its interaction with psychophysiology
could not be studied. Future research may focus more on this interaction. In particular,
differences in emotion regulation capabilities may be important consumer characteris-
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tics for tariff choice. Thus, it may also be interesting to investigate correlations between
a subject’s heart rate variability (SDNN and LFHF ratio) and tariff choice.
6.3 Framing of Cost Cap Tariffs
So far the cost cap tariff has only been discussed with initially increasing costs, which
are capped at a predefined cost level. However, the cost cap tariff can also be framed
as an initial fixed fee with a payback option for every minute below a predefined
consumption level. The cost schedules are identical between this payback tariff (PB)
and the cost cap tariff, as long as the initial fixed fee is equivalent to the cost cap, the
marginal payback is the same as the marginal usage price and the critical consumption
is set at the corresponding cost cap consumption. Yet, there is reason to believe that
cost schedules can be perceived differently although they are functionally the same.
Table 6.4 provides an example of mobile telecommunications tariffs, which illustrates
the framing of both tariffs and their total costs respectively.
TABLE 6.4: Exemplary cost cap and payback tariffs
cost cap tariff payback tariff
description
You pay 0.10e for every
minute on the phone. How-
ever, your total costs cannot
exceed a predefined cost cap
of 20e per month. If you use
more than 200 minutes no fur-
ther costs accrue.
You pay a fixed fee of 20e per
month, which includes all call-
ing costs. However, if you
use less than 200 minutes you
get 0.10e for every unused
minute.
total costs under the assumption of 100 minutes of telephony usage:
KCC = 0.10e/min100min = 10e
KPB = 20e − 0.10e/min(200 −
100)min = 10e
6.3.1 Related Literature
Earlier research on the perception of nonlinear pricing has found a significant impact
of tariff framing (Goh and Bockstedt, 2012; Iyengar et al., 2011; Ho and Zhang, 2008)
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on choice. For instance, Iyengar et al. studied the effect of tariff framing by comparing
pay-per-use with traditional two-part tariffs in a field experiment. The authors devel-
oped a utility model and estimated consumer preferences accordingly. Their results
show that marginal utility from consumption is significantly lower under a two-part
tariff, even after controlling for income effects and consumer heterogeneity. This so
called “access fee effect” decreases both consumer retention and consumption. Iyen-
gar et al. demonstrated that ignoring this framing effect results in a profit reduction of
11%. Ho and Zhang studied the perception of fixed fee framing by either charging a
fixed fee upfront or alternatively charging the fixed fee in an opaque frame as quantity
discounts. Although both approaches result in the same total costs, offers with a fixed
fee are rejected more often. As the authors explained, such behavior can be explained
by loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting (Thaler, 1985).
The prospective accounting theory of Prelec and Loewenstein (1998), which is an exten-
sion of the mental accounting theory, is especially well suited in the context of payback
tariffs. Prelec and Loewenstein found that consumers tend to couple costs with con-
sumption and vice versa. Timing and the interference of costs and consumption are
thereby most important. The derived pleasure of consumption is reduced by the pain
of paying, which leads to a strong debt aversion. Thus, consumer prefer to pay in ad-
vance because they can enjoy consumption as if it is free.
The same logic applies to the different perception of payback and cost cap tariffs. Pay-
back tariffs involve a prepayment which decouples consumption from payment. Fol-
lowing this argumentation, a payback tariff should be perceived more positively than a
cost cap tariff. Although the payback as well as the cost cap tariff end up with the same
total fee at the end of a month, the payment process is different. While consumers’
bill increases linearly with consumption under a cost cap tariff, consumers start with
a fixed fee under a payback tariff which linearly decreases afterwards. Thus, prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) suggests that the loss from the fixed fee should
not be outbalanced by the gains afterwards. Following this argumentation, a cost cap
tariff should be preferred to a payback tariff. It is therefore an open question, whether
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accounting theory is perceived stronger than prospect theory and whether a payback
tariff is in fact preferred to a cost cap tariff.
Compared to a flat rate tariff, both tariffs provide a similar insurance against high costs.
As discussed before, from a provider’s perspective it is only reasonable to set the fixed
fee of a payback tariff and the cost cap higher than the fee of a flat rate tariff, as other-
wise these tariffs would dominate the flat rate. Therefore, in times of high consumption
consumers are better off choosing a flat rate. It is unclear whether the option to pay less
in times of low consumption outbalances the bill difference in times of high consump-
tion, so that consumers prefer a payback to a flat rate tariff.
6.3.2 Methodology
The research question was studied by conducting a stated preference experiment.10 A
total of 330 respondents were recruited by a professional marketing research agency
to conduct an online survey. The corresponding sample is representative of the pop-
ulation of German mobile telephony users. Respondents had to answer two repeated
choice settings. In one choice setting, respondents had to choose five times between
a flat rate and a cost cap tariff with varying usage prices. The other choice setting
included the same pricing, this time, however, the cost cap tariff was framed as a pay-
back tariff. The presented flat rate, cost cap and payback tariffs are illustrated in Table
6.5. Both choice settings were presented to the respondents in random order to avoid
sequence effects.
Additionally, respondents answered several multi-item constructs on psychological ef-
fects, which have been found to explain tariff choice before. This includes the overesti-
mation, insurance, taximeter, and flexibility effect (see Chapter 2). The scales are related
to Lambrecht and Skiera (2006a), Kraemer and Wiewiorra (2012) and Uhrich et al. (2012)
and have been adjusted to account for cost cap and payback tariffs.11 In addition, an
10The full questionnaire is available in Appendix B.1.
11All questions related to the multi-item scales and the subsequent exploratory factor analysis can be
found in Appendix B.2.2.
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TABLE 6.5: Tariff framing under different price levels
pricing
level
FR CC PB
20 e/month 0.05 e/min 25 e/month
1 25 e/month cost cap 0.05 e/min payback
above 500min below 500min
20 e/month 0.10 e/min 25 e/month
2 25 e/month cost cap 0.10 e/min payback
above 250min below 250min
20 e/month 0.15 e/min 25 e/month
3 25 e/month cost cap 0.15 e/min payback
above 166min below 166min
20 e/month 0.20 e/min 25 e/month
4 25 e/month cost cap 0.20 e/min payback
above 125min below 125min
20 e/month 0.25 e/min 25 e/month
5 25 e/month cost cap 0.25 e/min payback
above 100min below 100min
external calling pattern was given to the respondents who were asked to assume an av-
erage consumption of 200 minutes with their consumption n being equally distributed
between 0 and 400 minutes. Hence, the uniform density distribution is given by:
f (n) =

1
400 if n ∈ [0,400]
0 otherwise
(6.1)
Note that in the following the parameter c is used for both describing the cost cap as
well as the initial fee under a payback tariff. Likewise, p describes the usage price
as well as the marginal payback rate. The flat rate fee is described by f . At C = c/p
consumption reaches the cost cap. Given the external calling pattern, a risk neutral
respondent with no tariff specific preferences is assumed to choose a flat rate tariff if
the expected costs under such are lower than under a cost cap respectively payback
tariff:
E(KFR) < E(KCC) = E(KPB)(6.2)
f < Prob(n < C)E(n | n < C)p + Prob(n ≥ C)c
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f < F(C)
∫
n<C
n
f (n)
F(C)
p dn + (1− F(C))c
f <
∫
n<C
n f (n)p dn + (1− F(C))c
Applying the assumed uniform distribution with range r = (400− 0) provides the crit-
ical price for a rational consumer to choose a flat rate tariff:
p >
c2
2r(c− f ) =
252
2 ∗ 400 ∗ (25− 20) = 0.156(6.3)
Consequently, if respondents are risk neutral and do not exhibit tariff framing specific
preferences, respondents were expected to choose the cost cap (payback) tariff first and
then switch to the flat rate tariff after the fourth price level. However, even if respon-
dents are risk averse, there should be no differences in choice behavior between the cost
cap and payback choice.
6.3.3 Results
Respondents tariff decisions are illustrated descriptively in Figure 6.3. Surprisingly,
respondents’ choice behavior strongly differs from the theoretical proposition in several
ways. First, the flat rate tariff is chosen with a significant share even if the given price
level had favored the flat rate alternative. Thus, respondents either exhibit a flat rate
bias as stated in earlier research (Train et al., 1989) or a noticeable risk aversion. Second,
the share of cost cap tariff choice seems to be different from the share of payback tariffs,
which will be statistically verified later. This finding suggests that the framing of the
cost cap tariff strongly influences its choice. At last, the share of cost cap choice sharply
drops after the second price level. While the payback tariff shows a similar pattern, the
decrease is not as strong, which confirms the framing effect.
Respondents’ choices are further analyzed using two logit regression with the flat rate
tariff as a baseline. The first logit regression solely studies the implied treatments. The
two choice settings are differentiated by a dummy variable named payback framing.
146
6.3 Framing of Cost Cap Tariffs
FIGURE 6.3: Share of CC/PB over FR tariff choice
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Note: The figure shows the share of 330 consumers who have chosen a cost cap (respectively payback
tariff) over a flat rate tariff. The increasing price level correspond to an increasing usage price (marginal
payback) of the cost cap (payback) tariff.
The five different price levels are dummy coded as well, using the first and lowest price
level as a baseline. In addition, the second logit regression also accounts for possible
psychological effects to influence tariff choice. Multiple choices per respondents are
controlled for by using clustered standard errors. The results of the logit regression are
illustrated in Table 6.6.
As expected, a higher price level significantly increases the chances of choosing the flat
rate option. Thus, respondents became aware of the nonlinear course of the payback
and cost cap tariff, and realized that with an increasing price level the flat rate tariff
becomes the cost minimizing alternative. Consequently, the chances of choosing the
flat rate is increasing with the height of the price level of the payback and cost cap tariff
respectively. It is interesting to see that the payback dummy which controls for the
framing of the cost cap/payback tariff significantly decreases the chances to choose the
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TABLE 6.6: Choice of cost cap and payback tariff
flat rate choice
(1) (2)
2nd price level 0.757∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.085)
3rd price level 1.575∗∗∗ 1.619∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.139)
4th price level 1.698∗∗∗ 1.745∗∗∗
(0.153) (0.159)
5th price level 1.786∗∗∗ 1.835∗∗∗
(0.164) (0.170)
payback -1.171∗∗∗ −1.201∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.114)
overestimation effect 0.250∗
(0.098)
insurance effect 0.243∗
(0.114)
taximeter effect 0.188+
(0.104)
flexibility effect −0.126
(0.103)
constant 0.500∗∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.117)
Observations 330x10 330x10
Nagelkerke R2 0.194 0.222
Standard errors clustered by subject in parentheses
+ p < .1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
flat rate tariff. Thus, the payback tariff is perceived differently and more positively than
the cost cap tariff.
PROPOSITION 13. Framing of the cost cap tariff as a payback tariff significantly increases its
choice probability.
Hence, it can be concluded that the positive effect of accounting theory is perceived
stronger than the negative effect of prospect theory. Therefore, consumers’ preference
for prepayment is an important factor in framing tariffs with a cost cap option. The
framing effect remains significant, even when psychological effects known to explain
tariff choice are added to the logit analysis. Thereby, model (2) partly contradicts the
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earlier findings of Section 6.1. In contrast, the taximeter has a tendency to drive flat
rate choice and thus, the effect is not compensated by the cap. Overestimating one’s
consumption is another significant parameter to favor flat rate choice. However, in
contrast to the findings of Section 6.1, exhibiting a need for insurance significantly fa-
vors flat rate choice. A possible explanation might be that the systematic variation of
cost cap’s usage price increased the need for insurance. At last, the flexibility effect does
not have a significant effect on tariff choice, which might be due to the weak interitem
correlations of the flexibility scale (see Appendix B.2.2).
6.3.4 Discussion
Summary of results The effect of tariff framing has been applied on cost cap tariffs
in a stated preference experiment. Framing the cost cap as an initial fixed fee with
payback option significantly increases chances to prefer a cost cap tariff to a flat rate
alternative. Thus, the results provide evidence that the positive effect from advanced
payment, as stated by the accounting theory, outbalances the negative effect from loss
aversion, as stated by the prospect theory. In general, consumers realize the nonlinear
course of cost cap tariffs and choose the cost cap tariff with higher probability if the cost
cap tariff provides the option to save money. Furthermore, psychological effects known
to explain tariff choice remain a significant influence for choosing a flat rate tariff.
Limitations and future research The study focused solely on the impact of framing
on tariff choice. Future research may also study the effect of framing on actual con-
sumption. Earlier research provided evidence that consumption is subdued due to
marginal pricing (Danaher, 2002). It is, however, unclear whether a marginal gain un-
der a payback tariff results in the same effect or whether consumers exhibit a similar
consumption pattern as under a flat rate tariff.
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Conclusion
“Pricing remains a black box to many companies;
misunderstood, undermanaged and virtually ignored.”
Robert A. Garda
THE purpose of this thesis was to study consumers’ perception and choice behav-ior of tariffs including cost caps, and its implication for providers’ tariff portfolio
design. Besides a theoretical consideration, stated preference experiments as well as
simulations have been used to study several derived research questions. In the follow-
ing, the results of this thesis and their implications are summarized in Section 7.1 and
promising future research is presented in Section 7.2.
7.1 Summary and Implications
The first research question this thesis addressed was whether the presence of a cost cap
component changes consumers’ tariff choice and consumption behavior. Therefore,
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a theoretical model was developed in Chapter 3 and later extended and empirically
evaluated in Chapter 4. The results showed that consumption at the level of the cost
cap is never optimal for a rational consumer. In fact, a subsequent empirical study in
Chapter 3 showed that respondents did not overestimate their consumption beyond
the model’s prediction. However, the cost cap causes a sudden increase of consump-
tion due to a shift in consumption preferences. Considering the choice of a cost cap
tariff, the theoretical model showed that consumers would only prefer a cost cap tar-
iff to a pay-per-use or flat rate tariff if they exhibited a reasonable uncertainty in their
prospective consumption. Empirical findings of Chapter 4 confirmed the importance
of such uncertainty in explaining consumers’ choice behavior. Thereby, the cost cap
tariff will only be chosen if its higher price level is outbalanced by the uncertainty in
consumption. Counterfactual simulations in Chapter 5 confirmed that providers’ can
in fact profit from consumers’ uncertainty by offering tariffs with cost caps.
Consequently, service providers who consider offering cost cap tariffs should be aware
of the kind of consumers they are targeting at. Especially providers who are limited in
their capacity to provide a service should be aware that the introduction of a cost cap
tariff may foster a steep increase of consumers’ consumption level.
The next research question focused on the ability of utility models to represent con-
sumers’ behavior. Therefore, several utility models were evaluated by their internal
and external validity to predict consumers’ tariff choices in a stated preference exper-
iment. The results in Chapter 4 showed that a traditional additive part-worth utility
model poorly predicts consumers’ choice behavior. In contrast, discrete/continuous
choice models can account for the dependency of discrete tariff choice and correspond-
ing continuous consumption decision, and exhibit a clearly better prediction power. In
addition, the choice models are further improved by including consumer uncertainty
and accounting for possible flat rate biases. Besides the analysis in Chapter 4, these util-
ity models were applied in two empirical studies in Chapter 3 and 6 and were found to
explain tariff choice significantly.
From a provider’s perspective the specification of consumers’ utility model is impor-
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tant for predicting future profits, as a misspecification might lead to an overestimation
of consumers’ satiation points as shown in Chapter 4.
In addition, this thesis addressed the question under which constellations the imple-
mentation of a cost cap component increases providers’ profit. Based on the estimated
consumer preferences of Chapter 4, several counterfactual simulations and sensitivity
analyses were conducted in Chapter 5 to address this question. The results provided
evidence that extending an existing tariff with a cost cap component is always profit
increasing under zero marginal costs, whereas the extension with an allowance is only
reasonable in a competitive scenario. This is because the cost cap component allows
a better price discrimination of consumers, as the usage price can be designed to face
consumers with low consumption and the cost cap accordingly to exploit profits from
consumers with high consumption. Furthermore, the cost cap exploits consumers’ will-
ingness to pay due to their demand uncertainty. Further sensitivity analyses revealed
this result to be robust against a variation of the cost cap component, as variations only
address a small number of consumers. Nevertheless, the advantage of the cost cap
component is diminished by increasing marginal costs and an increased competitive
price pressure. However, tariffs with cost cap components perform especially well in
matured markets where pay-per-use and flat rate tariffs are already established. Fur-
thermore, the analysis of framing effects in Chapter 6 showed that the perception of the
cost cap component can be positively influenced by framing the cost cap as an initial
fixed fee with payback option. This way the chances to choose a cost cap tariff can be
increased, which is likely to lead to increased profits.
In summary, providers should consider the extension of their existing tariffs with cost
cap components if they face low marginal costs. In case they face fierce competition
or high marginal costs, the implementation requires a case sensitive analysis. Never-
theless, the cost cap component should always be framed as an initial fixed fee with
payback option to be most effective.
Finally, the thesis studied the influence of psychological effects on the perception of
cost cap tariffs. In general, the empirical study of Chapter 4 showed that respondents
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exhibit tariff specific preferences in form of a flat rate bias that significantly influences
tariff choice. However, subsequent studies on psychological effects that drive cost cap
tariff choice did not achieve a clear finding. The first study on psychological effects in
Chapter 6 found the insurance effect to be the major driver to prefer a cost cap tariff
to a pay-per-use as well as a flat rate tariff. Furthermore, the taximeter effect signifi-
cantly influenced consumers to prefer a cost cap to a pay-per-use tariff. This finding
suggests that the cost cap diminished the pain of paying. Yet, a new psychophysiologi-
cal approach to measure consumers’ tariff perception, which was presented in Chapter
6, contradicted this finding. There was no significant difference between consumers’
reaction to price increases under pay-per-use and cost cap tariffs. Consequently, this
finding proposed that the taximeter effect remains under the insurance of a cost cap.
The second empirical study strengthened this finding, as the taximeter effect signifi-
cantly influenced consumers to prefer a flat rate to a cost cap tariff. Moreover, the re-
sults showed that the respondents of this study perceived the insurance effect stronger
under a flat rate than a cost cap tariff. Nevertheless, both empirical studies agreed that
overestimating one’s future consumption leads to a preferred choice of the flat rate tar-
iff. Yet, all results are limited to a provision of telecommunication services. It remains
an open research question whether cost cap tariffs are equally perceived in a different
service industry.
Hence, service providers are advised to conduct case specific studies before launching
possible cost cap extension as the psychological perception may be dependent on the
consumer group, existing tariff portfolio or the service industry. Needless to say, in-
sights of tariff perception can help to improve targeting the desired consumer group
and shape tariff advertisement to be more effective.
Overall, the thesis showed that a combination of different methodologies allows study-
ing in detail the effects of innovative pricing approaches such as cost cap tariffs. The
proposed utility models and simulation approaches provide synergies which service
providers can use to anticipate consumer reactions to price adjustments and optimize
their tariff portfolio accordingly. Thereby, this approach is not limited to four-part tar-
iffs and may also include further tariff components such as quantity discounts.
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7.2 Outlook
There are several limitations within this thesis which may foster future research in mod-
eling consumers’ choice behavior, measuring their tariff perception and optimizing ser-
vice providers’ tariff portfolio.
The proposed utility model of Chapter 3 and its extended variant of Chapter 4 only
accounted for tariff specific preferences in a limited way by using a bias parameter.
Earlier research, however, found that the rational tariff choice is systematically biased
due to several psychological effects, such as the insurance, taximeter, overestimation,
or flexibility effect. It is therefore desirable to model these effects in a more general
manner which copes the complexity of four-part tariffs by future research. Such an af-
fect based model could help to understand the interaction of tariff components with
psychological effects and to estimate corresponding tariff biases from stated preference
experiments directly. Furthermore, the proposed model accounted for the interdepen-
dency of discrete tariff choices and continuous consumption decisions. However, its
application was limited to the use of telephone usage only. As cell phone contracts are
offered as bundles of tariffs for telephony, messaging, and Internet usage nowadays, it
would be interesting to see how consumers substitute these different services. From a
practitioner’s perspective these insights have direct implications for the pricing of such
tariff bundles.
Considering the estimation of consumer preferences under four-part tariffs, there are
two prominent aspects to consider in the future. First, the applied conjoint experiment
did not offer the possibility to study learning effects over time as it is a static approach.
Yet, earlier research studies (Narayanan et al., 2007; Miravete, 2003) showed that con-
sumers learn their preferences over time and consequently adapt their consumption
pattern. In fact, this thesis showed that the implementation of a cost cap tariff may in-
duce a strong increase of consumers’ consumption. Therefore, it would be interesting
to see how fast consumers change their behavior in case their current tariff is further
extended by a cost cap option. The application of a field experiment together with
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an extension of the proposed utility model to account for learning effects promises to
study consumer behavior over time. Second, consumers face a challenging task when
it comes to the point of choosing from a set of four-part tariffs. It is therefore likely that
consumers simplify their decision by the use of heuristics. Gilbride and Allenby (2004)
demonstrated the use of a two stage decision model to account for common heuristics
including conjunctive, disjunctive, and compensatory screening rules. The proposed
model’s fit may benefit from an extension in this vein.
This thesis also studied the perception of tariffs with cost caps. While the conducted
studies in Chapter 6 found a significant influence of different psychological effects
on tariff choice, they did not account for the financial consequences of these choices.
Hence, the financial extent of cost cap biases could not be evaluated. The extent, how-
ever, and its implication on tariff pricing are especially interesting from a provider’s
perspective. Therefore, future research should extend the applied experiment in a
similar way as Schulze and Gedenk (2005) to study the additional willingness to pay
induced by psychological effects. Furthermore, other psychological effects than the
taximeter, insurance, flexibility or overestimation effect may explain tariff choice. Thus,
effects such as the paradox of choice (Schwartz et al., 2002) should be studied in detail to
explain tariff choice better. Finally, the perception of cost cap tariffs was solely studied
in the context of telecommunication services. Yet, cost cap tariffs are also used to price
insurance and rental services. It would be interesting to see whether cost cap tariffs are
equally perceived in these industries.
The measurement of tariff perception was further studied by a new methodological
approach using psychophysiological data as a proxy. There are several promising fu-
ture topics to be addressed by this methodology. The conducted experiment provided
evidence that the perception of the taximeter effect results in an actual pain of paying
which can be measured by the average decrease of the heart rate response. However,
the relationship between the extent of the negative perception of the taximeter effect
and the marginal price level remains an open question and should be addressed by
future research. Furthermore, the conducted experiment was designed as a between-
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subject study and required an assignment of respondents into tariff conditions. Hence,
the influence of psychophysiological perception on tariff choice could not be studied.
It is, however, reasonable to believe that consumers’ psychophysiological characteris-
tics, such as the emotion regulation capability, may explain tariff choice. In addition,
the relationship of stated perception in surveys and actual experienced perception in
experiments should be addressed by future research.
Finally, the thesis studied the effect of cost caps on providers’ optimal tariff portfolio. In
particular, there are two promising avenues for future research. First, switching costs
were unaccounted in the proposed model of Chapter 5, although they might increase
the attractiveness of tariffs with cost cap components. Charging a switching fee results
in consumers sticking with one tariff (Goettler and Clay, 2011). Therefore, consumers
can reduce the risk of being stuck with the wrong tariff after learning their consumption
behavior by choosing a cost cap tariff. It would be interesting to see whether consumers
are willing to pay a risk premium for the cost cap component consequently. Second,
the applied simulation considered a static reaction of market competitors to the intro-
duction of new tariffs. While this static consideration permitted an understanding of
beneficial tariff portfolios, its forecast of market equilibrium is limited. Hence, future
research should address a dynamic competition model in line with current research in
game theory (Steiner and Baumgartner, 2009).
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Appendix A
Empirical Study I
A.1 Questionnaire
Dear participant,
this questionnaire is about choosing tariffs for cell phone usage. Thereby, only air time
minutes are considered. Additional services, such as text messaging and data usage,
remain unconsidered.
The questionnaire is part of a research project of the Institute of Information Systems
and Marketing at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology.
The questionnaire will take about 15 minutes to complete.
Your data will be used for scientific purposes only and not be given to any third party.
Thank you for your participation.
A.1.1 Introduction
QUESTION 1. What is your gender?
◦ male
◦ female
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QUESTION 2. How old are you?
◦ 0-13 years
◦ 14-19 years
◦ 20-29 years
◦ 30-39 years
◦ 40-49 years
◦ 50-59 years
◦ 60-69 years
◦ 70 years and older
QUESTION 3. Do you own a cell phone contract or a prepaid card, which you are currently
using?
◦ yes
◦ no
QUESTION 4. Do you pay for one of them?
◦ yes
◦ no
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A.1.2 Explanation of Tariff Schemes
You will encounter different tariff schemes within this questionnaire. They consist of
the following tariff components:
Fixed fee Fixed monthly access fee, which has to be paid
independent of your consumption.
Usage price Price paid for every air time minute. This price is the same
independent of the calling network within this
questionnaire.
Allowance A predefined number of minutes, which are free of charge.
Cost cap The monthly total bill consisting of fixed fee and costs of
calls cannot excess a predefined cost ceiling (cost cap).
These tariff components together with your monthly calling pattern define your
monthly total bill. The following example illustrates this relationship. If you have been
on the phone for 200 minutes, the following total bills sum up under the given tariffs:
Consumption of 200 min Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 24 e 0 e 9 e
Usage price 0,00 e 0,15 e 0,10 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 100 min
Cost cap none 27 e none
Total bill in e 24 e 27 e 19 e
Tariff 1: You pay 24 e independent of your consumption.
Tariff 2: You pay 0.15 e per minute. After the 180th minute you reach the cost cap of
27 e and no further costs will occur.
Tariff 3: Independent of your consumption, you pay a fixed fee of 9 e. 100 minutes of
your total consumption of 200 minutes are covered by the allowance. The remaining
100 minutes are charged by 0.10 e per minute.
Your total bill is accordingly 9 e + 100 min * 0.10 e = 19 e.
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QUESTION 5. Please imagine you have been on the phone for exactly 100 minutes. Please
calculate the total bill of the following tariffs:
Consumption of 100 min Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 10 e 25 e
Usage price 0.10 e 0.15 e 0.00 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 0 min
Cost cap none 20 e none
Total bill in e
A.1.3 Evaluation of Your Calling Pattern
QUESTION 6. Please estimate how many minutes you are on your phone per month (only
outgoing calls).
I’m calling minimal ___ minutes per month.
I’m calling on average ___ minutes per month.
I’m calling maximal ___ minutes per month.
QUESTION 7. How sure are you about this estimation?
very uncertain very certain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
Please assume in the following, that you have to phone under a pay-per-use tariff and
that there is no alternative tariff to choose. You only have to pay for each air time minute
according to the usage price. This tariff does not include any fixed fee, allowance or cost
cap.
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QUESTION 8. Please state how many minutes you would on average be on the phone with the
given usage prices (outgoing calls only).
0.40e/min ___ minutes
0.20e/min ___ minutes
0.10e/min ___ minutes
0.05e/min ___ minutes
0.01e/min ___ minutes
free of charge ___ minutes
QUESTION 9. How sure are you about your consumption pattern?
very uncertain very certain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
A.1.4 Tariff Choice (1/3)
Next, there will be three sets of questions each consisting of five choice tasks. In each
choice task you have to choose one out of three tariff alternatives.
Please consider these tariffs as the only choice option. Do not compare these tariffs with
your current tariff or recent offers on the mobile telecommunications market.
Even if the choice tasks appear to be similar, each alternative is different. Thus, please
focus on every decision.
Choose every tariff according to your personal consumption.
QUESTION 10. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 5 e 10 e
none of these
Usage price 0.20 e 0.10 e 0.15 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 50 min
Cost cap 15 e 20 e 15 e
Your choice # # # #
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QUESTION 11. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 10 e 7.50 e 5 e
none of these
Usage price 0.10 e 0.15 e 0.20 e
Allowance 50 min 25 min 0 min
Cost cap 15 e none 20 e
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 12. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 7.50 e 0 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.0 e 0.17 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 0 min
Cost cap none none 8 e
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 13. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 5 e 10 e 7.50 e
none of these
Usage price 0.20 e 0.10 e 0.15 e
Allowance 0 min 25 min 50 min
Cost cap none 15 e 20 e
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 14. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 10 e 7.50 e 0 e
none of these
Usage price 0.00 e 0.15 e 0.20 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 0 min
Cost cap none 20 e 15 e
Your choice # # # #
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A.1.5 Your Opinion on Tariff Schemes (1/3)
QUESTION 15. Please state by the use of the following scale, whether the following statements
apply to you.
The probability of calling more than expected is higher than calling less.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
Even though a tariff with cost ceiling is a little bit more expensive, I’m happy as my
costs will never exceed this cost ceiling.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I don’t want to bind myself paying a fixed fee regularly for mobile phone consump-
tion.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I less enjoy being on the phone when costs are rising with every minute.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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I feel way loose and impartial to use my cell phone, when the fixed fee includes already
all running costs.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
While choosing a tariff, I pay attention to a low fixed fee, as I phone less from time to
time.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
A.1.6 Tariff Choice (2/3)
You have to choose again between three alternative tariff in the following 5 choice sets.
Please choose one tariff each.
Please take into account that only these offered tariffs are available to you. Do not
compare these tariffs with your current tariff or recent offers on the mobile telecommu-
nication market.
QUESTION 16. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 7.50 e 5 e
none of these
Usage price 0.20 e 0.00 e 0.10 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 50 min
Cost cap 20 e none 15 e
Your choice # # # #
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QUESTION 17. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 7.50 e 10 e 5 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.10 e 0.20 e
Allowance 25 min 50 min 0 min
Cost cap 15 e 20 e none
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 18. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 10 e 5 e 7.50 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.20 e 0.10 e
Allowance 25 min 0 min 50 min
Cost cap 20 e 15 e none
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 19. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 10 e 7.50 e 5 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.10 e 0.20 e
Allowance 50 min 25 min 0 min
Cost cap 20 e none 15 e
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 20. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 7.50 e 5 e
none of these
Usage price 0.20 e 0.15 e 0.10 e
Allowance 0 min 25 min 0 min
Cost cap none 15 e 20 e
Your choice # # # #
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A.1.7 Your Opinion on Tariff Schemes (2/3)
QUESTION 21. Please state by the use of the following scale, whether the following statements
apply to you.
It is important for me to be able to use my cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I don’t like when calling costs are rising every minute.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It bothers me when the flat rate does not pay out in a month.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It’s great when the monthly costs cannot exceed a defined amount, because I don’t have
to think about costs every minute.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I can well imagine to call more than the average.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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For the security that my costs will never exceed a predefined amount, I’m willing to
pay a bit more on average.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It is important for me to be able to use my cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
A.1.8 Tariff Choice (3/3)
You have to choose again between three alternative tariff in the following 5 choice sets.
Please choose one tariff each.
Please take into account that only these offered tariffs are available to you. Do not
compare these tariffs with your current tariff or recent offers on the mobile telecommu-
nication market.
QUESTION 22. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 7.50 e 5 e 0 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.10 e 0.20 e
Allowance 25 min 50 min 0 min
Cost cap 15 e none 20 e
Your choice # # # #
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QUESTION 23. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 7.55 e 0 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.00 e 0.15 e
Allowance 0 min 0 min 0 min
Cost cap none none 7.50 e
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 24. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 7.50 e 7.50 e 10 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.10 e 0.00 e
Allowance 0 min 25 min 0 min
Cost cap 15 e none none
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 25. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 7.50 e 5 e 10 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.20 e 0.10 e
Allowance 25 min 0 min 50 min
Cost cap none 20 e 15 e
Your choice # # # #
QUESTION 26. Which of these three tariffs would you choose?
Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 10 e 7.50 e 5 e
none of these
Usage price 0.15 e 0.10 e 0.20 e
Allowance 50 min 25 min 0 min
Cost cap 15 e 20 e none
Your choice # # # #
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A.1.9 Your Opinion on Tariff Schemes (3/3)
QUESTION 27. Please state by the use of the following scale, whether the following statements
apply to you.
The risk of calling more than average is higher than the risk of calling less than aver-
age.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
The assurance that my total bill will never exceed a certain amount is more important
to me than choosing the cheapest tariff.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I don’t like when costs are higher than originally anticipated.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
Only if I don’t have to pay per minute I’m happy to use my phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
If you pay attention to this questionnaire, answer this question with 7 “fully applies”.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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It bothers me that I pay too much under a flat rate in times of low consumption.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
A.1.10 Consumption Pattern
QUESTION 28. Who is the provider of your current tariff?
◦ T-Mobile
◦ Vodafone
◦ O2
◦ E-Plus
◦ 1und1
◦ Alice
◦ Base
◦ BILDmobil
◦ Blau
◦ Congstar
◦ Fonic
◦ Mobilcom
◦ Simyo
◦ Other
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QUESTION 29. Please state all components your current tariff includes.
◦ Monthly fixed fee
◦ Usage price
◦ Flat rate for calling in any network (including fixed line)
◦ Flat rate for calling in specific networks (e.g. only to fixed line)
◦ Allowance
◦ Cost cap
◦ Minimum turnover
◦ Internet/ data packet
◦ SMS packet
◦ Further components
QUESTION 30. Please state how important the following components are when choosing a
mobile tariff.
not important at all very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Allowance # # # # # # #
SMS packet # # # # # # #
Usage price # # # # # # #
Fixed fee # # # # # # #
Data packet # # # # # # #
Cost cap # # # # # # #
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QUESTION 31. How do you pay for your mobile services?
◦ Prepaid (by cash before delivery)
◦ Postpaid (by bill)
QUESTION 32. How much is your average monthly total bill (including all services such as
SMS or data consumption)?
___ e
QUESTION 33. Do you use a smartphone with this tariff?
◦ yes
◦ no
QUESTION 34. Please state whether the following statements apply to you.
I mainly use my cell phone for private purposes.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I’m responsible for choosing my mobile tariff.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
Friends ask for my advice when choosing a tariff.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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It is important for me to be able to use my cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I have mainly chosen my tariff due the affiliated cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
My consumption pattern is significantly influenced by tariffs and usage prices.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
A.1.11 Questions about Yourself
Please answer some general questions about yourself.
QUESTION 35. What is your profession?
◦ High school student/ apprentice
◦ University student
◦ Employee without personnel responsibility
◦ Employee with personnel responsibility
◦ Freelancer without personnel responsibility
◦ Freelancer with personnel responsibility
◦ Housewife/ househusband
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◦ Seeking work
◦ Retired
◦ Other
QUESTION 36. What is your highest education level?
◦ Higher academic degree
◦ Graduate degree
◦ Undergraduate degree
◦ General qualification for university entrance
◦ General certificate of secondary education
◦ Certificate of secondary education with apprenticeship
◦ Certificate of secondary education without apprenticeship
◦ Apprenticed/ student
◦ No graduation
◦ Other
QUESTION 37. What is the net income of all persons living in your household?
◦ smaller or equal to 500e
◦ 500 up to 1000e
◦ 1000 up to 1500e
◦ 1500 up to 200e
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◦ 2000 up to 2500e
◦ 2500 up to 3000e
◦ 3000 up to 3500e
◦ 3500 up to 4000e
◦ 4000e and more
◦ No answer
QUESTION 38. What is your family status?
◦ Single
◦ Live together with partner
◦ Married
◦ Divorced
◦ Widowed
QUESTION 39. How many people live in your household?
◦ 1 person
◦ 2 persons
◦ 3 persons
◦ 4 persons
◦ 5 persons
◦ more than 5 persons
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QUESTION 40. How many children live in your household?
◦ none
◦ 1 child
◦ 2 children
◦ 3 children
◦ 4 children
◦ 5 children and more
QUESTION 41. How would you evaluate your mathematical skills?
very weakly pronounced very strongly pronounced
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
A.1.12 Code of Honor
QUESTION 42. Is there anything you want to tell us?
Please allow us to ask a final question. This question does not have any impact on your
payoff or your participation in future questionnaires. Your answer cannot be seen by
the operating market research company.
QUESTION 43. Have you answered all questions honestly and truthfully to the best of your
knowledge?
◦ Yes
◦ No
192
A.2 Supplementary Analysis
A.2 Supplementary Analysis
A.2.1 Sample Demographics
gender # age # income #
male 365 14-19 68 [0e,500e) 16
female 381 20-29 159 [500e,1000e) 37
30-39 128 [1000e,1500e) 54
40-49 186 [1500e,2000e) 72
50-59 135 [2000e,2500e) 97
60-69 70 [2500e,3000e) 82
[3000e,3500e) 92
[3500e,4000e) 73
[4000e,∞e) 113
A.2.2 Scale Development
TABLE A.1: Multi-item scale on psychological effects
Taximeter
T1 I less enjoy being on the phone when costs are rising with every minute.
T2 Only if I don’t have to pay per minute I’m happy to use my phone.
T3 I don’t like when calling costs are rising every minute.
Insurance
I1 For the security that my costs will never exceed a predefined amount, I’m
willing to pay a bit more on average.
I2 Even though a tariff with cost ceiling is a little bit more expensive, I’m happy
as my costs will never exceed this cost ceiling.
I3 The assurance that my total bill will never exceed a certain amount is more
important to me than choosing the cheapest tariff.
Overestimation
O1 I can well imagine to call more than the average.
O2 The probability of calling more than expected is higher than calling less.
O3 The risk of calling more than average is higher than the risk of calling less
than average.
Flexibility
F1 I don’t want to bind myself paying a fixed fee regularly for mobile phone
consumption.
F2 While choosing a tariff, I pay attention to a low fixed fee, as I phone less from
time to time.
F3 It bothers me when the flat rate does not pay out in a month.
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TABLE A.2: Exploratory factor analysis: Pattern matrix
item
factor
Cronbach’s α
1 2 3 4
T1 0.7356 0.752
T2 0.5745
T3 0.6835
I1 0.6650 0.796
I2 0.7064
I3 0.6372
O1 0.7025 0.844
O2 0.7288
O3 0.7224
F1 0.5823 0.714
F2 0.6445
F3 0.6743
Note: Values <0.3 suppressed, varimax rotation
A.2.3 Estimation Results
FIGURE A.1: Draws of MCMC estimation
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TABLE A.3: Internal and external validity of alternative models
internal validity external validity
SLL Log BF HR MAD HR MAD
Model X -8,087 - 56.06% 0.23 52.41% 0.29
Model Y -8,167 - 65.23% 0.20 60.19% 0.27
Notes: SLL: simulated log-likelihood, Log BF: log Bayes factor,
HR: hit rate, MAD: mean absolute deviance
Model X accounts for allowance bias
Model Y accounts for externalities
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A.2.4 Additional Choice Sets
TABLE A.4: Choice sets for evaluating tariff perception for medium and high consumption
group
T1 T2 T3
M
fixed fee ( f ) 0 e 0 e 15 e
minute price (p) 0.15 e/min 0.17 e/min 0.00 e/min
cost cap (c) ∞ e 16 e ∞ e
H
fixed fee ( f ) 0 e 0 e 27.50 e
minute price (p) 0.15 e/min 0.17 e/min 0.00 e/min
cost cap (c) ∞ e 30 e ∞ e
Note: Components in parentheses describe the second choice set.
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B.1 Questionnaire
This questionnaire was conducted and designed with appreciated help of Kateryna Shapoval-
ova.
Dear participant,
this questionnaire is about choosing tariffs for cell phone usage and is part of a research
project of the Institute of Information Systems and Marketing at the Karlsruhe Institute
of Technology.
The questionnaire will take about 15 minutes to complete.
Your data will be used for scientific purposes only and not be given to any third party.
Thank you for your participation.
B.1.1 Introduction
QUESTION 1. What is your gender?
◦ male
◦ female
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QUESTION 2. How old are you?
◦ 0-13 years
◦ 14-19 years
◦ 20-24 years
◦ 25-29 years
◦ 30-34 years
◦ 35-39 years
◦ 40-44 years
◦ 45-49 years
◦ 50-54 years
◦ 55-59 years
◦ 60-64 years
◦ 65 years and older
QUESTION 3. Do you own a cell phone contract or a prepaid card, which you are currently
using?
◦ yes
◦ no
QUESTION 4. Do you pay for one of them?
◦ yes
◦ no
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QUESTION 5. Do you use your cell phone for private or business purposes?
privat purposes only business purposes only
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
QUESTION 6. Please state whether the following statements apply to you.
It is important for me to be able to use my cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I have mainly choosen my tariff due the affiliated cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
My consumption pattern is significantly influenced by tariffs and usage prices.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
B.1.2 Presentation of Tariff Schemes
In this section all tariff schemes will be presented which are relevant for this question-
naire. All tariffs of this questionnaire consider only air time minutes. Other services
(e.g. SMS, data, apps) are not relevant in the context of this questionnaire.
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Tariff scheme 1 - pay-per-use tariff: You pay a predefined price for every minute on
the phone.
Tariff scheme 2 - flat rate tariff: You pay a predefined fixed fee per month and no fur-
ther costs occur, independently of your phone consumption.
Tariff scheme 3 - cost cap tariff: You pay a predefined price for every minute on the
phone. However, your total costs cannot exceed a predefined cost ceiling (cost cap).
Before reaching the cost cap this tariff is comparable to a pay-per-use tariff (tariff
scheme 1). After reaching the cost cap this tariff is comparable to a flat rate tariff (tariff
scheme 2).
Example: You use a cost cap tariff with a usage price of 0.10e/min and a cost cap of
30e. Assuming you have had 100 minutes of air time, you have to pay 100min x 0.10e
= 10e. If you have 500 minutes of air time, you would have exceeded the cost cap of
30e: 500min x 0.10e = 50e. You only pay 30e.
QUESTION 7. Please imagine you have been on the phone for exactly 300 minutes. Please
calculate the total bill of the following tariffs:
Consumption of 100 min Tariff 1 Tariff 2 Tariff 3
Fixed fee 0 e 0 e 20 e
Usage price 0,10 e 0,15 e 0,00 e
Cost cap none 25 e none
Total bill in e
B.1.3 Note
For the following questions, please assume your personal mobile phone consumption
(outgoing calls only). Furthermore, assume that you have to pay for all calls by yourself.
Please note: There is no “right” or “wrong” answers in the following questions. Answer
all questions according to your personal assessment. Your assessment does not have to
be dead on time.
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B.1.4 Evaluation of Your Calling Pattern
QUESTION 8. Please estimate how many minutes you are on your phone per month (only
outgoing calls).
I’m calling minimal ___ minutes per month.
I’m calling on average ___ minutes per month.
I’m calling maximal ___ minutes per month.
Please assume in the following, that you have to phone under a pay-per-use tariff and
that there is no alternative tariff to choose. You only have to pay for each air time minute
according to the usage price. This tariff does not include any fixed fee, allowance or cost
cap.
QUESTION 9. Please state how many minutes you would on average be on the phone with the
given usage prices (outgoing calls only).
0.40e/min ___ minutes
0.20e/min ___ minutes
0.10e/min ___ minutes
0.05e/min ___ minutes
0.01e/min ___ minutes
free of charge ___ minutes
QUESTION 10. How sure are you about your consumption pattern?
very uncertain very certain
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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B.1.5 Tariff Choice (1/2)
Apart from your current tariff, imagine you have to choose one of the following tariffs.
Please assume that you are choosing the tariff for your personal consumption in the
following choice tasks.
QUESTION 11. State the minimal, average and maximal number of minutes you would call
with your cell phone for each tariff (only outgoing calls).
pay-per-use tariff cost cap tariff flat rate tariff
Fixed fee 0 e 0 e 25 e
Usage price 0.13 e 0.15 e 0.00 e
Cost cap none 30 e none
Minimal consumption
Average consumption
Maximal consumption
QUESTION 12. Please state how you rate each tariff.
not attractive at all very attractive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pay-per-use tariff # # # # # # #
Flat rate tariff # # # # # # #
Cost cap tariff # # # # # # #
QUESTION 13. Please state in which order you would choose these tariffs (state the most at-
tractive tariff as number 1, the second most attractive as number 2 and so on)
Your ranking: 1) ______ 2) ______ 3) ______
B.1.6 Tariff Choice (2/2)
In the following, prices have been changed. How would you choose now?
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QUESTION 14. State the minimal, average and maximal number of minute you would call
with your cell phone for each tariff (only outgoing calls).
flat rate tariff pay-per-use tariff cost cap tariff
Fixed fee 20 e 0 e 0 e
Usage price 0.00 e 0.10 e 0.12 e
Cost cap none none 25 e
Minimal consumption
Average consumption
Maximal consumption
QUESTION 15. Please state how you rate each tariff.
not attractive at all very attractive
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Pay-per-use tariff # # # # # # #
Flat rate tariff # # # # # # #
Cost cap tariff # # # # # # #
QUESTION 16. Please state in which order you would choose these tariffs (state the most at-
tractive tariff as number 1, the second most attractive as number 2 and so on)
Your ranking: 1) ______ 2) ______ 3) ______
B.1.7 Note
You have already finished half of the questionnaire.
For the second part of the questionnaire, please imagine apart from your actual con-
sumption that you use your cell phone for 200 minutes per month on average for out-
going calls and that you have to pay the costs for yourself. You monthly consumption
varies between 0 and 400 minutes, while every number of minutes is equally likely.
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B.1.8 Cost Cap Tariff
Please choose in each case between the given cost cap tariff and a flat rate tariff with
a monthly fixed fee of 20e. Please take into account, that the cost cap tariff practically
becomes a flat rate tariff after a specific amount of air time. The corresponding number
of minutes are given respectively.
Please imagine apart from your actual consumption that you use your cell phone for
200 minutes per month on average for outgoing calls and that you have to pay the
costs for yourself. You monthly consumptions varies between 0 and 400 minutes, while
every number of minutes is equally likely.
QUESTION 17. Which of these tariffs would you choose in each case?
Flat rate tariff Cost cap tariff Flat rate tariff Cost cap tariff
20 e/month 0.05 e/min
25 e/month cost cap # #
above 500min
20 e/month 0.10 e/min
25 e/month cost cap # #
above 250min
20 e/month 0.15 e/min
25 e/month cost cap # #
above 166min
20 e/month 0.20 e/min
25 e/month cost cap # #
above 125min
20 e/month 0.25 e/min
25 e/month cost cap # #
above 100min
B.1.9 Payback Tariff
Now we would like to introduce you to a brand new tariff scheme: the payback tariff.
Similar to a flat rate tariff you pay a fixed fee per month which includes all calling costs.
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However, if you use less than a predefined number of minutes, you get money back for
every unused minute.
Example: You pay 25e under a payback tariff. For every minute you call less than 500
minutes, you get 0.05e back. You can get back a maximum of 25e.
Please choose in each case between the given payback tariff and a flat rate tariff with a
monthly fixed fee of 20e.
Please imagine apart from your actual consumption that you use your cell phone for
200 minutes per month on average for outgoing calls and that you have to pay the costs
for yourself. You monthly consumption varies between 0 and 400 minutes, while every
number of minutes is equally likely.
QUESTION 18. Which of these tariffs would you choose in each case?
Flat rate tariff Payback tariff Flat rate tariff Payback tariff
20 e/month 25 e/month
0.05 e/min payback # #
below 500min
20 e/month 25 e/month
0.10 e/min payback # #
below 250min
20 e/month 25 e/month
0.15 e/min payback # #
below 166min
20 e/month 25 e/month
0.20 e/min payback # #
below 125min
20 e/month 25 e/month
0.25 e/min payback # #
below 100min
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B.1.10 Your Opinion on Tariff Schemes (1/3)
QUESTION 19. Please state by the use of the following scale, whether the following statements
apply to you.
It is important for me to be able to use my cell phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
For the security that my costs will never exceed a predefined amount, I’m willing to
pay a bit more on average.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It’s great when the monthly costs cannot exceed a defined amount, because I don’t have
to think about costs every minute.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I don’t like when calling costs are rising every minute.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It bothers me when the flat rate does not pay out in a month.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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I can well imagine to call more than the average.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It’s important to me to call enough so that my tariff has paid off afterwards.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
B.1.11 Your Opinion on Tariff Schemes (2/3)
QUESTION 20. Please state by the use of the following scale, whether the following statements
apply to you.
I feel way loose and impartial to use my cell phone, when the fixed fee includes already
all running costs.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I less enjoy being on the phone when costs are rising with every minute.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
The probability of calling more than expected is higher than calling less.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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Even though a tariff with cost cap is a little bit more expensive, I’m happy because my
costs will never exceed this cost cap.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
It’s important to me to exhaust the flat rate.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
Payback and cost cap tariff are equally attractive to me.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
B.1.12 Your Opinion on Tariff Schemes (3/3)
QUESTION 21. Please state by the use of the following scale, whether the following statements
apply to you.
There is no difference between the payback and the cost cap tariff.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
The risk of calling more than average is higher than the risk of calling less than aver-
age.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
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I don’t want to commit myself to pay regularly a fixed fee for mobile calling.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
I don’t like when costs are higher than originally anticipated.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
Only if I don’t have to pay per minute I’m happy to use my phone.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
The assurance that my total bill will never exceed a certain amount is more important
to me than choosing the cheapest tariff.
does not apply at all fully applies
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
B.1.13 Details on Your Consumption Pattern
QUESTION 22. Please state all components your current tariff includes.
◦ Monthly fixed fee
◦ Usage price
◦ Flat rate for calling in any network (including fixed line)
◦ Flat rate for calling in specific networks (e.g. only to fixed line)
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◦ Allowance
◦ Cost cap
◦ Minimum turnover
◦ Data packet
◦ SMS packet
◦ Further components
QUESTION 23. How much is your average monthly total bill (including all services such as
SMS or data consumption)?
___ e
QUESTION 24. Do you have a monthly budget for your mobile total bill?
◦ Yes
◦ No
QUESTION 25. How much is this budget?
___ e
QUESTION 26. How do you pay for your mobile services?
◦ Prepaid (by cash before delivery)
◦ Postpaid (by bill)
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B.1.14 Thought Experiment
Imagine you could participate in the following described free lotteries. Each lottery has
two possible outcomes, which occur with equal probability. Your payoff depends on a)
which lottery you choose and b) which outcome occurs.
Example: If you choose lottery 4 and outcome A occurs, you get 40e. If outcome B
occurs, you get 4e.
QUESTION 27. Please choose one of the following five lotteries, which you would like to play.
Lottery Outcome Payoff Probability Your choice
1
A 16e 50% #
B 16e 50%
2
A 24e 50% #
B 12e 50%
3
A 32e 50% #
B 8e 50%
4
A 40e 50% #
B 4e 50%
5
A 48e 50% #
B 0e 50%
B.1.15 Questions about Yourself
QUESTION 28. What is your profession?
◦ High school student
◦ University student
◦ Apprentice
◦ Employee
◦ Freelancer
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◦ Housewife/ househusband
◦ Seeking work
◦ Retired
◦ Other
QUESTION 29. What is the net income of all persons living in your household?
◦ smaller or equal to 500e
◦ 500 up to 1000e
◦ 1000 up to 1500e
◦ 1500 up to 2000e
◦ 2000 up to 2500e
◦ 2500 up to 3000e
◦ 3000 up to 3500e
◦ 3500 up to 4000e
◦ 4000e and more
◦ No answer
QUESTION 30. How many people live in your household?
QUESTION 31. How many children live in your household?
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QUESTION 32. How would you evaluate your mathematical skills?
very weakly pronounced very strongly pronounced
1 2 3 4 5 6 7# # # # # # #
QUESTION 33. Is there anything you want to tell us?
B.1.16 Code of Honor
Please allow us to ask a final question. This question does not have any impact on your
payoff or your participation in future questionnaires. Your answer cannot be seen by
the operating market research company.
QUESTION 34. Have you answered all questions honestly and truthfully to the best of your
knowledge?
◦ Yes
◦ No
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B.2 Supplementary Analysis
B.2.1 Sample Demographics
gender # age # income #
male 154 14-19 10 [0e,500e) 12
female 176 20-24 37 [500e,1000e) 24
25-29 41 [1000e,1500e) 35
30-34 34 [1500e,2000e) 39
35-39 28 [2000e,2500e) 61
40-44 40 [2500e,3000e) 34
45-49 44 [3000e,3500e) 27
50-54 39 [3500e,4000e) 22
55-59 31 [4000e,∞e) 43
60-64 26
B.2.2 Scale Development
TABLE B.1: Multi-item scale on psychological effects
Taximeter
T1 I less enjoy being on the phone when costs are rising with every minute.
T2 Only if I don’t have to pay per minute I’m happy to use my phone.
T3 I don’t like when calling costs are rising every minute.
Insurance
I1 For the security that my costs will never exceed a predefined amount, I’m
willing to pay a bit more on average.
I2 Even though a tariff with cost ceiling is a little bit more expensive, I’m happy
as my costs will never exceed this cost ceiling.
I3 The assurance that my total bill will never exceed a certain amount is more
important to me than choosing the cheapest tariff.
Overestimation
O1 I can well imagine to call more than the average.
O2 The probability of calling more than expected is higher than calling less.
O3 The risk of calling more than average is higher than the risk of calling less
than average.
Flexibility
F1 It bothers me when the flat rate does not pay out in a month.
F2 It’s important to me to exhaust the flat rate.
F3 It’s important to me to call enough so that my tariff has paid off afterwards.
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TABLE B.2: Exploratory factor analysis: Pattern matrix
item
factor
Cronbach’s α
1 2 3 4
T1 0.7367 0.705
T2 0.4506
T3 0.6839
I1 0.3130 0.6511 0.755
I2 0.5980
I3 0.3261 0.6177
O1 0.6872 0.3472 0.852
O2 0.7072
O3 0.7537
F1 0.4447 0.567
F2 0.5751
F3 0.5738
Note: Values <0.3 suppressed, varimax rotation
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Experimental Instructions
Dear participant,
you will take part in an experiment designed for determining emotions. This ex-
periment will take about 1.5 hours. The data obtained during this experiment is
anonymized and will be used for scientific purposes only.
During the experiment your heart rate will be measured and recorded. Therefore, we
ask you politely to keep the hand that is attached to the equipment still during the
procedure.
During the experiment you can earn money. We guarantee a minimum payment of 5e
at the end of the experiment.
C.1 Procedure
General remarks In the course of the experiment you will make several telephone
calls to a hotline that gives out voucher codes to the callers. You can redeem your
voucher code right away and hereby earn money. Before you receive a valid voucher
code at the end of the call, you will be placed in the waiting loop first. From this time
on you will be charged connection costs.
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Preliminary information Previous to each call, you will receive a budget to cover
your expences. During a call the budget will be reduced by the connection costs. If the
budget exceeds the resulting connection costs you will get the difference as a payoff in
the end of the session. If the connection costs exceed your budget, the final payment at
the end of the session will be reduced by this negative amount. Previous to each call
your budget and the connection costs, which depend on the usage, will be displayed.
The duration of the call and the actual costs are not known in advance. You can make a
call by clicking on the button “Start call”. After this action the call will be established.
Waiting loop After the call is established you will be forwarded to a waiting line and
be put on hold. At this point of time you cannot terminate the call on your own. During
your call certain information will be displayed on your monitor:
On the top of your screen you will be informed about the number of your current call.
The elapsed time informs you about the time you have already spent in the waiting
loop. Your current budget is always determined for a certain call beforehand and does
not change over its duration. In contrast, the ongoing costs reflect the currently accumu-
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lated connection costs. Furthermore, the difference between your budget and ongoing
costs of the call is displayed as the current balance.
During the time in the waiting loop you will hear some background music. It will be
regularly interrupted by a notice, asking you to be patient for some more time. Addi-
tionally there will be an acoustic signal, notifying a rise in costs.
Voucher code After an indefinite period of time you will be released from the waiting
loop. You will then be shown a screen on which you have to enter the voucher code.
From this moment on there are no further connection costs for this call.
This screen shows information about your current total balance of the entire experi-
ment up to this point of time. In addition, the balance of the just terminated call is
displayed.
At that time you will also hear a recorded message with your voucher code. This code
has to be entered using the buttons numbered from one to nine. Your voucher is directly
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redeemed by clicking on a numbered button. If your input was correct, the value of the
voucher will immediately be added to your overall balance.
To conclude this call, press the button “Terminate call” which will appear subsequently.
After a pause of one minute the next call will be placed. During the entire experiment
a total number of eight calls will be established.
Finally, after conducting eight calls, we kindly ask you to answer a concluding ques-
tionnaire.
C.2 Payment
The payment after each call consists of two parts. First, you get 1.50e for each time
entering the correct voucher code. Second, you get the balance of your current call
added to you overall payment.
The balance is calculated as the difference between your budget for this call and the
ongoing costs of this call. In this experiment you will get a budget of 6.50e for each
call. The variable costs of a call are calculated in units of 30 seconds each. Thereby
you pay 1.29e for each unit of 30 seconds. Additionally, there is a varying cost cap,
which is assigned a value of 3.87e or 6.45e . This means you pay the variable costs of
1.29e per unit only until the cost cap is reached. As soon as your ongoing costs have
reached the cost cap, no further cost accrue. The beginning of a new 30 seconds unit
is communicated to you by an acoustic signal as well as by a red highlighting of the
displayed ongoing costs.
Example You are equipped with a cost cap of 3.87e. A call lasts 1 minute and 49
seconds and therefore consists of 4 commenced units of 30 seconds each. For the first
three units you pay 1.29e per unit. Afterwards the cost cap is in effect and as a result
you do not pay for the fourth unit. The balance of this call is calculated as follows:
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C.3 Concluding Remarks
Budget: 6.50e
Ongoing costs: 3x1.29e = 3.87e
Remaining balance: 6.50e - 3.87e = 2.63e
Assume you had an overall balance of 3.00e up to this call. After this call the remaining
balance of the call will be added to your overall payoff: 3.00e + 2.63e = 5.63e.
Entering the correct voucher code will add another 1.50e to you overall payoff.
Example (contd.) The voucher code in this round is seven, which is correctly provided
by you to the system. Afterwards, your overall payment is updated by adding 1.50e,
so that your current total balance is: 5.63e + 1.50e = 7.13e.
The remaining balance as well as the value of voucher is added to the overall payoff
after each call.
C.3 Concluding Remarks
At the beginning of the experiment a test call will be conducted. During this call you
should become acquainted with the experimental situation of a call. Payoffs of this
round are not taken into account in the final payment.
Afterwards there will be a rest period of 5 minutes, which is necessary for the phys-
iological measurement. Please relax and stay calm during this period. Focus on the
cross that is displayed on the screen. After 5 minutes have elapsed, the main part of the
experiment will start with the first of eight calls.
If you have any questions considering the procedure of this experiment, please remain
silent and signal to experiment supervisor. Please wait until the supervisor approaches
you and then ask your question as quietly as possible.
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Appendix C Experimental Instructions
Please use only your free hand to interact with the experimental system. The hand
connected to the measurement equipment has to be kept still during the whole experi-
ment. Try to avoid any kind of movement which could distort the measurement. Please
remain seated after the experiment has finished and wait until the supervisor has re-
moved the measurement electrodes. These instructions remain at your desk after the
experiment.
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Appendix D
Detailed Simulation Results
FIGURE D.1: Profit of 2PT under different usage prices and fixed fees
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Appendix D Detailed Simulation Results
FIGURE D.2: Profit of 3PTCC under different usage prices and fixed fees
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TABLE D.1: Optimal tariffs under monopoly with varying marginal costs
0¢ marginal costs PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
usage price ¢/min 11.90 21.20 6.49 6.48 7.01 7.02
fixed fee e 23.48 15.79 15.79 15.41 15.41
allowance min 0 0
cost cap e 40.32 61.98 62.03
profit e 5,181 7,304 6,148 7,987 7,987 8,163 8,163
consumer
share
% 84.52 39.89 80.59 39.35 39.37 39.52 39.50
total
consumption
104min 4.35 13.46 5.17 5.17 5.17 6.13 6.13
profit per
consumer
e/con 8.22 23.48 10.23 27.21 27.20 27.69 27.70
consumption
per consumer
min/con 69.05 449.68 97.45 175.97 176.07 208.04 207.93
1¢ marginal costs PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
usage price ¢/min 12.67 21.59 7.00 7.01 7.95 7.95
fixed fee e 24.04 15.57 15.56 14.69 14.70
allowance min 0 0
cost cap e 40.70 66.22 66.21
profit e 4,759 5,965 5,565 7.483 7,483 7,576 7,576
consumer
share
% 83.97 40.69 80.35 38.92 38.92 39.92 40.48
total
consumption
104min 4.08 13.33 5.81 4.94 4.94 5.75 5.75
profit per
consumer
e/con 7.60 19.65 9.28 25.77 25.77 25.85 25.90
consumption
per consumer
min/con 65.09 439.15 96.86 170.03 196.32 170.00 190.53
5¢ marginal costs PU FR 2PT 2PT 3PT 3PT 4PT
CC F A CC
usage price ¢/min 15.68 17.93 8.79 8.79 8.79 8.79
fixed fee e 36.14 14.38 14.38 14.38 14.38
allowance min 0 0
cost cap e 85.71 369.11 411.83
profit e 3,321 2,006 3,523 5,659 5,659 5,659 5,659
consumer
share
% 81.71 23.57 80.44 37.98 37.98 37.98 37.98
total
consumption
104min 3.11 8.70 3.99 4.18 4.18 4.18 4.18
profit per
consumer
e/con 5.45 11.41 5.87 19.97 19.97 19.97 19.97
consumption
per consumer
min/con 51.01 494.69 66.49 147.59 147.59 147.59 147.59
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Acronyms
2PTCC cost cap tariff 17
2PTF traditional two-part tariff 16
3PTA three-part tariff with allowance 19
3PTCC three-part tariff with cost cap 20
ADHRR average deceleratory heart rate response 128
BF Bayes factor 75
CC cost cap tariff 18
CS consumer surplus 24
DSL digital subscription line 88
ECG electrocardiogram 135
FR flat rate tariff 15
HF high-frequency 129
LF low-frequency 129
MAD mean absolute deviation 75
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Acronyms
MCMC Markov chain Monte Carlo 70, 74
MNL multinomial logit models 29
OLS ordinary least squares regression 54, 136
PB payback tariff 142
PU pay-per-use tariff 14
SD standard deviation 129
SLL simulated log likelihood 75
WTP willingness to pay 24
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